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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last five years, there is evidence of an emerging interest in the 
application of theories and approaches from social movement perspectives to Islamic 
movements in a broad sense. Such emerging research has mostly been undertaken in the 
Middle East and North Africa, but not in Southeast Asia. By applying the fundamentals 
of social movement theory i.e., political opportunity structure (POS), resource 
mobilisation theory and collective action frames, I will examine the emergence and the 
rise of the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesian politics. PKS emerged 
from quiet conversations among students in secular universities who subsequently 
transformed their activism into a political movement. PKS attracted public and scholarly 
attention since its success in increasing vote in by six hundred percent, from 1.4 percent 
in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004.  
I will demonstrate that social movement approach can shed important light on the 
dynamics of PKS. Results of this study suggest that PKS: (1) emerged from an array of 
tumultuous social and political conditions that gave rise a favourable political 
opportunity structure; (2) took advantage of expanding political opportunities by 
enhancing its resource mobilisation, including its organisational structures, cadres and 
recruitment, financial assets, and communication networks; and (3) consciously 
responded to the significant increase in political opportunities and its organisational 
capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values. 
 v 
In addition, I argue that PKS cannot be seen as merely a political party which 
only articulates its political agenda within the framework of institutionalised politics, but 
it also acts as a SMO, which vigorously engages in collective action. No other party is so 
active in mobilising their supporters on the streets. In this sub-thesis, I will examine the 
behaviour of PKS by employing protest-event analysis, which is commonly used in the 
tradition of social movement research. My study captured 225 PKS collective events as 
reported by Kompas, Republika, and the results suggest that PKS' collective actions have 
been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support 
for the Palestine cause. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously 
charged issues. It is true that anti-Israeli and America sentiments are widespread in 
Indonesian Muslim circles. Unlike PKS, however, other Muslim organisations' anti 
Israeli and America stance does not manifest in direct actions.  
By using timing and sequence indicators, I found that during election time in 
1999 and 2004, the number of PKS’ predecessor, PK and PKS collective actions 
declined significantly. Aside from the increasing participation of PKS in election 
process, this decrease of PKS actions at election time can be seen as a wish to avoid 
alienating voters by appearing militantly Islamic. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. 1. Background 
 After many years of authoritarian rule and hostility to political Islam1 under 
President Suharto, Indonesian Muslim activists now have the public space to 
develop and express their views. The resignation of Suharto on May 21, 1998 
created a window of opportunity for mushrooming Islamic activism2 in the 
country. Islamic activism takes a number of forms, but in this study I will 
concentrate on just two. The first is the (re)birth of Islamic political parties. 
Among 141 new political parties established shortly after the fall of Suharto, 42 
parties—nearly one-third—were Islamic, defined here “as parties that either 
explicitly claim Islam as their ideology or draw most of their support from Islamic 
organisations.”3 Twenty of the 42 parties that eventually contested in the 1999 
                                                
1The term ‘political Islam’ here refers to “Islam as political ideology rather than as a 
religious or theological construct.” See, Mohammad Ayoob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality”, 
in World Policy Journal; Fall 2004; 21, 3, p. 1. Similarly, Fuller uses the terms ‘political Islam’ and 
“Islamism’ synonymously to point to those Muslims who believe that “Islam as a body of faith has 
something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary 
Muslim World and who seek to implement this idea in some fashion.” See, Graham E. Fuller, The 
Future of Political Islam, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. xi.    
2It is important to bear in mind that I do not use the terms ‘political Islam’ and Islamic 
activism synonymously in this work. Borrowing from Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic activism is 
“the mobilisation of contention to support Muslim causes.” He preferred this broad definition to 
accommodate “the variety of contention that frequently emerges under the banner of “Islam,” 
including propagation movements, terrorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and 
identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state and inward-looking 
groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts.” See, Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2004, p. 2.        
3Anies Rasyid Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory,” in 
Asian Survey, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, Sept/Oct, 2004, p. 672. See also Arskal Salim, Partai Islam dan 
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elections were ‘Islamic.’ Given that only 24 political parties qualified to compete 
in the 2004 elections, the total number of Islamic parties involved in the last 
election declined sharply, to only 7 parties. 
Second, the post-Suharto era has also been marked by the proliferation of 
Islamic movements that run the gamut from violent to peaceful, from ‘democratic’ 
to anti-democratic.4 Among new Islamic movements that use violence to achieve 
their goals are the Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defenders’ Front or FPI), and 
Laskar Jihad (the Jihad Troops),5 to mention a few notorious groups. Although 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council) described 
itself as a non-violent organisation, the group does not repudiate the use of force. 
Hizbut Tahrir (the Party of Liberation) is a non-violent organisation, but it strongly 
opposes the notion of democracy and that of the nation-state.6  
There have been, often unstated, assumptions which have informed much 
of the discussion in the West regarding the distinction between Islamic political 
                                                                                                                                  
Relasi Agama-Negara, Pusat Penelitian IAIN Jakarta, 1999. However, out of 42 Islamic parties, 
only 20 Islamic parties qualified to compete in the 1999 elections. Moreover, out of these 20 
parties, only 10 Islamic parties gained one seat or more in the people’s Representative Council 
(DPR). They were PPP (58 Seats), PKB (51 Seats), PAN (34 Seats), PK (7 Seats), PNU (5 Seats), 
PP (1 Seat), PPII Masyumi (1 Seat), and PKU (1 Seat). Taken together, these Islamic parties gained 
37.5 percent of the votes (172 seats out of 462 seats). See, Agus Salim, “The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(1982-2004): Its Political Opportunity Structure, Resource Mobilisation, and Collective Action 
Frames,” unpublished M.A Thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, 2004, p. 2.  
4For a detailed account of the proliferation of radical Islam movements, see, for example, 
Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia, Teraju, 
Jakarta, 2002; Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, Rajawali 
Press, Jakarta, 2004.  
5Noorhaidi Hasan, “Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New 
Order Indonesia,” PhD Dissertation, Universiteit Utrecht, Netherland, 2005. A short version of this 
dissertation can be found in Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: The Rise of Laskar Jihad in the 
Era of Transition in Indonesia, Indonesia 73, (April 2002), 
6The most detailed account of the Hizb Tahrir in Indonesia can be found in Agus Salim, 
“The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir,” 2004.  
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parties and social movements. The former is defined as the confessional dimension 
of formal politics, while Islamic social movements entail non-formal politics. It 
has been argued that political parties are an inherent part of normal 
institutionalised politics, which include activities such as standing as political 
candidates, lobbying, legislating and the like. Jenkins and Klandermans, for 
instance, suggest that “social movements...constitute a potential rival to the politics 
from the political representation system.”7 Katzenstein points out that “students of 
social movements commonly associate institutionalisation [of politics] with 
demobilisation…Social movements...are necessarily extra-institutional.”8  
For this distinction to be valid, Islamic political parties would not mobilise 
their supporters or sympathisers in the streets or organise other kinds of extra-
institutional collective actions. Likewise, Hizbut Tahrir, MMI, FPI, and other 
Islamist groups are not allowed to use institutional methods in order to express 
their discontent. Thus, it is pertinent to ask: Can a social movement be clearly 
distinguished from a political party? Or, following Smith’s questions in regards to 
the relationship between “movement,” “political party,” and “mass public”: To 
what extent can a party be considered independent of the electoral forces which 
                                                
7J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest: 
Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1995, p. 5.    
8Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, “Stepsisters: Feminist Movements Activism in Different 
Institutional Spaces,” in David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, The Social Movement Society: 
Contentious Politics for a New Century, Rowman & Little field, Lanham: MD, 1998.     
 4 
back it? At what point can a social movement be said to exist and not just be an 
ephemeral social spasm?9           
Of the Islamic political parties in Indonesia that have used extra-
institutional actions to draw the attention of the public, the Prosperous Justice 
Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) is the only one which actively mobilises its 
sympathisers on the streets for non-electoral activities. In the wake of the war 
against terrorism declared by U.S. President George W. Bush after the September 
11 attacks, PKS has intensified its Islamist mobilisation, criticising American 
foreign policies towards the Muslim world. For instance, on April 17, 2005, more 
than 200,000 slogan-chanting protesters—the males in white Islamic attire, the 
females in headscarves—marched through the main streets of Jakarta and 
eventually converged upon the most protected site in the capital, the U.S. 
Embassy.10 Banners held aloft in the demonstration accused the U.S. and Israel of 
being “the real terrorists” and perpetrators of “state terrorism”.11 The most 
frequently referred to issue for PKS members is the Israeli occupation of Palestine, 
and they have often organised anti-Israeli and anti-America demonstrations. 
Generally speaking, PKS’ collective actions are carried out very peacefully.  
PKS is an unusual party in many respects. Unlike other political parties, 
PKS has gained public sympathy for mobilising its constituencies on a continual 
                                                
9Gordon Smith, “Social Movements and Party System in Western Europe,” in Martin 
Kolinsky and William E. Paterson, Social and Political Movements in Western Europe, ST 
Martin’s Press, New York, 1976, p. 331..  
10Sadanand Dhume, “Radicals March on Indonesia’s Future,” Far Eastern Economic 
Review, May Vol. 168, 2005.    
11Ibid.  
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basis and not just at election time, operating as a ‘cadre party’ which requires strict 
standards of training and behaviour for members, and assisting victims of natural 
disasters and poverty throughout Indonesia. An examination of the formation of 
PKS and its Islamist transnational framing will unveil the various factors behind 
its emergence and the process of its transformation from a social movement to a 
political party.  
 
1.2. The Research Question 
Two main questions underlie this study. The first is why and how did PKS 
emerge? To answer this question it is important to look at political processes and 
organisational factors that may constrain or facilitate the emergence of the party. 
All perspectives in the field of social movements emphasise theories of movement 
emergence.12  
The second is how does PKS provide clear messages of its ideology that 
resonate with its target audience? As is widely known, PKS has now built its 
image on a reputation for being the cleanest political party in Indonesian politics, 
with a record of social work, and the championing of Islamic causes. This study 
will investigate the extent to which non-Islamist issues such as fighting corruption 
drive its collective action. It also examines the extent to which the Islamist issues, 
                                                
12For a detailed account of the importance of movement emergence, see Doug McAdam, 
John D. Mc.Carthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Framing 
Processes: Toward a Synthetic, Comparative on Social Movements,” in Doug McAdam, John D. 
Mc.Carthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political 
Opportunities, Mobilising Structures, and Cultural Framings, Cambridge University Press, USA, 
1996.    
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including PKS’ efforts to address geographically distant issues, are visible in its 
collective action. The interplay between PKS’ ideology and its Islamist character 
form a major part of this sub-thesis.  
 
1.3. State of Current Research 
Learning from its experiences in the 1999 election, PKS achieved a 
considerable success in the 2004 election by campaigning on a ‘clean and caring’ 
image.  PKS has succeeded in avoiding other typical shortcomings of political 
parties in Indonesia such as inactive branches, internal fractiousness, clientelism 
and excessive dependence on charismatic leaders.13 Unlike other political parties 
that are derived from so-called ‘local traditions,’ PKS draws ideological influence 
from the Middle East, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Given its novelty in Indonesian politics, PKS is not surprisingly become 
the subject of a growing literature. The development of PKS and its remarkable 
achievements in the 2004 election as well as the party’s political behaviour have 
been interpreted in a variety of maya, many of them unflattering. From this 
literature we can extrapolate that there are two main approaches in the discussion 
of PKS: the first of these, which was written by journalists, can be described as a 
‘journalistic approach,’ the second, which was written by academic observers, 
might best be referred to as an ‘academic approach.’ Within both, we have critical 
                                                
13Amy McCreedy, “Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesian Islamic Politics,” Asia 
Program Special Report, April, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003.  For a 
detailed account of the pitfalls of Indonesian parties, especially Islamist parties, see Greg Fealy, 
“The Politics of Islam in Democratising Indonesia,” paper presented at conference, “Islam in 
Modern Indonesia,” US-Indonesia Society, Washington DC, February 7, 2002.  
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and sympathetic writings. Western journalists are more commonly critical such as 
Sadanand Dhume and Andrew Steele for what they saw as PKS’ hidden agenda to 
eventually push for the implementation of Islamic law in public life. They suggest 
that PKS is opportunistically using democratic political means to eventually hijack 
it when political power is in its hand. They saw that there is no significant 
difference between PKS and other Islamist groups. Dhume described it as an 
“evolutionary and gradual movement to the establishment of Islamic state.” In 
comparing its political ideals with the militant jihadist group Jemaah Islamiyyah 
(JI), he wrote:  
“Like JI, in its founding manifesto PKS calls for the creation of an Islamic 
caliphate. Like JI, it has placed secrecy-the cell structure both groups 
borrowed from the [Muslim] Brotherhood-at the heart of its organisation. 
Both offer a selective vision of modernity, one in which Western science 
and technology are welcome, but Western values are shunned”14  
 
The main difference between JI and PKS, Dhume added, is not of goals, 
but of methods. Similarly Steele warned Indonesians to take account of PKS’ 
hidden agenda to switch its focus from anti-corruption issues to a more 
fundamentalist direction.15  
Meanwhile, some academic observers are scholarly in tone and content, but 
they are often still critical of PKS. For example, Platzdasch’s study examines the 
nature and development of Islamism in Indonesia in the post Suharto era,16 
                                                
14Dhume, “Radicals March,” 2005, pp. 18-19.   
15Andrew Steele, “The Decline of Political Islam in Indonesia. Asia Times 
Online Ltd, Mar 28, 2006. Retrieved from 6 June 2008, from  http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ 
Southeast_Asia/ HC28Ae03.html  
16Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.  
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focusing on the PBB (Crescent Star Party), the PPP (United Development Party) 
and the PK (Justice Party). After a thorough consideration of the dynamics 
between ideological idealism and political pragmatism among Islamist parties, he 
concludes that pragmatism still prevails. Liddle and Mujani’s study of Islamist 
parties and democracy demonstrates that so far, PKS has exploited Islamist and 
non-Islamist issues or in the words of Liddle and Mujani, “the two-track strategy, 
expanding its cadre network through new recruitment from the universities while 
promoting its broader message through participation in national and local 
government.”17 However, Liddle and Mujani asserted that the double track 
strategy is not working well due to its own internal contradictions.   
Other scholars focus primarily on the influence of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood upon PKS. Damanik’s work on the phenomena of the PKS’ 
predecessor, PK, describes it as a political party which has its roots in a campus 
dakwah movement.18 He argues that the PKS’ transformation from a student 
movement into a political movement was facilitated by two global influences: the 
1979 Iranian revolution and the Brotherhood.19 He concluded that PKS is more 
influenced by the Brotherhood ideas and activism through the writings of the 
Brotherhood’s ideologues such as Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb than the 
events in Iran. Likewise, Bubalo and Fealy’s work on the influence of Middle 
                                                
17R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “Islamist Parties and Democracy: The Indonesian 
Case,” unpublished paper. I am grateful to William Liddle l and Saiful Mujani for bringing this 
paper to my attention.  
18The word ‘dakwah’ is derived from Arabic for someone who supports religious 
propagation, preaches, and spreads the religious understanding of Islamic teachings. Campus 
dakwah means a wide range of dakwah activities conducted by and for university students.   
19Damanik, Fenomena, 2002. 
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Eastern sources towards Islamist movements in Indonesia affirm that PKS was 
inspired by the Brotherhood. Given that PKS seeks to gain mass support from the 
public, Bubalo and Fealy see that its impact is larger than salafism or radical 
salafism.20 On the contrary, Furkon’s study reveals that the party cannot be seen as 
an offshoot of the Brotherhood.21 He argues that, unlike the Brotherhood’s over-
reliance on Al-Banna, the party has no charismatic leaders and its political views 
are in line with Islamic modernism.  
In the last few years, an emerging generation of Tarbiyah or PKS 
intellectuals has also contributed to the growing literature on PKS. Notable among 
these was Yon Machmudi, one of the people who founded the party. His study, 
extracted from his Ph.D. dissertation at the Australian National University (ANU), 
offers the term “global santri” to describe the characteristics of PKS supporters.22 
In his dissertation, Machmudi focuses on PKS origins, ideology and efforts to 
Islamise Indonesia. In contrast to the critical camp who frequently accuses PKS of 
bringing a hidden agenda to Islamise the country, he maintains the claim that 
“PKS has not tried to impose shariah but rather it has attempted to revise its image 
by focusing on the issues of prosperity and justice.”23 
Some scholars seem to be sympathetic to PKS despite the fact that they are 
not personally connected to PKS. For example, Nandang’s work, which was based 
                                                
20Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? Middle East, Islamism, and 
Indonesia, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australia, 2005.   
21Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum 
Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer, Teraju, Jakarta, 2004.  
22Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Wajah Baru Islam Politik Indonesia, 
Syaamil Cipta Media, Bandung, 2005.  
23Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.  
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on his master’s thesis at the University of Indonesia, relies heavily on the views of 
PKS predecessor, PK on the implementation of shari’a (Islamic law).24 He sees 
PK as a political vehicle for implementing shari’a within democratic processes. 
Similarly Firman’s study on PKS’ political thinking and behaviour asserts that 
PKS is moderate in nature. He argues that PKS operates within democratic 
constitutionalism, refutes the use of violence, uses a gradualist approach, and the 
like.25 In a similar vein, Elizabeth Collins sees PKS as “a moderate alternative to 
radical Islamism in Indonesia.”26  
Aside from the growing academic literature and journalistic writings on 
PKS based on scientific inquiry, there have been abundant non-scholarly writings 
on the party in the last few years. They were published for various reasons, 
including for propaganda or campaign or training purposes. Some of them were 
generally written by PKS key leaders and its sympathisers and were published by 
PKS-affiliated publishers.27 PKS has also published many compilations of the 
                                                
24Nandang Burhanuddin, Penegakan Syariat Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan, Al-Jannah 
Pustaka, Jakarta, 2004.  
25Firman Noor, “Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism.”: A Study of Political Thinking and 
Behavior of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1999-2005,” unpublished M.A. Thesis, Faculty of 
Asian Studies, ANU, 2006.    
26Elizabeth F Collins, “Islam is the Solution:” Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia, 
unpublished paper. Available at http://www.classic.ohio.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolutions.pdf.    
27For example, Abu Ridha, Negara & Cita-Cita Politik, Syaamil, Bandung, 2004; Abu 
Ridha, Saat Dakwah Memasuki Wilayah Politik, Syaamil, Bandung, 2003; Abu Ridha, Amal Siyasi 
Gerakan Politik Dalam Dakwah, Syaamil, Bandung, 2004; Abu Ridha, Islam dan Politik: 
Mungkinkah Bersatu? Syaamil, Bandung, 2004; Mahfudz Sidiq, Dakwah & Tarbiyah di Era 
Jamhariyah, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2002; Mahfudz Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan 
Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktivis Dakwah Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di tengah 
Krisis Nasional Multidimensi, Era Intermedia, Solo, 2003; Mahfudz Sidiq, Pemikiran dan Manhaj 
Politik Ikhwanul Muslimin, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2003; Andi Rahmat and Mukhammad 
Najib, Gerakan Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus, Purimedia, Surakarta, 2001; Hidayat Nurwahid 
and Untung Wahono, Pengaruh Sekularisasi dan Globalisasi Barat Terhadap Harakah Islamiyah 
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speeches and articles of its leaders, including the chairman of the PKS’ 
Consultative Council or Majelis Syuro, K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin,28 President of 
PKS, Tifatul Sembiring,29 the party’s general secretary, Anis Matta,30 and Sapto 
Waluyo.31  
Above all, the aforementioned studies, for the most part, remain isolated 
from the perspectives developed by social movement theories. I have presented 
briefly most literature describing the history of PKS, the influence of Middle 
Eastern sources and its political stance in contemporary Indonesian politics. This 
study seeks to build on the available literature by engaging in further research 
according to the traditions of social movement research.  
 
1.4. Significance of the Study 
Much has been written about PKS and its tendency to be more moderate 
and democratic than many other parties in the political and religious domains, but 
little attention has been given to the party from the perspective of social movement 
theories. It is regrettable that many students of Islamic activism and those of 
political Islam have apparently ignored new developments in research on 
collective action and contentious politics that could provide a theoretical basis 
                                                                                                                                  
di Indonesia. Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2001; Muzammil Yusuf, Isu Besar Dakwah dalam 
Pemilu, PT Syaamil Cipta Media and DPP PKS, 2003.   
28K.H Hilmi Aminuddin, Bingkai Dakwah di Jalur Politik, Arah Press, Jakarta, 2008.  
29Tifatul Sembiring, Dakwah adalah Perubahan ke Arah yang Lebih Baik, Arah Press and 
DPP PKS, Jakarta, 2008.   
30Anis Matta, Integrasi Politik dan Dakwah, Sekjen Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah and Arah 
Press, Jakarta, 2008.  
31Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah, 2005. This volume is basically a compilation of 
his articles published mostly by the Islamic magazine SAKSI from 2002-2004. 
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relevant to understanding the Islamist movement.32 This is all the more surprising 
given the pivotal importance of collective action theory in explaining the 
interaction between social movements, the state, and the mass public in the 
contemporary world. This theoretical approach has gained popularity among 
scholars in North America, Western Europe and Latin America, but has been little 
applied in Southeast Asia. The development of a social movement approach in the 
contemporary perspective of conventional social sciences can be useful to 
illuminate various aspects of Islamist movements such as their methods of 
financing and recruitment, the political dimensions of Islamist activities and how 
their ideologies and theological origins influence the formation of their collective 
action frames.   
Aside from the reluctance of scholars of Islamic activism to show much 
interest in social movement theories, the relatively small number of studies on 
Islamism from the perspective of social movement studies is due to the fact that 
most students of collective action and contentious politics tend to draw their 
research from many secular and religious social movements in the West, and not 
from Islamist mobilisation.33 In other words, the lack of integration of Islamic 
movement studies into the mainstream of social movement theory reflects the 
reluctance on the part of students of social movements to include them. McAdam, 
                                                
32See, for instance, Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004, p. 3. See also, Asef Bayat, 
“Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 6. pp. 891-908, 
2005.    
33Philip W. Sutton and Stephen Vertigans, “Islamic ‘New Social Movements’? Radical 
Islam, al-Qaeda, and Social Movement Theory,” in Mobilisation: An International Journal 11 (1), 
p. 101.  
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McCarty and Zald’s (1996) collection, for instance, focuses specifically on secular 
movements.34 Zald and McCarthy’s (1987) compilation includes religiously social 
movements, but only those in the Western tradition.35 Similarly, the recent volume 
of Davis and his colleagues (2005) has no indexed references to Islam or Islamic 
movements but their list of representative social movement organisations does not 
mention Islamic movements.36   
It comes as no surprise, as Kurzman notes, that “Over the past generation, 
the fields of social movement theory and Islamic studies have followed parallel 
trajectories, with few glances across the chasm that has separated them.”37 Indeed, 
there is evidence of a new interest in looking at Islamism with regard to the 
emergence of new social movements in the globalised world. This new interest has 
much to do with the proliferation of transnational movements and the 
intensification of globalisation.38 Tarrow’s (1998) book, for instance, rightly 
classified Islamic fundamentalism as one of three transnational social 
movements,39 but he does not explore the characterization in detail. It is true that 
                                                
34McAdam, Mc.Carthy, and Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives, 1996.    
35Mayer N Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in An Organizational 
Society, Transaction Inc., New Brunswick: New Jersey, 1987.  
36Gerald F Davis, et al., Social Movements and Organization Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2005.  
37Charles Kurzman, “Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies,” in Wiktorowicz 
(ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004, p. 289.  
38For instance, Paul Lubeck, “The Islamic Revival: Antinomies of Islamic Movements 
under Globalisation,” in R. Cohen and S.M. Rai, Global Social Movement, Athlone Press, 
Brunswick: NJ, 2000.   
39Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998.   
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Tarrow’s recent work (2005)40 contains many more indexed references to Islamic 
movements, such as Jamaat al-Islami, but he tends to define largely Islamic 
transnational movements as violent, which is a result of what Tarrow has termed 
‘Qutb, al-Mawdudi and Khomeini’s political Islamism’ such as jihad, suicide 
bombings, and al-Qaeda. Also, the McAdam and Snow collection (2003) includes 
just one selection on Islam, that is, Kurzman’s analysis of the 1979 Iranian 
revolution which uses political opportunity structures.41  
Above all, however, Islamism has been isolated from the mode of inquiry 
developed by social movement theories in the West. According to Bayat, this 
isolation is more a consequence of ‘modernist’ interpretations that portray 
Islamism “as reactive movements carried by traditional people, the intellectuals, 
and the urban poor, against Western-style modernisation.”42 The modernist 
framework is then divided into two43: The first group, on the right, the “clash of 
civilisations” camp, asserts that Islamism is anti-democratic and regressive in 
character. This group is best represented by Bernard Lewis,44 Elie Kedourie,45 and 
                                                
40Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2005.  
41Doug McAdam and David Snow (eds.), Social Movements: Readings on Their 
Emergence, Mobilisation, and Dynamics, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 1997. 
Kurzman’s article in the collection was initially published by the American Sociological Review; 
see Charles Kurzman, “Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunities in Social Movement 
Theory: Evidence from the Iranian Revolution of 1979,” American Sociological Review 61, 1994, 
pp. 153-170. 
42Bayat, “Islamism,” 2005, p. 894.  
43Ibid.  
44See, for example, Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong, Phoenix, London, 2002; Lewis, 
“Roots of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly, September, 1990.   
45Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture, Frank Cass, Portland, 1994.  
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Samuel P. Huntington.46 The second group, on the left, accuses religious 
movements, including Islamism, of being regressive utopian and anti-movement.47 
This camp is represented by respected collective action theorists, Albert Melucci 
and Alain Touraine.  For Melucci, Islamism is a kind of religious movement, 
defining its identity “in terms of the past drawing on [the] totalizing myth of 
rebirth which is often at least quasi-religious in content.”48 “Totalising monism,” 
he believes, “is the central distinguishing feature of regressive Utopianism.”49 In 
turn, as Touraine has stated, within social movements there must exist ‘positive’ 
and ‘progressive’ ideas, so distinguishing them from religious movements, which 
do not have such notions.50               
Recent attempts by scholars such as Carrie Wickham, Quintan 
Wiktorowicz, and Diane Singerman, to bring Islamic activism into the realm of 
collective action theory must be noted. In so doing, the integration of religious 
movements, particularly Islamism, within collective action theory can be pursued. 
Further, this inclusion of Islamism does not only relate to the presence of 
                                                
46Suggesting the West is “unique”, Huntington points out the Western Christianity is the 
single most important historical characteristic of Western civilization, while “Islam is still bound to 
the idea that church and the state are one; in essence, God is Caesar”. Huntington and his 
counterpart see the root cause of the democracy predicament in the majority Muslim countries as 
lying in Islamic traditions. Islam suffers from the poverty of civil society, the lack of civil liberties, 
and is more largely associated with “a spirit of collectivism” than with individualistic values. For 
the Western world, however, this individualism has played a vital role in developing liberal 
democracy. For more discussion, see Samuel. P. Huntington, “The West: Unique, Not Universal,” 
Foreign Affairs, New York, Nov/Dec. volume 75, issue 6, 1996b: 31; Huntington, The Clash of 
Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996a. 
47Bayat, “Islamism,” 2005, p. 894.  
48Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 104.  
49Ibid. As also quoted by Bayat, “Islamism,” p. 894. 
50 Bayat, “Islamism,” 2005, p. 894.  
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transnational movements largely associated with violent actions, such as Al-
Qaeda, but also draws on various aspects of Islamism (i.e. ideology, 
characteristics, mobilisation and female participation). In the last five years there 
has been evidence of an emerging interest in the application of theories and 
approaches from social movement perspectives to Islamic movements in a broad 
sense.51 Nonetheless, such emerging research has mostly been undertaken in the 
Middle East and North Africa, particularly in Egypt,52 Algeria,53 Palestine,54 
Iran,55 Turkey,56 and Yemen.57  
                                                
51Among others, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilising Islam: Religion, Activism, and 
Political Change in Egypt, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002; Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(ed.), Islamic Activism; A Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective 
Action Theory,” in Sociological Theory, 22 (1) 2004, pp. 26-37, Charles Kurzman, “Structural 
Opportunities and Perceived Opportunities in Social Movement Theory: Evidence from the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979,” American Sociological Review 61, 1994, pp. 153-170; Charles Kurzman, 
“Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies,” to mention a few important works on Islamism 
and social movement studies.        
52Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilising Islam; Diane Singerman, Avenues of 
Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton: NJ, 1995; see also, James Toth, “Islamism in Southern Egypt: A Case Study of a 
Radical Religious Movement,” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 35 (2003), 547-
572; Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilisation: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood,” in The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 42, Number 4, pages 487-510; Mohammed M. 
Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement,” in 
Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004.       
53Mohammed M. Hafiz, “From Marginalization to Massacre: A Political Process 
Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004; Rick 
Fantasia and Eric L. Hirsch, “Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and Transformation of the 
Veil in the Algerian Revolution, “ in Bert Klandermans and Hank Johnston, Social Movement and 
Culture, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1995.  
54Marwan Khawaja, “Resource Mobilisation, Hardship, and Popular Collective Action in 
the West Bank,” in Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 1. (Sep., 1994), pp. 191-220; Glenn E. Robinson, 
“Hamas as Social Movement,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004. 
55Benyamin Smith, “Collective Action with and without Islam, Mobilising the Bazaar in 
Iran,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2005; Kurzman, “Structural Opportunities and 
Perceived Opportunities,” 1994.  
56Cihan Z. Tugal, “The Appeal of Islamic Politics: Ritual and Dialogue in a Poor District 
of Turkey,” in The Sociological Quarterly, 47 (2006) 245-273; M. Hakan Yavuz, “Opportunity 
Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004.     
57Janine Clark, “Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social 
Institutions and the Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen,” in Comparative Political Studies, 
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Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the study of Islamist 
movements that employ social movement theory in Southeast Asia.58 As is widely 
known, Muslims constitute the largest religious community in contemporary 
Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia. An estimated 207 million or 45 per cent 
of the sub-continent’s 470 million inhabitants are Muslim.59 Of these, 90 per cent 
live in Indonesia, which makes Indonesia the most populous Muslim country in 
the world. Indeed the characteristics of Islam in Indonesia in particular, and 
Southeast Asia in general, are among the least Arabized forms of Islam. This is 
partly the result of its geographical location, with Southeast Asia being situated far 
from the Middle East. Apart from this, many scholars argue that the different 
characteristics of Islam in Southeast Asia are largely the result of a process of 
Islamisation that was generally peaceful, gradual, and most importantly, adaptive 
to local traditions.60 
In recent years, however, many observers have commented that Southeast 
Asia is starting to seem like the new home base for radical Islamist groups such as 
                                                                                                                                  
Vol. 37, No. 8, October 2004, pp. 941-968; Janine Clark, “Islamist Women in Yemen: Informal 
Nodes of Activism,” in Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004; Jillian Schwedler, “The Islah 
Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a Transitional Party,” in 
Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism, 2004.    
58To my knowledge, only a very few studies on Islamism use social movement theories 
have been made in the region. Among others, see Agus Salim, “The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir (1982-
2004), ” 2005. 
59Greg Fealy, “Islamisation and Politics in Southeast Asia: The Constrasting Cases of 
Malaysia and Indonesia,” in Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns (eds.), Islam in World Politics, 
Routledge, London and New York, 2005, p. 153. 
60Azyumardi Azra, “Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism,” paper presented 
at Miegunyah Public Lecture, the University of Melbourne, 6 April 2005, p. 2.  
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Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) and the like.61 
Interestingly, the Islamist movements in the region are not only represented by 
radical groups, but also by moderate ones too. PKS, for instance, is described by 
many as a moderate Islamism because the party consistently abides by democratic 
process and does not use violence to achieve its goals.62 In the light of the very 
small number of studies on Islamism in the region using the social movement 
theory approach, this study endeavours to use this approach to convey a better 
understanding of Islamism in Indonesia.  
 
1.5. Theoretical Framework  
1.5.1. Social Movement Integrated Approach 
I have indicated the emerging consensus among students of social 
movements regarding the importance of three factors: political opportunities, 
mobilising structures or resource mobilisation and framing processes. In the social 
movement research tradition, virtually all perspectives in the discipline are, first 
and foremost, theories of movement emergence.63 The primary concern is with 
understanding: (1) the origin of certain social movements and the factors and 
processes that may shape or explain the emergence of the movement; and (2) the 
                                                
61John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, 
Vol. 81, Iss. 4., 2002.  
62Among others, see, Firman Noor, “Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism,” 2006; Elizabeth 
F. Collins, “Islam is the Solution.”   
63McAdam, McCarthy, and N. Zald, “Introduction,” in McAdam, McCarthy, and N. Zald, 
(eds), Comparative Perspectives, 1996, p. 7.  
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extent and form of the movement in its ongoing development.64 Previously, each 
intellectual trend was more likely to focus on only one aspect of a movement. For 
example, the proponents of resource mobilisation stress the significance of the 
organisational dynamics of collective action while advocates of collective action 
frames criticise resource mobilisation and political opportunity theories for 
rendering too much attention on organisational and political terms, and 
accordingly neglecting the importance of the social construction of ideas.  
For the purposes of this analysis, I will neither discuss each factor 
separately nor give added weight to one particular aspect of a movement. Rather, 
these three emerging trends in the study of social movements are treated equally in 
an integrated rather than fragmented fashion (See figure 1).65 According to 
Lichbach, the three main perspectives are a mixture of the study of “conditions” 
and “norms” as well as “means” of collective action.66 McAdam and his 
collaborators identified three interrelated factors, they are: environmental, 
relational, and cognitive mechanisms.67 The key reason for investigating the 
“conditions” or the environmental mechanism is that the prospects of movement 
activists for advancing particular claims, mobilising supporters, and affecting 
                                                
64Ibid.  
65For a more detailed account of the discussion for synthesis of the three perspectives see, 
Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “Toward an Integrated perspective on Social 
Movements and Revolution,” in March Irving Lichbach and Aland S. Zuckerman (eds.), 
Comparative Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997; see also, McAdam, 
McCarthy, and Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives, 1996. 
66Mark Irving Lichbach, “Rethinking Rationality and Rebellion: Theories of Collective 
Action and Problems of Collective Dissent,” Rationality and Socieity 6, January 1994:8-39 as cited 
by Mc Adam, Tarrow and Tilly, “Toward an Integrated Perspective,” Ibid., p. 144. 
67Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2001, pp. 25-26. 
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influence are context-dependent.68 It focuses extensively on external factors that 
affect actors’ capacities to bring about change.69 It has come to be known as the 
political opportunity structure which stresses the significance of expanding 
political opportunities when the state is vulnerable that allows for the instigation of 
social movements.70  
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that political opportunities 
alone do not make a movement. As claimed by McAdam and Snow, “the most 
facilitative political environment only creates a certain structural potential for 
collective action.”71 When sufficient organisations and networks are absent among 
the aggrieved group, the political potential is unlikely to be realized. Accordingly, 
the study of “means” or the relational mechanism is crucial for activists, to provide 
the supportive infrastructure they require for collective action. There are at least 
three aspects of this infrastructure that are especially critical: a membership base, a 
                                                
68David S. Meyer, “Protest and Political Opportunities,” in Annual Review of Sociology, 
30, 2004, p. 126.   
69John. L. Campbell, “Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanism in Organizations and 
Social Movements Research,” in Davis, et al., Social Movements and Organization Theory, 2005, 
p. 43.    
70The first explicit use of a “political opportunity” perspective was Eisinger (1973). In an 
attempt to explain why some cities in the U.S. witnessed extensive riots about race and poverty in 
the late 1960s while others did not. In order to analyze the case, he focused on the openness of 
urban authorities to more political inputs. See, Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest 
Behavior in American Cities,” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Mar., 1973), 
pp. 11-28. Building upon Eisinger’s work, Tilly provided the beginning of a more comprehensive 
framework on the political opportunity structure. See, Charles Tilly, From Mobilisation to 
Revolution, Addison-Wesley, Reading: MA, 1978.  
71McAdam and Snow, “Conditions of Organisation: Facilitative Context,” in McAdam 
and Snow (eds.), Social Movements, 1997, p. 80.  
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communication network and leaders.72 The study of means has come to be known 
as resource mobilisation73 or mobilising structure approaches.  
Finally, within the social movement approach there is an investigation into 
the norms or cognitive mechanisms that deal with shared ideas and interests or 
what students of social movement call “collective action frames.” Frames are 
interpretative schemata that ‘’enable participants to locate, perceive, and label 
occurrences.”74 In other words, frames indicate what “to look at, what is important, 
and thereby indicate what is going on.”75 Thus, mobilising ideas and beliefs is seen 
as important as the resource acquisition and deployment activities of movement 
vehicles and the waning of political opportunity processes.  
Figure 1: Social Movement Integrated Approach76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
72Ibid.  
73This framework is strongly influenced by rational choice theory. This perspective adopts 
as one of its underlying problems, that of American economist Mancur Olson’s (1968) “free-rider.” 
McCarthy and Zald then offer an answer by introducing the perspective of resource mobilisation 
which focuses on means available to the actors of social movements. 
74David A. Snow, D.A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, Robert D. Benford, 
“Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-mobilisation, and Movement Participation,” in McAdam and 
Snow (eds.), Social Movements, 1997, p. 235. 
75Hank Johnston, “Verification and Proof in Frame and Discourse Analysis,” in Bert 
Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg (eds.), Methods of Social Movement Research, University 
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2002, p. 64.  
76Adapted from Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir,” 2005, p. 18.  
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Based on the above integrated perspective on social movement, I will show 
that PKS: (1) emerged from an array of tumultuous social and political conditions 
that gave rise to a favourable political opportunity structure; (2) was able to take 
advantage of conducive social and political opportunities by enhancing its 
resources mobilisation, including its organisational resources and networks, to 
support the sustainability of the movement; and (3) consciously responded to the 
significant increase in political opportunities and its infrastructural capacities to 
mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values. 
 
1.5.2 Islamist Transnational Framing 
 As noted earlier, this study will also seek to grapple with the PKS’ 
contentious actions on the Palestinian issue and its attachment to Islamic causes in 
general.  Sceptics may ask: what is new and different about PKS’ protest of the 
Iraq war in particular, and anti-Americanism in general? Accordingly, this study 
will emphasise the international contexts of political opportunities that have 
facilitated the rise of PKS. The structure of political opportunities that supported 
the emergence of the party is not mutually exclusive in terms of domestic political 
institutions and processes.77  
In addition, this sub-thesis introduces the notion of Islamist transnational 
framing. The term frame is rooted in the study of communicative interaction. 
                                                
77McAdam introduced the term ‘international context of political opportunities’ as 
opposed to the tendency among social movement scholars to reveal unintentionally a state-centered 
or closed-polity bias as if it is “the structure of political opportunities almost exclusively in terms of 
domestic political institutions and processes.” See, McAdam, “Conceptual Origins,“in McAdam, 
Mc.Carthy, and Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives, 1996, p. 34. 
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Gregory Bateson introduces the idea of a frame as a meta-communicative device 
that sets parameters for ‘what is going on.’78 He demonstrates that the interaction 
of individuals always involves an interpretative framework in order to ascertain 
how the actions and words of others should be understood.79  Drawing upon 
Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis (1972) and Forms of Talk (1981), Gamson, 
Fireman, and Rytina introduce the notion of an injustice frame in the study of 
collective action.80 In short, frames are to denote “schemata of interpretation” that 
enable individuals to legitimate and motivate collective action.”81 There is an 
isomorphic relationship between participants of a movement and a movement 
organisation. On the one hand, movements are seen as carriers and transmitters of 
beliefs and ideas. On the other hand, “they also actively engaged in the production 
of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers.”82 Movements can thus be 
regarded as signifying agents involved in actively shaping and structuring existing 
meanings.  
What I am offering by introducing the idea of Islamist transnational 
framing is the notion of an Islamic identity that transcends geographical boarders. 
Most Islamist movements take advantage of the concept of umma (community of 
                                                
78Pamela E. Oliver and Hank Johnston, “What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in 
Social Movement Research,” in Mobilisation: An International Journal, 2000, 4 (1), p. 40.   
79Ibid.; See also, Hank Johnston, “Verification,” 2002, p. 63.  
80For a detailed discussion, see William A Gamson, Bruce Fireman, and Steven Rytina, 
Encounters with Unjust Authority, Dorsey, Homewood, III, 1982.  
81See, Snow, Rochford, Jr., Worden, Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes,” 1997, p. 
235.   
82David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilisation,” in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriese, and Sydney Tarrow (eds.), International 
Social Movement Research, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action, Comparing Social Movement 
Research Across Cultures, JAI Press, Greenwich: CT, 1988, p. 198.  
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believers) embodied in the long history of Islam as a means of religious 
propaganda to appeal to Muslims throughout the world. To solidify the 
relationship between Muslim countries with different nationalities and races, a 
religious identity should be strengthened. In practice, however, the Islamic identity 
or umma has contested meanings, “relying on discrete political, social, and 
economic contexts in which particular Islamic identities have been forged.”83  
What is important to understand regarding Islamist transnational framing, 
is the dialectical relationship between the consciousness of ‘imagined’ umma and 
transnational framing. However, even while Islamist transnational activists make 
transnational claims, they still draw on the political opportunities, resource 
mobilisation, and networks of the country in which they live.84  PKS’ collective 
action has used an Islamist transnational framing derived heavily from the Middle 
East. It is thus hardly surprising that the party has similarities with a number of the 
region’s other social movement organisations. For instance, PKS’ cultural 
framings on Palestine and its beliefs in a Jewish conspiracy are virtually the same 
as those of Hamas in Palestine.85 As will be further explained in the following 
chapter, this study will offer four elements related to the concept of Islamist 
                                                
83Jillian Schwedler, “Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace, or Mobiliser,” in SAIS Review, Vol. 
21, Iss.2. Washington, 2001, p. 6.  
84Tarrow identified this point as ‘a characteristic of transnational activism,’ The New 
Transnational Activism, 2005,  p. 2. 
85For a detailed account of Hamas as a social movement, see Glenn E Robinson, “Hamas 
as Social Movement,” in Wictorowics, Islamic Activism, 2004. Meanwhile, for detailed examples 
of how the belief in the Jewish conspiracy, see Al-Muzammil Yusuf, “Hizbus Syaithan,” in Irwan 
Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2002; Irwan Prayitno, “Yahudi Sebagai Hizbus Syaithan,” in Prayitno, 
Kepribadian Dai, 2002; Irwan Prayitno, “IMF Perpanjangan;” in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2002, 
Abu Ridha, Apakah Terorisme Itu, 2001.     
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transnational framing: (1) Islam is the solution; (2) Islam is under siege by the 
West; (3) Jewish Conspiracy; and (4) Global umma.  
 
1.6. Methodology 
This study relies on two main sources of investigation: library research and 
fieldwork. The library research was conducted by surveying a number of relevant 
books, articles, research reports, journals, thesis, dissertation, and the like. Aside 
from that, the library research was undertaken by exploration of electronic (the 
Internet) and printed media (newspapers, magazines) pertinent to the subject of 
this study.  
Another main source of information was field research. Field work was 
conducted in Jakarta, and in a number of PKS political strongholds in Depok, 
Bekasi, and Tangerang. Field work was crucial in order to obtain important 
materials. During my field research, I obtained documentary evidence found in 
PKS’ archive, including records of party congresses and official statements by 
party boards, PKS journals, bulletins, books and pamphlets available at the party’s 
branches.  
Thus, this study used the following research techniques by benefiting 
materials obtained during my field research in Indonesia. 
1.  The Large-N, National-Level Analysis  
I took advantage of the large-N, national-level analysis by employing 
protest-event which is frequently used in social movement research. I used this 
method in order to see the general pattern of PKS’ collective action in Indonesia 
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i.e. to answer these questions: When the PKS’ action takes place? This is to 
develop information on the timing and sequences of collective action in regard to 
political opportunity structures. What forms of the party’s action has it primarily 
taken?  What issues or claims has it raised? How many participants are being 
involved in the action? Where the action takes place?  
Accordingly, during my two-month fieldwork in Indonesia, I relied on two 
national dailies, Kompas and Republika, in order to collect data on PKS’ collective 
actions as a basis of the large-N, national-level analysis. This covered a span of 27 
years (1980-2007).  Why a span of 27 years and why Kompas and Republika?  
This time-period allows me to see the variance since the emergence of the campus 
dakwah movement in the late 1970s, which led to the formation of KAMMI during 
Suharto’s authoritarianism (1980-1998) and the birth of PK, now known as PKS, 
as the movement’s political vehicle in the-post Suharto era (1998-2007). 
I selected Kompas and Republika because both are nation-wide. Kompas is 
the most appropriate and most widely journal of record in the country. Republika 
was established in the 1990s. Nonetheless, Republika was selected because the 
newspaper is seen by many as a voice of Muslims. Not surprisingly, Republika 
seems to cover a broader range of PKS’ collective actions rather than Kompas, 
which includes the party’s tendency to address a broad range of Islamist issues and 
international Islamism.  To confirm the validity of the data and to capture PKS’ 
collective actions that were not reported by Kompas and Republika, I also referred 
to other national and regional dailies and their electronic archives 
2.  Interviews 
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 I conducted in-depth interviews and informal conversations with PKS key 
leaders, the Majelis Syura, rank and file members, parliamentarians, and protest 
participants. Regarding the process of interview, I used a semi-structured format. 
That is, I had certain core topics that I wanted to address in each interview, but I 
was also flexible in responding to specific cases of each of the respondents. 
Accordingly, in order to facilitate this process, I employed an open-ended 
approach. To appropriately investigate the key areas raised in the interview, I paid 
attention to what the large-N analysis tells us about the general pattern of PKS’ 
collective actions.   
3.  Direct, Close Observation 
During my field research in Indonesia, I also conducted observations of 
relevant events involving the PKS such as Jakarta local elections (campaign, 
elections), ‘1 Dollar Movement for Palestine’ and other PKS’ protest actions 
which occured during my field work. I visited DPP PKS, the University of 
Indonesia’s (UI) LDK, Al-Azhar, etc. In order to enrich the observation, I also 
attended seminars, public speeches, public sermons, Friday prayers, discussions, 
etc that were related to the subject under investigation.   
 
1.7 Outline of the Report 
Chapter 1 explains the background of PKS and its collective actions. The 
background then raises research questions that this work will address. It discusses 
existing theoretical explanations based on abundant writings about PKS in the last 
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few years. This chapter presents the importance of this study as well as explaining 
social movement integrated approach employed in this study   
Chapter 2 describes PKS as a political party, which presents itself as a 
force of collective action by functioning as a social movement organisation. It 
explains the origins of PKS which can be found in the dakwah movement in the 
late 1970s. Meanwhile Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of PKS collective 
events as recorded by mass media. This chapter relies primarily on protest event 
analysis which is commonly used in social movement research. 
The socio-political context of the emergence of PKS will be examined in 
Chapter 4. This chapter describes the origins of PKS during Suharto’s 
authoritarianism and its development in post-Suharto Indonesia. It also discusses 
international influences that help to explain the emergence of PKS.  
Chapter 5 explores various means of mobilisation that shape the emergence 
of PKS and its collective action. This chapter focuses on the importance of PKS 
organisational structures, from leaders, cadres and recruitment channel, networks, 
and financial assets. Chapter 6 analyses PKS’ framing process explaining the 
content of its ideology and its Islamist transnational framing and how this message 
is transmitted through a number of media networks. The last chapter ends with a 
summary of the whole discussion in regards to the research questions.   
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CHAPTER 2 
PKS AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANISATION 
 
 
To better understand PKS, it is necessary to look at the history of its 
emergence. Like other Indonesian Islamist movements formed in the early 1980s 
that drew inspiration from the Middle East, PKS emerged from quiet discussions 
among students in many secular universities who subsequently transformed their 
activism into a political movement. PKS emerged out of an Islamist movement and 
it still relies on the ‘movement’ aspect of its character by taking advantage of its 
capacity and resources to mobilise huge rallies.  
This chapter will describe the emergence of PKS. In the first part of this 
chapter, I will present the three phases of its emergence in an attempt to show that 
entering institutionalised politics was a key aim of the movement. The first is that 
phase of campus dakwah or predication movement; the second is that of instituting 
a student movement; and the third is that of a political movement. In addition, I 
will also highlight the party’s strategy of pursuing Islamism. Analysis of PKS’ 
from social movement organisation to political party will be developed in the last 
part of this chapter. 
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2.1. Three Phases of PKS’ Emergence 
2.1.1. Campus Dakwah Movement 
The origins of the PKS can be found in the so-called campus dakwah 
movement.1 The campus dakwah involves a wide range of propagation activities 
conducted by and for university students. Briefly, the emergence of the campus 
dakwah itself can be explained as a reaction to Suharto’s hostility towards and 
repression of political Islam, which became apparent shortly after he took power. 
Suharto’s New Order was reluctant to rehabilitate the largest pre-New Order 
Islamic political party, Masyumi, which was banned by the Sukarno regime in 
1960 and whose primary objective was to establish an Islamic state. Instead, 
Suharto permitted the formation of a new party, Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim 
Party) to cater to Masyumi’s constituency, but prohibited Masyumi leaders from 
leading it.  
 Realising that the Suharto regime was still hostile to ideas of political 
Islam, former prominent Masyumi leaders, headed by Mohammed Natsir, 
established the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council 
for Islamic Preaching) in 1967. This dakwah council initially focused on a serious 
attempt to conduct Islamic propagation among Indonesian Muslims in response to 
                                                
1Dakwah literally means ‘call’ to Islam or religious propagation to revive faith or to 
protect Islamic society from immorality. Broadly speaking, dakwah is proselytising, missionary 
work, or means of propagating ad-din (religion). The activists of dakwah are called du’ah (plural 
form of da’i). This word is derived from Arabic for someone who supports religious propagation, 
preaches, and spreads the religious understanding of Islamic teachings.  
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Christian missionary efforts throughout the country.2 Subsequently, DDII also 
responded to perceived threats from the so-called Cultural or liberal-minded 
Muslims.3 The main aim of Cultural Islam was to reject much of the political 
Islamic agenda, to redefine the relation between state and religion and to propose 
tolerance between religions.4 On the contrary, DDII was a vocal proponent of 
political Islam repeatedly arguing that Islam is not only a religious or theological 
construct, but also a political ideology. 
 Driven by its religio-political agenda, but confronted by the regime’s 
intolerance of political Islam and Cultural Islam’s refutation of the DDII’s ideas, 
this dakwah council tried to revitalise dakwah by “creating” a subtle and fluid 
social movement on campuses. This movement was relatively impervious to state 
control and took advantage of campus mosques as the base camp of its Islamic 
social movement in secular universities.5 The leading figures of DDII deliberately 
targeted students of secular universities in order to resist the influence of thoughts 
espoused by supporters of Cultural Islam.  
 In doing so, in late 1967, DDII began to promote campus mosque-based 
Islamic study groups at the University of Indonesia, at Surabaya’s Airlangga 
                                                
2Burhanuddin, “The Conspiracy of Jews: The Quest for Anti-Semitism in Media 
Dakwah,” Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 5: 2 (2007), p. 55. See also, Martin van 
Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,’ Southeast Asia 
Research, 10, 2 (2002), pp. 122-23. 
3Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,’ Southeast 
Asia Research, 10, 2 (2002), p. 127.  
4Greg Fealy, “Divided Majority: The Limits of Political Islam in Indonesia,” in S 
Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (eds), Islam and Political Legitimacy in Asia, Routledge Curzon, 
London, 2003, p. 12.   
5Yudi Latif, “The Rupture of Young Muslim Intelligentsia in the Modernization of 
Indonesia,” Studia Islamika, Vol 12, Number 3, 2005, p. 391.  
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University, at Yogyakarta’s Gadjah Mada University, and also in Makassar and 
Padang.6  At the same time, DDII initiated to recruit leaders of Islamic students 
from diverse secular university backgrounds in order to be trained as religious 
mentors for the mosque movement. The cadre training was conducted at the 
Panitia Haji Indonesia (PHI, Indonesian Haji Committee) headquarters in Jakarta. 
The major trainers were DDII leaders and intellectuals such as Mohammad Natsir, 
Pranoto Mangkusasmita, M. Rasyidi and the like.7  
The significant role of DDII in expanding campus predication was also 
evident in Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah (LMD, the Institute of Predication 
Strivers).8 This institute was established by DDII’s high-profile affiliate, 
Imaduddin Abdulrahim who, beginning in the 1970s, conducted intensive religious 
trainings at ITB’s Salman mosque. Despite Imaduddin’s opposition to the Cultural 
Islam pioneered by Nurcholish Madjid, the ideology of LMD and its curriculum 
were in fact a modified version of the Nurcholish-composed NDP (Nilai-nilai 
Dasar Perjuangan).9 Imaduddin gave stronger emphasis to the doctrine of tauhid 
and the danger of ghazw al-fikr (intellectual warfare) which was perceived as a 
Western-influenced ideological challenge to the Muslim worldviews.10 Many 
Islamic student activists were attracted to the LMD trainings and began to 
                                                
6Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.   
7Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, Chapter 1, most notably in the sub-title “Predication 
Movement.”     
8For a detailed discussion of LMD, see, Dra. Nurhayati Djamas, “Gerakan Kaum Muda 
Masjid Salman,” in Dr. Mamat Salamet Burhanuddin, M.Ag (ed.), Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di 
Indonesia,” Pustaka Firdaus, Jakarta, 1989.   
9 Latif, “The Rupture,” 2005, p. 393. The establishment of LMD was in part to counter 
Nurcholish’s liberal-minded thought, see, Djamas, “Gerakan Kaum Muda Masjid Salman,” 1989, 
pp. 250-252.  
10Ibid.  
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disseminate LMD’s ideology and curriculum on their own campuses. Aan 
Rohanah, a one-time student activist and now PKS Member of Parliament, 
recalled: 
In fact, there was nothing new in LMD’s curriculum and materials. I was 
more amazed at the way its curriculum was applied in daily activities 
during the training. There had been an increasing spirit of ‘dakwah’ in my 
mind after completing the training and a great desire to spread a truly 
Islamic understanding in my campus at the time.11 
 
By the late 1970s, the scope and force of the campus dakwah movement 
began to enter a new chapter in the wake of Suharto’s increasing political 
repression. Student political activities at the time were permanently “frozen” since 
the implementation of the ‘Normalisation of Campus Life’ (NKK) and Student Co-
ordination Bodies (BKK) policy in 1978. The Suharto regime launched this 
depoliticisation program on campuses as a reaction to students’ growing of and 
challenge to the regime. NKK/BKK banned all students’ political activism inside 
university campuses and replaced the previously independent Students’ Councils 
(Dewan Mahasiswa/DEMA).12 After this clampdown on student activism, the 
1980s was marked by the emergence of various types of non-political student 
activism such as study groups and non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
                                                
11Interview, Aan Rohanah, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.   
12For detailed information of the 1978 student movement, see Hariyadhie, Perspektif 
Gerakan Mahasiswa 1978 dalam Percaturan Politik Nasional, Citra Mandala Pratama, Jakarta, 
1995; Herbert Feith, “The Indonesian Student Movement of 1977-78,” a revised of a talk at he 
Contemporary Indonesia Study Group of the Monash Centre of Southeast Asian Studies on 15 
March 1978.   
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activities.13 Among other forms of student activism that emerged in this period, 
campus dakwah was the most popular.  
Aside from that, in 1985 Suharto required all mass-based organisations, 
including political parties, to adopt Pancasila as the sole ideological basis (asas 
tunggal) of their organisations. These policies outraged some Islamic leaders, who 
described the regime’s treatment of political Islam as “kutjing kurap” (cats with 
ring-worm).14 At the height of the regime’s suppression of political Islam and 
student activism, the mosque became what respected Muslim intellectual 
Jalaluddin Rakhmat describes as ‘a sanctuary for the expression of political 
dissatisfaction and frustration’.15 The recollections of economist Rizal Ramli, 
support this notion:  
“When I was at ITB in the late 1970s all student political activity revolved 
around the student center. But ever since the government imposed 
restrictions on campus politics, the student center had been dead. All the 
activity is now funneled to the mosque. Young people need an outlet for 
their political aspirations and they will find it where they can.”16     
 
Coincidentally, the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s 
brought about by the collapse of American supported regime in Iran is believed to 
                                                
13The students’ study groups were loosely structured whose members were a small 
number of students who met regularly surrounding campus to discuss social and political theories. 
Another alternative student activism since the banning of political activity on campus was non-
governmental organisations (NGO). Furthermore, there were a small number of students who 
operated clandestinely in the face of the regime’s suppression by publishing critically inclined 
students’ leaflets, brochures or magazines, but thereby they were relatively easily handled by 
authorities and military.  For a detailed account of this, see Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto, 
Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia, Stanford University Press, California, 
2005.  
14Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004),” 2005. 
15Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Allen & Unwin, NSW, 
1994, p. 174.   
16Ibid. 
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be a significant factor of the growing level of religiosity among students. There 
was a desire among students to identify themselves with the wider Muslim umma 
or worldwide Islamic community.17  
In the early 1980s, campus dakwah began to introduce usrah (Arabic for 
‘family’) and serves as a pattern to manage and train its followers in a more 
systematic way.18 Usrah are small, closely-knit groups that are connected in a 
hierarchical structure. However, most members do not know members in other 
usrah.19 From this kind of organisational structure campus dakwah grew rapidly 
and campus mosques have since become a centre for its activities. 
The use of usrah (cells) for religious training in campus dakwah was 
borrowed directly from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Campus dakwah’s 
association with the Brotherhood was also entrenched by student leaders 
disseminating and promoting the works of influential Brotherhood figures as 
primary references for study, thereby making the ideas and models of Brotherhood 
activism — in Bubalo and Fealy’s words—“the cornerstone of the dakwah’s 
thinking.”20  
The process of transplantation of the Brotherhood’s ideas and methods into 
campus dakwah groups was made possible by extensive DDII networks. Since its 
                                                
17See, for instance, Hussin Muthalib, “Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political 
Implications,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 9. (sep. 1990), pp. 877-891.   
18For more discussion of the training programs, see The Department of Cadreisation’s 
Team, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula PKS and Syamil Cipta Media, Bandung, 2003.    
19Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and 
Democratization,” in Samuel Haneman and Henk Schulte (eds.), Indonesia in Transition, Pustaka 
pelajar, Yogyakarta, 2004, p. 61.  
20Bubalo and Fealy, Joining the Caravan? 2005, p. 67.  
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establishment, the DDII leadership directed its attention towards the Middle East. 
It had and still has strong connections with the Islamic World League (Rabithat al-
Alam al-Islami), the worldwide Islamic organisation that was funded by the Saudi 
Kingdom, and to which Natsir was appointed Vice-Chairmen.21 This strong 
connection along with the boom in oil prices in the 1970s gave rise to more funds 
for religious scholarship programs. Many Islamic students, most notably those 
with close ties to DDII were sent by Natsir to undertake overseas study in the 
Middle East. Not surprisingly, they were influenced by the teachings and methods 
of the Brotherhood.22  
By the early 1980s, the Brotherhood’s ideas and models of activism had 
been disseminated through the interactions of students returning from study in the 
Middle East.23 At the same time, through the work of DDII’s intellectuals and 
affiliates, most notably known as Abu Ridha and Prof. Rahman Zainuddin, the 
writings of top leading figures of the Brotherhood such as Hassan al-Banna, 
Sayyid Qutb and the like, had been translated into Indonesian thereby making it 
possible for campus dakwah activists to access these writings in their own native 
language.  
 
 
 
                                                
21Bruinessen, “Genealogies,” 2002, p. 123.   
22See, Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006. Also, see Latif, “The Rupture,” 2005. 
23Damanik, Fenomena, 2002; Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006. Also, see Latif, 
“The Rupture,” 2005. 
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2.1.2 Instituting Student Movement 
Campus dakwah also took advantage of the emergence of so-called Islamic 
resurgence among well-educated people, especially students of secular universities 
in the late 1970s. Many of these students possessed religious and spiritual 
inquiries. Not surprisingly, campus mosques became the centre of dakwah 
activities, and were attended by many students who wanted to participate in 
religious circles (halaqah).24 Subsequently, students developed a sense of 
confidence and assertiveness to espouse Islamic ideals and values. Also, the 
influence of Islamic revivalism was evident in increasing prevalence of Islamic 
attire (e.g. jilbab or headscarf for female students), the greater number of students 
praying at campus mosques, the increase in number of students who preferred 
Islamic publishing and so on.      
Campus dakwah then metamorphosed into a legalised unit of student 
activity, that is, it became the Campus Predication Institute (LDK).25 More 
importantly, activists of campus dakwah used this campus-sponsored religious 
body for recruitment and organisational purposes. LDK benefited from being an 
officially recognised student organisation in two ways. First, it received financial 
support, in the same way as other registered student organisations, from the 
campus administrator. This yearly financial assistance was useful for the 
sustainability of the organisation and was helpful for supporting massive and 
                                                
24Halaqah is an Islamic gathering or forum to discuss religious issues.  
25The most detailed account of the LDK can be found in Damanik, Fenomena Partai 
Keadilan, 2002. See also, Damanik, Tarbiyah Menjawab Tantangan, 2002; Furkon, Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, 2004.   
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costly religious events such as the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birth 
(mauled) and Ramadhan-related (fasting month) events. Second, in the context of 
suppression of student activism, through establishing itself as a legal student 
organisation, LDK sent a clear message to the regime that it did not oppose the 
status quo. It emphasised to the state that its main activity was the cultivation of 
religious understanding and practice.  
In the mid 1980s, LDK was established by a number of Islamic students 
who were active in campus dakwah activities at the Indonesia University (UI) 
under the umbrella of the so-called Forum of Islamic Studies (FSI, Forum Studi 
Islam).26 FSI is a pseudo name for campus dakwah established in almost all 
faculties at UI. Since FSI developed rapidly and won wide support among 
students, the establishment of a well-organised forum for managing a broad range 
of Islamic activities such as LDK was very important. LDK soon began to build 
broader contacts with various bodies of dakwah movements on other university 
campuses.27 Considering that the development of campus dakwah increased 
significantly in many prestigious universities, most remarkably, in Java and 
Sumatra, LDK activists tried to build a broader network of intercampus 
predication by establishing the Forum for Coordination of Campus Predication 
(FSLDK).  
                                                
26Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.  
27For example, at ITB, activists of the campus dakwah activists operated out of the 
university’s Salman Mosque and coordinated their regular activities through the so-called Family 
of Islamic Students (Gamais, Keluarga Mahasiswa Islam). At the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB, 
Institute Pertanian Bogor) and the Gadjah Mada University (UGM), campus dakwah activists ran 
their religious activities through the Council for Mosque Cultivation (DKM, Dewan Kemakmuran 
Masjid) al-Hurriyah, and the Shalahuddin Congregation (Jamaah Shalahuddin) respectively.   
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It is worth noting that LDK alone is hardly homogenous and within the 
organisation there are a range of different opinions about strategies for establishing 
an Islamic state and the degree of acceptance toward the ideas of democracy and 
nation-state. Followers of Hizbut Tahrir (HT, the Liberation Party), for instance, 
were also actively involved in LDK, particularly at IPB. HT is an Islamist 
transnational movement which strongly rejects the notions of democracy and 
nation-state, and whose primary objective is to rebuild a global Islamic caliphate.28 
Initially, the core religious convictions of LDK were largely adopted from 
the Brotherhood’s Hassan al-Banna and Jamiat al-Islamy’s al-Mawdudi views. 
That is the idea that Islam is al-diin or a total, comprehensive, and all-
encompassing way of life with no separation between aqidah wa shari’ah (belief 
and law), diin wa dawlah (religion and state), and diin wa dunya (spiritual and 
temporal). In this regard, there is no sharp contrast between the Brotherhood-
inspired LDK activists and their HT counterparts. What makes HT very different 
relative to the rest of LDK activists is the ideological framework created by its 
founder Shaikh Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani. Unlike the mainstream LDK who believe 
                                                
28HT’s ideas were brought to Indonesia in the 1980s by a Palestinian born activist of HT, 
Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, who received an invitation from the head of Ghazali Islamic boarding 
school KH. Mama Abdullah bin Nuh. Most favoured early recruits of Al-Baghdadi and Nuh’s such 
as Al-Khatthath, Hafiz Abdurrahman, Ismail Yusanto, Zulia Ilmawati and Fahmi Amhar used 
officially campus religious bodies for the purposes of recruitment. Among other things, Badan 
Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa (BKIM) which was part of the LDK network in IPB, was the primary 
institutional site of HT. There is evidence showing that HT utilized LDK to advance its ideologies 
through methods of intensive training called halaqah (study circle) and daurah (training program) 
and benefited largely from LDK’s networks of activism throughout campus mosques. The most 
detailed account of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) can be found in Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004),” 2005. See also, Burhanuddin, “Beyond the Nation-State: The Quest 
for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia," in the Asian Journal of Social Science (NUS and Brill) 36:5 (2008), 
forthcoming.  
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that democracy can provide a way to form an Islamic state, HT strongly opposes 
the idea of democracy because it is perceived as a human-made system.29 
In the mid-1980s, the name usrah came to be associated with radical 
Islamist groups such as the underground Darul Islam (The House of Islam).30 This 
group used a cell structure (usrah) to maintain its clandestine operation against the 
state. In fact, as noted earlier, campus dakwah sought to avoid direct confrontation 
with the regime by staying away from politics and focusing its activities on 
cultivating religious understanding and practice among students. Given that the 
association of usrah with radical organisations could harm campus dakwah, its 
leaders began to call their movement halaqah, which refers to an informal 
religious circle of students and their teachers.31     
In other occasions, some leading figures of campus dakwah called their 
movement ‘Jemaah Tarbiyah’32 in order to keep distance from politically radical 
                                                
29Interview, Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 23 February 2005.  
30Darul Islam is the oldest radical Islamic movement led by Kartosuwirjo. The DI 
rebellion began in 1947 and yet the army crushed it in the 1960s. However, there were a few units 
in West Java which succeeded in reviving the movement. They utilized the Brotherhood-style cell 
structure (usrah) to recruit members. For a detailed account of Darul Islam, see C.A.O. van 
Nieuwenhuijze, “The Dar ul-Islam Movement in Western Java,” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 2 
(Jun. 1950), pp. 169-183. 
31Collins, “Islam is the Solution.”  
32The word “tarbiyah” is derived from Arabic for “the process of education, training, and 
caring someone.” It is closely associated with the use of usrah (cell) or halaqah (religious circle) 
that consists of ten to twelve cadres, which are led by a type of religious instructor called murabbi, 
whose mission it is to form an evenly strong-mind assemblage of cadres. The word “murabbi” is a 
variant spelling of “tarbiyah” derived from the same form of Arabic word, that is, rabba yurabbi 
which means “to educate, to train, to care, to bring up, to maintain.” While “tarbiyah” is a mashdar 
(original) form of the verb, murabbi is a fail (subject) form the verb meaning to ‘persons who carry 
out the process of education or training.’  Salman, “Participation in Social Movement: Explaining 
People’s Choice to Join the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia,“ unpublished MA thesis, at Syarif 
Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, 2006. 
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associations.33 In fact, there is no clearly defined meaning of the word ‘tarbiyah’ 
issued by campus dakwah activists or the central board of PKS.34 Some argue that 
this name is not a formal name of a movement.35 Jemaah Tarbiyah is used 
interchangeably with Ikhwan, which refers to the Egyptian Muslim group (Ikhwan 
al-Muslimin or Muslim Brotherhood) whose ideas and model of activism have 
largely inspired the movement.36 In short, Jemaah Tarbiyah is used to distinguish 
itself with other Islamic groups, especially those who came out of Islamic student 
predication movements but have substantial differences in ideological frameworks 
and methods to achieve their goals.  
In a further development, despite some differences, a broad range of 
streams within LDK eventually supported the establishment of the Forum for 
Coordination of Campus Predication Institution (FSLDK, Forum Shilaturrahmi 
Lembaga Dakwah Kampus) in 1986. FSLDK is a forum for coordinating dakwah 
activities on campuses throughout Indonesia and for building broader networks 
among LDK activists. Taking advantage of the tenth annual meeting of FSLDK in 
Malang during 1998, which was attended by hundreds of students from various 
parts of Indonesia had assembled in Malang, some LDK activists announced the 
formation of the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI, Kesatuan 
                                                
33Interview, a Prominent Dakwah Leader (Anonymous), Jakarta, 21 August 2007.   
34Mahfudz Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktivis Dakwah 
Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis Nasional Multidimensi, 
Era Intermedia, Solo, 2003, p. 84.  
35Ibid.  
36Abdul Aziz and Damanik argue that the term “Tarbiyah” and “Ikhwani” are synonymous 
in this case, which refers to LDK activists whose methods (manhaj) and ideas are inspired from the 
Egyptian Brotherhood. See, Abdul Aziz, Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia, Pustaka 
Firdaus, Jakarta, 1996. See also, Damanik, Fenomena, 2002.     
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Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia). In fact, as was clarified by the coordinator of 
the FSLDK’s communication centre, the assembly itself did not formally endorse 
the birth of KAMMI.37 Rather, the new organisation was based on individual 
initiatives and was declared after the meeting was officially closed.38 This 
rejection was voiced by those who came from Hizbut Tahrir.39 The birth of 
KAMMI during the tenth annual meeting of FSLDK was seen as abusing the 
conference for political interests.40 KAMMI was indeed established by FSLDK’s 
activists who were closely associated with Tarbiyah such as Fahri Hamzah. 
Regardless of this opposition, Tarbiyah-affiliated activists succeeded in 
establishing KAMMI.  
In the wake of deepening social political unrest in the latter period of 
Suharto, KAMMI emerged as one of the most conspicuous student movements 
voicing public grievances through massive rallies throughout the country and 
pressuring for regime change. Most of all, the formation of KAMMI reflected the 
evolution of the dakwah movement from mere consolidation through personal 
Islamic propagation and political quietism to a more critical view of the nation’s 
current condition. As explained earlier, campus dakwah had previously maintained 
its strategy of distancing itself from political confrontation with the state; believing 
that the path of dakwah would have a long-term impact.41 The fall of Suharto, after 
                                                
37Budi Mulyana, Gatra, 2 May 1998.  
38Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006. See also, Kraince, “The Role of Islamic 
Students,” 2000.  
39Interview, a Prominent Dakwah Leader (Anonymous), Jakarta, 21 August 2007.   
40Ibid.  
 41See Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.  
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months of grand-scale demonstrations pioneered by a number of student 
movement organisations, including KAMMI, gave proponents of campus dakwah 
a chance to redesign its strategy for advancing their ideals in a relatively new 
democratic environment.     
 
2.1.3 Political Movement 
Shortly after the resignation of Suharto on 21 May 1998, KAMMI leaders 
embarked on forming an Islamic political party. This initiative was also supported 
by some campus dakwah activists who argued that the already established 
networks and resources of the dakwah movement should be transformed into a 
political party. They believed in the benefits of participating in the newly 
democratic system. However, some activists opposed the idea and proposed to turn 
the movement into a non-political organisation (ormas). An internal survey 
involving core cadres of the movement resulted in the majority of activists 
agreeing to establish a party.42 The party was then named “Partai Keadilan” 
(Justice Party), now known as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice 
Party).  
It is important to keep in mind that despite the contribution of KAMMI’s 
leaders to the formation of PK, KAMMI and PK claim no formal relationship, but 
there is much evidence to the contrary. They acknowledge, however, that the two 
                                                
 42Ibid. See also, Damanik, Fenomena, 2002   
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share a social, cultural, ideological relationship with PK and its successor PKS.43 
The relations between KAMMI and PK/PKS are obvious, and it sometimes serves 
as “the student wing of (PK)/PKS.”44 Furthermore, PK and its successor PKS 
provide opportunities for KAMMI activists to pursue political careers. The first 
chairman of KAMMI, Fahri Hamzah, and his successor, Andi Rahmat, are 
currently serving as PKS representatives in the national parliament (2004-2009). 
Most alumni of KAMMI hold key positions of leadership in the party structure, 
either in the central board or in local branches. 
The first priority for the leadership of PK was how to transfer the 
ideological loyalties of the campus dakwah movement to the party. The 
reformulation of the relationship between the party and movement is pivotal to the 
long-term success of the party.45 Like the Brotherhood and its offshoots elsewhere, 
PK and its current manifestation PKS hold the view that “al-jama’ah hiya al-hizb 
wa al-hizb huwa al-jama’ah”, which means “the movement is the party and the 
party is the movement.” The term jamaah (Arabic for ‘movement’) was employed 
by the Brotherhood followed by PK and PKS to describe an Islamic movement 
that operates clandestinely to avoid regime oppression. As is widely known, the 
Egyptian Muslim organisation faced harsh punishment from the regime. 
Nonetheless, the term ‘jamaah’ is then no longer valid when the regime has 
granted a space for democracy. Instead, the term hizb (Arabic for ‘political party’) 
                                                
43Troy A. Johnson, “Islamic Student Organisations and Democratic Development in 
Indonesia: Three Case Studies,” unpublished M.A. Thesis presented at Ohio University, 2006.  
44Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.  
 45Ibid.  
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is more favourable in the pursuit of Tarbiyah’s goals.46 Accordingly, in the 
emergence of a new democratic regime in Indonesia in 1998, Tarbiyah activists 
decided to form PK and utilize Tarbiyah’s preexisting networks and resources.  
In the run-up to the 1999 elections, PK attracted many observers because it 
campaigned as “the only political party with a clear program and transparent 
structure.”47 Unlike other Islamic parties, which seem to rely heavily on their 
extraordinary leaders, PK emphasised the egalitarianism of Islam and collective 
strength, and showed less concern for charismatic leaders, while at the same time 
demanding strict submission to religious norms.48  
PK drew its support largely from Tarbiyah activists who are mainly from 
urban areas, well-educated, younger and have an orthodox outlook. Ironically, this 
party appeared to exclude a mass following, which, it is deemed by PK leaders, do 
not understand Islamic principles. It was widely perceived as ‘an exclusive party’ 
because of the strict selection criteria for its members, and the fact that its cadres 
are subjected to thorough training. Indonesianist Jim Schiller’s field research in 
Jepara, for example, shows that in “the very tiny PKS [in the district] is led by 
doctors, its men and women sit separately at rallies which cater more to deepening 
loyalty than attracting new voters.”49 
In Indonesia’s first free elections in over 30 years in 1999, PK failed to 
meet the electoral law permitting parties to compete in the next elections. This 
                                                
46Ibid. See also, Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006. 
47Bruinessen, “Post-Suharto,” 2004.  
 48Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005, pp. 50-51.  
49Comment to I-Discussion email list managed by Edward Aspinall, as quoted from 
Collins, “Islam is the Solution.”   
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failure was expected by many due to PK’s inability to attract new voters by 
offering a broader message. After this unsuccessful campaign, the newly political 
party reconstituted itself as the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
or PKS) in April 2003. In the 2004 parliamentary elections, PKS succeeded in 
gaining 7.34% of the popular vote or 45 out of 550 seats, a size-fold increase over 
its predecessor Partai Keadilan (PK), which received only 1.4% in the 1999 
elections. This remarkable success of PKS was in part due to the fact that the party 
adopted so-called a two-track—simultaneously Islamist and non-Islamist—
electoral strategy.50 This was pivotal to maintaining the party’s base of support 
from its traditional and orthodox constituencies and it played a crucial role in 
generating new voters by promoting universal issues such as anti-corruption and 
clean government.  
 
2.2. PKS as Islamist Social Movement    
2.2.1 What is Islamism? 
Having sketched the transformation of PKS from a student movement to 
political party, I will emphasise the position of the party as an Islamist movement. 
Before discussing PKS as an Islamist movement, one must define what Islamism 
and social movements are. Islamism is the extent to which Islam is perceived as a 
set of specific norms, comprehensive and superiority of Islam and, therefore, it 
contains the blueprint of a social order. Hence, Islamists intend to replace the 
                                                
50Liddle and Mujani, “Islamist Parties.”  
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present social and political order with such norms based on a certain understanding 
of Islamic teachings. This may be carried out peacefully or through violent actions 
that are determined by the value system of the actors.51 According to Bubalo and 
Fealy, the major consequence of Islamism is the existence of an Islamic state or 
system.52 This is the core element of Islamism followed by Islamic activism.53 
Both characteristics of Islamism cannot easily be separated, because an Islamic 
state is impossible to build without activism.  
Above all, however, PKS can best be understood as moderate Islamism 
instead of radical jihadist Islamism.54 This is largely because the party operates 
within a democratic system as well as because it accepts the idea of nation-state. 
Also, it describes itself as a peaceful movement that rules out the use of violence 
in achieving its goals. In attempting to delineate the position of PKS among 
various Islamic organisations in Indonesia, the former president of PKS, Hidayat 
Nurwahid, describes the party as a centrist Islamic party which occupies the 
middle ground between radical Islamist groups that reject democracy and Muslim 
organisations committed to democracy.55 Nonetheless, no other major party would 
agree with Hidayat’s claim that PKS is a centrist party. PKS is still viewed by 
                                                
51For more discussion of the indicators of Islamism, see, Saiful Mujani et al., Benturan 
Peradaban: Sikap dan Perilaku Islamis Indonesia terhadap Amerika Serikat PPIM, Freedom 
Institute, Penerbit Nalar, Jakarta, 2005. 
52 Bubalo and Fealy, Joining the Caravan? 2005, p. 9.  
53Ibid., p. 10.   
54Radical jihadist is commonly defined as the Islamic armed struggle (al-jihad), which 
exists in three main variants: internal (combating nominally Muslim regimes considered impious); 
irredentist (fighting to redeem land ruled by non-Muslims or under occupation); and global 
(combating the West). The characteristic actors are the fighters (al-mujahid). See, International 
Crisis Group (ICG), “Understanding Islamism,” ICG Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37, 
2005. 
55As quoted from Collins, “Islam is the Solution.”  
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many as an Islamist party, but it uses an existing democratic system to pursue its 
political agenda.    
 
2.2.2. Between Movement and Party 
In this part, I will look at PKS as a political party, which presents itself as a 
force of collective action by functioning as a social movement organisation. In 
order to understand the term ‘social movement,’ it is necessary to look at the 
emergence of social movement theory in the early 1970s. In the 1950s and the 
mid-1960s, social psychology dominated scholarship on movements, focusing 
extensively on the collective behaviour approach which saw social movements as 
long-lasting panics and crowds.56 Subsequently, a group of scholars, particularly 
proponents of resource mobilisation, criticised collective behaviour theories and 
began to formulate ideas about the importance of political structure and 
organisational factors to account for social unrest.57  
Maintaining the view that social movements and political parties are a 
distinct category, McAdam and Snow list a number of characteristics of social 
movements that include the following elements: (1) collective or joint action; (2) 
                                                
56There are at least three main differences between social movements and collective 
behavior: institutional versus non-institutional, spontaneous versus planned and ephemeral versus 
prolonged. It has been claimed that collective behavior is relatively characterised by its non-
institutional and spontaneous activity, but the biggest difference between social movements and the 
other forms of collective behaviour concerns the duration of the social movement, that its more 
long-lasting than collective behaviour. See, Gary T. Marx and Douglas McAdam, Collective 
Behaviour and Social Movements: Process and Structure, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1994, p. 72.  
57The most influential account of this approach can be found in John D. McCarthy and 
Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” in Mayer N 
Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds.), Social Movements in An Organisational Society, Transaction 
Inc., New Brunswick: New Jersey, 1987.  
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change-oriented goals; (3) some degree of organisation; (4) some degree of 
temporal continuity; and (5) some extra-institutional collective action, or at least a 
mixture of extra-institutional (protesting in the streets) and institutional (lobbying) 
actions.58 Blending these elements together, we can draw the conclusion that social 
movements are a collectivity or a group of people acting with some degree of 
organisation and continuity outside of institutional procedures or the mechanisms 
of formal politics, for the same purpose of challenging the authorities.59 
Undoubtedly, McAdam and Snow still maintain that outsiders are the prevailing 
image of the actors within social movements.    
I will treat PKS as a social movement. There is a growing trend in the field 
of social movements to see protest as ‘politics by other means,’ and it is now well 
recognised that extra-institutional and institutional politics are intertwined and 
interdependent.60 Social movements that consist of extra-institutional actions can 
exist not only at election time. As noted by Goldstone, political parties and social 
movements in the U.S. and Western Europe have become:  
“Overlapping, mutually dependent actors in shaping politics, to the point 
where even long-established political parties welcome social movement 
                                                
58Doug McAdam and David Snow, “Introduction, Social Movements: Conceptual and 
Theoretical Issues,” in Dough McAdam and David Snow (eds.), Social Movements: Readings on 
Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 1997, 
p. xviii.  
59Ibid.  
60Pamela E Oliver, Jorge Cadena-Roa, and Kelley D. Strawn, “Emerging Trends in the 
Study of Protest and Social Movements,” forthcoming in volume 11 of Research in Political 
Sociology; see also, John K. Glenn, “Parties out of Movements: Party Emergence in Post-
communist Eastern Europe,” in Jack A. Goldstone (ed.), States, Parties, and Social Movements, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: UK, 2003.      
 50 
support and often rely specifically on their association with social 
movements in order to win elections.”61  
 
If PKS is viewed as a social movement organisation, its existence can be 
explained by three crucial factors: (1) political opportunity structure; (2) resource 
mobilisation; and (3) collective action frames. As will be further explained, there 
are a significant number of external factors or political opportunities that gave rise 
to PKS. By using the perspective of resource mobilisation, PKS is able to generate 
the involvement of its sympathisers and to transform it into activism and long-time 
commitment. More importantly, PKS takes on an organisational framework. In 
social movement theory, this is a large specialty area known as resource 
mobilisation. Lastly, PKS’ collective action entails what social movement scholars 
call ‘frame alignment processes,’62 which is a pivotal point of collective action 
frames. This emphasises the importance of ideas in conjunction with 
organisational and political opportunity factors. 
In short, PKS takes the form of a movement for a number of reasons.  First, 
PKS has not only articulated its political agenda within institutionalised politics, 
but has also translated its grievances and interests through a range of collective 
actions which involve large numbers of its sympathisers. No other party has such a 
high degree of engagement with extra-parliamentary activity. An investigation of 
                                                
61Jack A. Goldstone, “Bridging Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Politics,” in 
Goldstone (ed.), States, Parties, and Social Movements,” 2003, p. 4.   
62For a detailed account of this term, see David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven 
K. Worden, Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micro-mobilisation, and Movement 
Participation,” in Doug McAdam and David Snow (eds.), Social Movements: Readings on Their 
Emergence, Mobilisation, and Dynamics, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 1997, pp. 
235-251. 
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PKS’ collective action will be comprehensively presented in Chapter 3. It can be 
said that elements of social movement organisations i.e. collective action, change-
oriented goals, extra-institutional procedures and so on, have been apparent in 
PKS’ social movement.  
Second, PKS is a political party which comes out of the Tarbiyah, a 
religious movement. As explained earlier, PKS utilised the already established 
networks and resources of Tarbiyah to advance its political agenda. In other words, 
there is no distinction between PKS and Tarbiyah. Like Tarbiyah on which it is 
based, PKS is a cadre party. PKS is based on a network of cells (usrah) where 
members are required to meet for Al-Qur’an reading and memorising and 
discussion every week (halaqah).63 Through this process of cadreisation, PKS 
demands that its members conform to Islamic ideals and norms in all aspects of 
life. Members must have passed through a series of six levels ending with 
takhassus, holders of special expertise in dakwah.64  
In this regard, PKS considers itself as a vanguard rather than, in Duverger’s 
term, ‘a mass party.’65 As a party, PKS actively engages its constituencies on 
continual basis, not only at election times and has a remarkable record of social 
work. In other words, cadres are not only an important part of PKS’ electoral 
strategy, but they also play significant role in the process of mobilising the party’s 
collective action. The prevalence of grand-scale demonstrations and the high level 
                                                
63Panduan Lengkap Manhaj Tarbiyah Kader PK-Sejahtera, Media Insani Press, Solo, 
2005.  
64Ibid. See also, Liddle and Mujani, “Islamist Parties.”    
65Maurice Duverger, “Caucus and Branch, cadre Party and Mass Parties,” in Peter Mair, 
(ed.), The West European Party System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 37-45.  
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of participation in PKS’ collective activities have been made possible by the strong 
commitment and loyalties of its cadres.       
 
 
Illustration 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Caption:  
10.000 PKS sympathisers rally against Israel (date unspecified). Available at 
zioneocon.blogspot.com/Indonesian%20rally.jpg. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE COLLECTIVE ACTION OF PKS:  
EXAMINING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND 
PERCEPTIONS OF FAR AND NEAR ENEMIES  
 
 In order to understand PKS as a social movement, we need to consider more 
detailed information about actions or related events carried out collectively by PKS 
supporters as recorded by the mass media. This chapter relies primarily on protest 
event analysis, which is frequently used in social movement research. Nonetheless, 
some excerpts from my interviews with several prominent leaders of PKS will be 
presented as well to support the findings of this protest event analysis.    
 
3.1 Operational Definitions 
As noted earlier, PKS not only articulates its agenda within the framework 
of institutionalised politics, but also acts as a social movement organisation, which 
spiritedly engages in collective action. Given that the notion of social movement 
and that of collective action are inexorably intertwined, we must adequately define 
what collective action is. As described earlier, one of the most salient characteristics 
of social movements is the element of collective action.1 It can be said that 
collective action is one of the core elements of social movement. McAdam and 
Snow argue that social movements are a form of collective action.2 Klandermans 
                                                
      1See, Chapter II, especially sub-title, “Between Movement and Party.”  
2McAdam and Snow, “Social Movements,” 1997, p. xxiv.  
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states that social movements are dominated by “individuals sharing collective goals 
and a collective identity who engage in disruptive collective action.”3  
Hence, collective action is closely associated with the process of 
mobilisation outside the mechanism of formal politics, for example petition, rallies, 
marches, sit-ins, and other actions. In this sense, collective action relies on 
unconventional forms of political participation as opposed to the conventional ones. 
According to Kaase and Marsh, conventional participation is any activity by 
ordinary people, not elites, to influence political outcomes according to relatively 
settled procedures or laws such as voting, campaigning, etc.4 In contrast, 
unconventional participation refers to any activity by ordinary citizens to influence 
political outcomes “that does not correspond to the norms of law and custom” such 
as demonstration, strikes and boycotts.5  
Another characteristic of collective action is a “joint action in pursuit of a 
common objective.”6 It is also worth noting that collective action is not an abstract 
category. It is a real, visible movement, a “product,” and its messages are clearly 
sent to opponents or the public.7 In a similar vein, Olzak stipulates a minimal 
definition of collective action, that is, (1) collective (involving more than one 
                                                
3Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1997, p. 2.   
4Max Kaase and Alan Marsh, “Political Action: Theoretical Perspective,” in Samuel H. 
Barnes and Max Kaase (eds.), Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies, 
Sage Publication, California, 1979, pp. 39-42.   
5Ibid., p. 41.  
6 McAdam and Snow, “Social Movements”, 1997, p. xxiv.   
7Dieter Rucht, “National Contexts and Movement Structures,” in McAdam, McCarty, and 
Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives, 1996, p. 186  
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person),8 and (2) it makes claims in sustained sequences of interaction with 
opponents or authorities.9  
In investigating PKS’ collective action, I adhere to the aforementioned 
characteristics, they are (1) collective; (2) making a claim while challenging others; 
(3) visible and observable by the public; (4) change-oriented goals; and (5) using 
extra-institutional procedures that involve some degree of mobilisation. 
Accordingly, following Burstein, I will not include PKS’ political party 
conventions, and the like in the list of collective action.10 However, I will not 
exclude the process of mobilisation during PKS’ congressional activities or 
following the party’s anniversary celebrations. Usually at the time of its 
anniversary, the party mobilises its sympathisers into the streets or conducts great 
meetings or public sermons addressing various issues on international Islamism. 
Having said that the concept requires some degree of extra-institutional 
politics and mechanism, I also exclude a huge number of reports published by both 
the print and electronic media on PKS and its parliamentary members’ comments in 
formal political activities from the notion of collective action. The way the party is 
striving in parliament, in elections (either at the national or local levels) and at the 
negotiating table cannot be seen as forms of collective actions. For instance, media 
                                                
8Students of social movement have been varied in their interpretations of the meaning of 
collective in collective events. Charles Tilly proposed a minimum of 50 people. See, Charles Tilly, 
From Mobilisation to Revolution, Addison Wesley, Reading: Mass., 1978.   Olzak and West use at 
least 2 people, but most observers choose a minimum in the range of 10 and 20. See, Susan Olzak, 
“Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 15 (1989), 
p. 126.   
9Ibid., p. 124.  
10See, P. Burstein, Discrimination, Jobs and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Employment 
Opportunity in the United States since the New Deal, University Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985.  
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reports on PKS’ support for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the run-up to the 
presidential election in 2004 or an inter-party coalition that included PKS and aimed 
to support a government policy called ‘Koalisi Kerakyatan’ will not be classified as 
collective action. This is largely because those activities or repots are primarily 
concerned with the scope of elite rather than spontaneous grass-root mobilisation.11    
 
3.2 Protest Event Analysis 
In order to examine PKS’ collective action, I take advantage of a growing 
approach in the field of collective action research, that is, a study of protest events.12 
Events, wrote Paige and Tilly, are a non-routine type of action repertoire,13 
unconventional, collective, disruptive and public acts that involve claims on behalf 
of a larger collective.14 The benefits of using event analysis are the following: (1) 
events are (at least potentially) commensurate across different kinds of movements, 
thus facilitating a unified theory of mobilisation; (2) an event-centred approach can 
                                                
11Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989, p. 125.   
12Most major research traditions in collective action have taken advantage of analysis of 
newspaper event data. Apart from using newspaper data for conducting protest event analysis, I also 
use them along with other primary sources for political discourse analysis as will further developed 
in the chapter 4 and 5. For a detailed account of protest event and political discourse analyses, see 
Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, “Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest Event and 
Political Discourse Approaches,” in Mobilisation: An International Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2/Fall 
1999, pp. 203-221.     
13This is to distinguish with routine activities such as public discussion, religious meetings, 
and so on.  As is widely known, PKS has continuously built its reputation on being a so-called cadre 
party (partai kader) which actively engages its constituencies on a continual basis, with a remarkable 
record of social work and dealing with non-political issues such as running a number of educational 
institutions both formal (Sistem Terpadu) or non-formal, and so on. PKS also manages such religious 
activities as liqo (weekly meeting), mabit (spending the night at the mosque), daurah (training 
program), rihlah (travel program) and the like in regular ways. These routine activities cannot be 
seen as forms of collective action. Olzak even excludes anniversary marches and annual celebrations 
since their timing is predetermined and not spontaneous. See, Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989, p. 
126. 
14See, J.M. Paige, Agrarian Revolution, Free Press, New York, 1975; See also, Tilly, From 
Mobilisation, 1978.  
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incorporate the dynamics of timing and mutual causality; and (3) as a consequence 
of this, the decline or rise of mobilisation can be tested by an examination of the 
relation between protest and political opportunity structures.15  
While acknowledging these inherent limitations of the use of newspaper 
data,16 this study will use newspaper data for the following reasons: First, 
newspaper-based event data provides a rich collection of information on the 
occurrence of PKS’ collective action, its duration, its participants, its targets and the 
like. In other words, among other sources, “newspapers provide the most complete 
account of events for the widest sample of geographical or temporal units.”17 
Second, as offered by Earl and her collaborators, I used so-called ‘triangulation of 
multiple sources’ to ensure a broader range of coverage, which is likely both to 
capture more events (addressing description bias) and to provide multiple accounts 
of each event (addressing description bias).18 Third, related to the use of multiple 
                                                
15Oliver, Cadena Roa, and Strawn, “Emerging Trends.”   
16Some scholars have criticized protest event analysis. First of all, newspaper content is not 
intended or created for academic purposes so that the reliability and validity of the data might be 
questioned.16 In other words, researchers, who use newspaper data, depend on the work of others to 
help in providing collective events. Also, some critics argue that the protest event method that relies 
heavily on newspaper data suffers from selection bias because a news desk has a number of 
limitations such as space restriction to report on all events that actually occur. Likewise the 
newspaper data cannot be immune from impressions and inferences of journalists or commentators 
or actors thereby making such data more vulnerable to description bias. David G. Ortiz, Daniel J. 
Myers, N. Eugene Walls, and Maria-Elena D. Diaz, “Where Do We Stand With Newspaper Data,” in 
Mobilisation: An International Journal, 10 (3): p. 397. See also, Jennifer Earl, Andrew Martin, John 
D. McCarthy, and Sarah A. Soule, “The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action,” 
Annual Review of Sociology, 30, 2004, pp. 68-73. 
  17Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989, p. 128.  
18Earl, et al., “The Use of Newspaper,” 2004.  
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sources, I also take advantage of the increasing popularity of electronic archives as 
sources of data on PKS’ collective actions.19  
In doing so, I relied on two national dailies Kompas and Republika during 
two-months of fieldwork in Indonesia to collect data on PKS’ collective actions 
from 1980 to 2007. Given that the two print media have their own official websites, 
I also took advantage of their electronic archives by using keyword search strings. 
To confirm the validity of the data and to capture PKS’ collective events that were 
not reported by Kompas and Republika, I also referred to other national and regional 
dailies or weekly magazines and their electronic archives such as Media Indonesia, 
Suara Merdeka, and Tempo. Among the 225 collective events carried out by PKS 
captured in this work, 37.8% of them were reported by Kompas, 48% were covered 
by Republika, and only 14.2% were obtained from other sources.  
Clearly, by using more than two sources of newspaper data, this study 
captured more PKS collective events and is thus able to assess differences in 
reporting on the same events that are covered by more than one newspaper. 
However, for the purposes of the protest event analysis carried out in this chapter, I 
have just put “unique events” in the dataset where the same events are covered by 
Republika, Kompas and other news agencies will be enumerated as one event. 
Republika, based on the dataset, captured more PKS’ collective events than 
Kompas.  
 
                                                
19For the benefit of electronic archives, see, Earl, et al., “The Use of Newspaper,” 2004, p. 
75.  
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3.3 Indicators  
In an attempt to assess PKS collective actions from 1980-2007, I use several 
indicators that are commonly used in when conducting protest event analysis. The 
first is when the action takes place.20 This is to develop information on the timing 
and sequences of events in conjunction with theories of political opportunities. In 
Indonesia’s case, the collapse of Suharto’s regime in 1998 is crucial to mark the end 
of political repression in the country. As will further be explained, the openness and 
repressiveness of political systems are influential in determining the emergence of 
movements.  
The second is types of actions.21 These forms of actions are distinguished 
into 12 categories; that are, demonstrations/rallies, great meetings (tabligh akbar), 
fundraising, istighotsah (public praying), a devotion to social work and mobilisation 
to help victims of natural disasters, public statements of opinion, flag burning, 
sending of fighters (jihadits) and ‘volunteers,’ mobilisation during the party’s 
declaration, anniversaries and convention and unconventional mobilisation related 
to elections.  This is to define the extent to which PKS conducts its collective 
actions out in peaceful, disruptive or violent ways.22  
                                                
20See, Hanspeter Kriesi, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Marco G. Giugni, 
New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1995.   
  21Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989.    
22Some researchers propose a wide range of definitions on collective violence. Olzak 
defines events as violent if weapons or attacks are used to threaten or damage persons physically or 
objects. See, Susan Olzak, “Labour Unrest, Immigration and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America, 
1880-1915,” in American Journal of Sociology, May, 1994. A violent event has been defined in 
terms of the number of deaths during collective actions E.N Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime 
Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” in American Sociology Review 50, pp. 47-61.   
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The third is that each of PKS’ collective events will be assessed on the basis 
of issues or claims.23 Main issues raised through the party’s collective action are “a 
much more common—if more prosaic—reason why people band together in 
movements.”24 People will not risk their lives or sacrifice their time, money, or 
energies to participate in PKS’ collective action unless they have good reason to do 
so. To this end, I classify PKS’ collective action into two broad categories defined 
based on either Islamist or non-Islamist issues. Fourth, PKS’ events to raise certain 
issues will be classified as either addressing international or domestic issues.  
The fifth is that each of PKS’ collective actions will be weighted by its 
duration multiplied by the average number of participants.25 This is to measure 
event intensity that has been operationalised in many ways, including through its 
size and duration. The analysis of event intensity will also be developed to specify 
any particular issues which attract PKS’ sympathisers to go to the streets. The sixth 
is the involvement of actors or political leaders in PKS’ events.26  Finally, given that 
an event’s location can matter in several ways, the measurement of dataset based on 
the location of events will be presented as well.27 
 
3.4 Findings 
 I have discussed at length that PKS as a social movement organisation 
cannot be simplified as a political party. It evolved out of an informally Islamist-
                                                
  23Tarrow, Power in Movement, 1998.  
24Ibid., p. 4.  
25Olzak, “Analysis of Events,” 1989.     
26Ortiz, Myers, Walls, and Diaz, “Where Do We Stand.”  
27Ibid.  
 61 
based movement called ‘Jemaah Tarbiyah.’ After the resignation of Suharto in 
1998, Tarbiyah advocates formed a political party called Partai Keadilan (PK, 
Justice Party), a predecessor PKS, as a political vehicle to advance its goals. Hence, 
the term “Tarbiyah” here refers to LDK/FSLDK, KAMMI, PK, and PKS. Indeed, 
FSLDK is hardly monolithic, but it is dominated by those who are affiliated with 
Tarbiyah. Also, despite the claim that KAMMI has no formal relationship with 
PK/PKS, the dominant trends among the leadership and membership of this student 
organisation are the ideas of Tarbiyah. Further, in many instances, KAMMI 
presented itself as, in Machmudi words, “the student wing of PKS.”28   
 Among the total collective events captured in this work, the majority of 
events are held under the banner of PKS (60.9%), KAMMI (25.8%), PK (12%), and 
FSLDK (1.3%). The relatively little activity carried out by FSLDK is an 
unsurprising finding considering the fact that it is merely a friendship forum for 
building networks to facilitate intercampus predication. PK merged into PKS in 
2003 following its failure to generate sufficient votes in 1999. It comes as no 
surprise that PKS draws more attention from news agencies than other forms of 
Tarbiyah. Its remarkable success in the 2004 elections is a crucial reason why many 
people, including media, are looking at PKS more closely.  
 
3.4.1. Timing and Sequence 
Most events carried out by the FSLDK, KAMMI, PK and PKS have been 
conducted after the resignation of Suharto in May 1998. Only 6.2% of them 
                                                
28Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.  
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occurred when Suharto was still in power. These small portions of collective events 
were carried out largely by KAMMI. As is widely known, KAMMI, as one of the 
most influential student forces, played key role in demanding total reform actions 
which subsequently led Suharto to step down in 1998. Bearing slogans demanding 
‘non-violent reform’ (reformasi damai), KAMMI held massive rallies throughout 
the country from April to 21 May 1998 when Suharto announced his resignation. 
Still today, KAMMI is a leading force among Islamic student movements in 
Indonesia. Above all, however, the grand-scale demonstrations pressuring the 
government for change before 21 of May 1998, including those under the banner of 
KAMMI, were made possible by the declining capacity of Suharto to sideline any 
challenges. The regime’s weakened ability to suppress student demonstrations was 
facilitated by the emergence of the 1997 economic crisis which created a large hole 
in Suharto’s political regime and thereby created a window of political opportunity 
for regime change.  
The Graph 1 shows that prior to 1998 Tarbiyah did not appear publicly in 
order to avoid sustained political repression. Tarbiyah then focused its activities on 
cultivating religious understanding and practices in campus mosques. This finding 
affirms the theory of political opportunities where it is stated that the more the 
political system is opened, the more opportunities are available for the emergence of 
collective action. In contrast, the more the political system is closed, the less 
opportunity there is for collective action.29  
                                                
29The next chapter will further discuss the relationship between the timing of PKS’ 
collective actions and political opportunity by taking a closer look at the final days of Suharto.  
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In addition, the graph highlights that the majority of PKS’ collective actions 
were carried out in November 2006 (8.4%), July 2006 (6.2%), March 2003 (4.4%), 
August 2006 (4.4%), May 2006 (4.4%), etc. Overall, 2006 was the most intensive in 
terms of PKS’ events as 33% of its collective actions were conducted in that year 
(Graph. 2). Interestingly, during election time in 1999 and 2004, the number of PK 
and PKS’ collective actions declined significantly, respectively 2.7% and 8.9%. 
Aside from the increasing participation of PKS in election process, the decrease of 
PKS’ collective actions at election time can be seen as a wish to avoid alienating 
voters by appearing militantly Islamic. As will be explored, six-in-ten of PKS’ 
collective actions can be classified as ‘Islamist’ in substance. If the party organizes 
such an Islamist-based action at election times, it would damage the image of the 
party. As the national leadership of PKS decided to sell non-Islamist issues in the 
2004 elections, most notably, promoting clean and caring image, the party’s refrains 
from openly pushing Islamist agenda. 
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Aside from that, the answer to why 2006 became the most active year for 
PKS’ actions is that the majority of PKS collective events can be classified as event-
connected collective action, which responds to certain actual issues. In 2006 for 
instance, there were a number of controversies which PKS reacted to:  the uproar 
over cartoon portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad published by a Danish 
newspaper (3.6%), the Israeli invasion against Lebanon (6.2%), George W. Bush’s 
visit to Indonesia (8.9%), anti-pornography movements following the release of 
Indonesian version of “Playboy” magazine (5.8%), and a proposed national anti-
pornography law. The intensity of PKS’ collective action also increased slightly in 
2003 following the U.S. attacks on Iraq (6.2%) and continuing wars in Afghanistan 
(1.8%). 
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3.4.2. Forms of Action 
Among the 12 forms of collective actions looked at in this study, 
demonstration is the most preferred action of PKS, including PK and KAMMI 
(51.6%). 16.9% of PKS events take the form of position statement (pernyataan 
 65 
sikap). Another favourite type of action is a call, appeal or demand (6.2%) and a 
devotion to social work in regard to natural disasters (4.9%). Aside from that, PKS’ 
campaigns for raising donations was made up 4% as well as organising great 
meetings (tabligh akbar) (3.6%). Other actions are reported at about the same level, 
on average no more than 3% of the total of PKS’ collective events gathered in this 
work (Graph 3).     
Almost all of PKS’ collective actions, including FSLDK, KAMMI, and PK, 
are peaceful and orderly.30  Nevertheless, there is some indication that just a few of 
PKS’ events are classified as “violent” such as readiness to send jihadist (fighters) 
to the Middle East (1.8%).31 Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that this 
readiness to send jihadist is merely a rhetorical-by-product of a larger event and 
constitutes an effort to publicly display Islamic solidarities in defense of its fellow 
Muslims in other parts of the world. For example, some PKS branches conducted 
registration for ‘volunteers’ willing to be sent to Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and 
Afghanistan. As reported by media, hundreds of PKS cadres from Kediri in East 
Java were ready to leave for Lebanon to help Hizbullah troops in their struggle 
against the Israeli invasion in 2006. The men were ready to leave for Lebanon at any 
time while waiting for the go-ahead from the party’s central executive board. But, to 
my knowledge, no one was sent to the Middle East. Apart from the rhetoric of 
                                                
30Editorial, “Aksi Simpatik Partai Keadilan,” Media Indonesia, 19 October 2001; 
“Demonstrasi Itu Tertib dan Damai,” Media Indonesia, 15 September 2003; “Ketertiban Sejuta 
Umat,” Media Indonesia, 31 March 2005; Dahlan Iskan, “Massa Santun di Dunia yang Bergetah,” 
Suara Indonesia, 20 September 1998. For the case of KAMMI’s non-confrontational character 
approach, see, Jakarta Post, 11 April 1998, p. 1; “5000-an Mahasiswa Islam Serukan Aksi Damai,” 
Republika, 11 April 1998, p. 12; “Demonstrasi Sambil Tersenyum,” Merdeka, 11 April 1998, p. 1.    
31 Antara, 27 July 2006.  
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sending jihadist, PKS also frequently drew attention from the public on its readiness 
to send volunteers to help distribute financial and logistical assistance to its fellow 
Muslims suffering from Israeli and American invasions in the Middle East. 
Nonetheless, there was no clarity whether the volunteers were sent or not.  
Another form of PKS actions that is rarely seen in public is flag burning 
(2.7%). It is difficult to classify “flag burning” as a violent action because of the 
absence of injuries and death in such action. However, given that PKS and KAMMI 
are generally widely known as peaceful movements, the burning of photos of 
President Bush or the U.S. and Israeli flags throughout demonstrations signaled the 
growing escalation of anger among their participants. For instance, in response to 
the Israeli full-scale offensive against Lebanon, local branches of student 
organisations in Ambon, including KAMMI and LDK, organised thousands of 
people to march through the main streets of the city while waving Palestinian flags, 
chanting anti-America and Israeli slogans and burning Israeli flags. A few protesters 
in the demonstration carried with them fake guns, rocket launchers, and bombs and 
these people tended to cover their faces with martial “ninja” masks as is commonly 
found among the radical Palestinian group HAMAS.32 In general, however, in PKS’ 
demonstrations it is hard to find violent actions that result in the presence of injuries 
and property damage as is the case in religious vigilante groups such as Front 
Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Front Defenders) and Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troops), 
who, as parts of their anti-American demonstrations, carry out sweeping operations 
against Westerners in a number of Indonesian hotels. 
                                                
32Antara 21 July 2006. 
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3.4.3. Main Issues 
Criticism of Western domination of the global political order, epitomized by 
U.S. foreign policies against the Muslim world, has been apparent in PKS collective 
events. Specifically, along with the rise of anti-America sentiment that has been a 
dominant issue in PKS protests (17.3%), the Palestine cause has also aroused 
outpourings of Islamic solidarity among the party’s supporters. Not surprisingly, 
anti-Israeli sentiment has become the most salient characteristic of PKS 
demonstrations, with almost one third (29.9%) of its total events focusing on this 
issue.  
This figure makes PKS different from other Islamic parties and Islamic-
based mass organisations such as the largest traditionalist Muslim organisation 
Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and the Muslim modernist-based organisation 
Muhammadiyah. No other Islamic party has such an attachment to the Palestine 
cause as well as such an enduring criticism of America as does PKS. It is true that 
that anti-Israeli and America sentiments are widespread in Indonesian Muslim 
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circles. Public opinion polls conducted by a respected pollster Lembaga Survei 
Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute) in 2004 and 2005 suggest that many 
Indonesian Muslims had an unfavourable view of America and Israel.33 Unlike 
PKS, however, other Muslim organisations' anti-Israeli and America stance does not 
manifest in direct actions.  In PKS we find relatively high levels of participation in 
various types of actions against America and Israel. In other words, PKS supporters 
have more successfully transformed their anti-America and Israeli sentiment into 
actions relative to their fellow Muslims who affiliate with other Islamic parties or 
with Muslim organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah.   
Other contentious events captured in this work are KAMMI’s call for 
reformasi, which was followed by Suharto’s relinquishing power (5.8%) and its 
rejection of Suharto’s cronies and the New Order (0.9%). Since its inception, 
KAMMI successfully mobilised massive rallies and great meetings (tabligh akbar) 
against Suharto in many public universities in Indonesia. Yet it is true that the 
reformasi struggle was not only dominated by KAMMI’s demonstrations, since 
other student groups and non-governmental organizations long active in the pro-
democracy movements also contributed significantly to demanding regime change. 
Compared to other groups, “KAMMI’s demonstrations have been widely 
recognized as being amongst the least prone to violence.”34 This study also looks at 
the way KAMMI acted as a political pressure group against President Wahid 
leading to his downfall in 2001 (3.6%) 
                                                
33Saiful Mujani, “Anti-Americanism in Contemporary Indonesia,” in Studia Islamika Vol. 
12, No. 2, Jakarta, Indonesia: Centre for the Study of Islam and Society, National Institute for 
Islamic Studies (IAIN), 2005. 
34Kraince, “The Role of Islamic Student Groups,” 2000, p. 15.   
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Apart from the issues mentioned above, this study also gathers data of 
collective events showing that PKS has tried to build its reputation through 
organising collective actions to fight against corruption (4%) and money politics 
(1.8%), call for sustainability of the reformation struggle (1.3%), and the 
abolishment of ABRI’s (the Indonesian Armed Forces) dual function (1.3%). As the 
most disciplined political force in Indonesia, PKS also exerts its capability to send 
hundreds of its tight-knit cadres to offer support in natural disaster zones (5.8%). 
PKS also paid significant attention to the anti-pornography movement (5.8%) and 
anti-stigmatisation of Muslims as terrorists (1.3%). Other issues raised in PKS’ 
demonstrations but occupied at about the same level, on average no more than 1% 
of the total PKS collective events gathered in this study.   
However, among the issues surveyed in this study, the principal finding is 
that PKS’ collective events have been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and 
anti-Americanism as well as support for the Palestine cause. This indicates PKS’ 
preoccupation with distant but religiously charged issues. It could be said that the 
Palestine question is a “trademark” of the party. In fact, PKS collective actions are 
generally event-based. One event may come and go, but the prevalence of PKS 
actions against Israel can emerge across time and location. The Palestine question 
keeps occupying the minds of PKS supporters as reflected in its everlasting large-
scale demonstrations protesting Israeli actions against Palestinians. 
In other words, the high number of PKS’ actions which focus on the 
Palestine cause vis-à-vis the anti-American and Israeli sentiment suggest that the 
party remains preoccupied with the relatively distant issues, which is Islamist in 
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essence, rather than grappling with local issues that correspond with national 
interests. The data shows that PKS uses domestic events to bring attention to 
international issues, such as demanding that the government takes a firm line against 
Israel and give stronger support to the Palestinian struggle. During the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung on 2-24 April 2005, 
PKS urged the government to address the Palestine cause. Also, during the political 
turmoil of 2001, PK and KAMMI also actively mobilised its supporters to demand 
the downfall of President Wahid for his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal 
along with their opposition against his plan to open an economic relationship with 
Israel (3.6%). For some people, turning greater attention to geographically distant 
issues like Palestine and Israel as the nation is still struggling with a number of 
economic, political and social issues (e.g. corruption, poverty rate, oil price) is 
unwise.    
Nonetheless, the data shows again that PKS has paid greater attention to any 
international events which relate to anti-Israel and America sentiments. Among the 
total PKS’ anti-Zionist actions (29.2%), a large proportion was carried out to 
condemn Israeli attacks against Palestinian militants and the Israeli military actions 
against Hizbullah in Lebanon. Anti-Zionist actions are also carried out to respond to 
the issue of imposing economic sanctions on Palestine and the planned 
“development” of al-Aqsha Mosque dedicated to reclaiming the site. PKS even pays 
a lot of attention to “small-scale” event-based issues in the Middle East such as the 
Israeli incursions into Palestinian territories over the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier 
and the arrest of Palestinian parliament members.  
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Interestingly, anti-Israel sentiment has been widespread among PKS cadres 
who either come from the party’s central executive board in Jakarta or even from 
local and small branches. As described in Graph 5, the intensity of PKS’ anti-Israeli 
demonstrations, in which its participants chanted anti-Israeli slogans, held placards 
equating Nazi and Zionist regime symbols and yelled Allahu Akbar (God is great), 
are not exclusively conducted in Jakarta. Similar processions wound their way 
simultaneously through other big and small cities across the country, such as 
Surabaya, Makassar, Kediri, Gresik, and so on. This is hardly found in other Islamic 
parties. Unlike PKS, many Islamic parties are rarely seen to mobilise their 
supporters to go the streets. If they do so, they will usually raise issues of more 
domestic relevance such as demanding the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter into the 
preamble of the constitution.      
Further, it is plausible to say that PKS are capable of increasing the 
likelihood of coverage in the media. Some of its protests against Israel are not 
event-based, yet receive greater coverage from news gatherers. For example, the 
fiftieth commemoration of the Israeli occupation of Palestine received massive 
media coverage, even though the public previously deemed this issue unimportant, 
distasteful and not of interest to news readership.35  
  
                                                
35Just a few people are aware of this issue as PKS held huge rallies attended by hundreds of 
thousands of its sympathisers in Jakarta, Surabaya, and other cities. As explained earlier, most of 
PKS actions against Israel and the U.S. are conducted in response to internationally conflictual 
events, which are normally followed by the presence of violence, including injuries and deaths. For 
example, actions as a response to the Israeli air strike against Palestinians the U.S. unilateral attacks 
on Iraq were more likely to be reported by media, since the events involved a bunch of solidarity and 
addressed an actual issue.   
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3.4.4. Islamist and Non-Islamist Category 
This study will also distinguish the aforementioned issues based on Islamist 
and non-Islamist categories. As described earlier, such Islamist issues point to an 
“active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws or policies that are 
held to be Islamic in character.”36 These Islamist issues range from moral reform to 
transnational Islamism. Moral reform is centred upon religious values and is 
characterized by coercive moralism, that is, “the stated goal of the movement is to 
ensure that all citizens, regardless of their individual preferences, conform to their 
group’s moral values and standards.”37  
In this regard, PKS opposition to the “Playboy” magazine and so-called 
deviant Islamic sects and its strong endorsement of the anti-pornography bill and the 
implementation of shari’a-based laws in local governments can be included as 
Islamist moral reform in character. Meanwhile, transnational Islamism refers to a 
form of Islamic solidarity that transcends geographical boundaries by taking 
advantage of the concept of umma as shown in PKS enduring actions against Israel 
and America.  
On the other hand, PKS events on anti-corruption, the reformasi struggle, 
anti-money politics and the like are classified as non-Islamist issues. The data shows 
that roughly six-in-ten of PKS’ collective events can be classified as Islamist 
(62.2%), but just 25.8% of them were non-Islamist in essence. The gap is 
                                                
36ICG, Understanding Islamism, No. 37, 2005, p. 1. For a more detailed account of 
definition of Islamism, see Chapter 1 c.q. “What is Islamism?”  
37Rory McVeigh and David Sikkink, “God, Politics, and Protest: Religious Beliefs and the 
Legitimation of Contentious Tactics,” Social Forces, June 2001, 79 (4), p. 1431.   
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substantial, but with a very few exceptions to this distinction making it not a cut and 
dry category. Curiously, PK and KAMMI’s call for President Wahid’s resignation 
was not only motivated by his alleged corruption involvement as widely aired in the 
public, but also his strong ties and associations with the Zionist government38 and 
his controversial plan to lift the ban on Marxism, Communism and Leninism 
thought.39 
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Given that there is no other party which has such a high degree of 
engagement in collective action, it is difficult to make comparisons. However, the 
finding has told us something significant about PKS. The fact that six-in-ten of 
PKS’ events are Islamist suggests that, in spite of PKS’ successful campaign in 
2004 on an anti-corruption ticket, the party is still pushing forward its hard-line 
religious views. If PKS’ “clean and caring” campaign really matters, this message 
should be more visible in its collective actions, not just during election time. Graph 
                                                
38Sekretariat Jenderal DPP PKS, Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik PK dan PKS 
Periode 1998-2005, Harakatuna Publishing, Bandung, 2007, pp. 181-182. 
39Marxism, Communisum and Leninism were banned with the following a decision made by 
the People’s Consultative Assembly TAP/XXV/MPRS/1966 after the so-called failed coup of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965.  
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4 illustrates that PKS’ actions on non-Islamist issues (e.g. anti-corruption, rule of 
law, etc) make up less than half of the amount of the party’s Islamist views. 
Through its collective actions, PKS has presented itself as being amongst the best 
organised Islamist force raising geographically distant issues that correspond with 
the increasingly anti-America and Israeli sentiment along with issues relatively 
closer to home, which are still Islamist in essence (e.g. support for a controversial 
anti-pornography bill, strong opposition to the “Playboy” magazine, etc).                 
 
3.4.5. Far and Near Enemies 
Unlike other Islamic parties, PKS has shown more explicitly its concern for 
the plight of fellow Muslim countries, most notably, Palestine, Afghanistan, 
Lebanon and Iraq. This does not necessarily mean that PKS are only concerned 
about what is happening globally. The data shows that PKS is also concerned about 
what is happening in its home country.  
Accordingly, a wide variety of issues addressed during PKS’ events will be 
classified in both challenging the relatively far enemy and the nearer enemy. Like 
Islamist movements elsewhere, PKS has extended its perceptions of “enemy” to 
both domestic and foreign foes.40 The party’s strong criticism against America’s 
aggressive international anti-terrorist campaign is perceived as undermining the 
Muslim world as shown in its grand-scale demonstrations against Bush’s state visit 
to Indonesia; American attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan; as well as its enduring anti-
                                                
40Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005, p. 55.  
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Zionist sentiment, can be classified as PKS’ tendency to challenge its distant 
enemies.  
Another internationally contentious event, that is, the row between America 
and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program, which has attracted the world’s attention, 
gained only 0.4% from the total of PKS’ actions. Indeed PKS describes itself as 
Sunni.41 The party’s reluctance to address the issues between the U.S. and Iranian 
might be caused by the existence of Sunni-Shi’ah rivalry among PKS activists.  
On the contrary, PKS events, which promise to bring a clean and caring 
government, massive mobilisation of its cadres for assisting victims of natural 
disasters, as well as its endorsements for the implementation of shari’a-inspired 
laws in some local governments and its huge collective actions to call for the 
enactment of an anti-pornography bill can be categorised as addressing the 
relatively nearer enemies.  
Interestingly, the data reveals that the majority of PKS events were anchored 
in geographically distant enemies focusing on transnational Islamist issues rather 
than on relatively nearer enemies and the national interest. Nearly half of PKS’ 
events as recorded by the mass media were dedicated to challenge foreign foes, 
while 37.8% of them were concerned with domestic issues (Graph. 5). Hidayat 
Nurwahid, former president of the party, admitted that the relatively distant enemies 
(notably pro-Palestine) have been a dominant trend in PKS demonstrations.42 
Another PKS key leader, Untung Wahono held: 
                                                
41Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.   
42Hidayat Nurwahid, Interview, 4 October 2007.  
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We must send a strong message to Israel and the U.S. which usually favours 
Israel over Palestine, that the attacks will receive more protests and 
condemnation from global publics. The easiest way to show our opposition 
to Israel is grand-scale demonstrations, by which our disapproval towards 
Israel can be reported by Western news agencies. PKS does not need to 
organise massive rallies that raise domestic issues because we have already 
articulated them through a number of PKS representatives in the legislature. 
In terms of PKS demonstrations, our target audience is, in fact, Westerners.43    
 
After all, bearing in mind, this far and near enemies’ distinction is not 
exclusive and there is a considerable overlap between the two. For instance, PKS’ 
strong opposition to the release of the Indonesian version of “Playboy” magazine 
cannot be included as a merely domestic issue, since the magazine is considered by 
PKS cadres as an American-influenced publication deliberately injected into 
Indonesia to undermine religious and moral values. 
                                         Graph 5 
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3.4.6. Location, Participants, and Leaders 
By wide margins, Jakarta is the most active city, where a large proportion of 
PKS’ collective actions were being conducted (55.6%), but just 5.8% of them are 
held in Surabaya, Bandung (4.9), Semarang (4%), Yogyakarta (3.6%). Other cities 
                                                
43Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007.   
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like Solo, Medan, Cirebon, and Bekasi are reported at the same percentage (1.8%). 
Pontianak, Palembang, Denpasar, and Pangkal Pinang share the same level (1.3%). 
Other cities are reported at about the same level, on average no more than 1% of the 
total PKS collective events gathered in this work.  
                                             Graph 6 
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There are a number of reasons why more than half of PKS’ collective 
actions occurred in Jakarta. First, Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia, where 
Republika, Kompas as the primary sources of this study along with many news 
agencies are situated. Media sources are less likely to attend and report events that 
are far away because of the lack of journalists and it is more costly to cover the 
events. Second, as the centre of political and economic activities and the place 
where all foreign embassies are located, Jakarta provides target specific locales. 
PKS’ most favoured sites for demonstrations are situated in the capital including the 
U.S. Embassy, the United Nation’s representative, the Hotel Indonesia roundabout, 
the House of Parliament and others. More importantly, Jakarta is a PKS stronghold, 
where the party won convincingly in the 2004 elections and thus collective events 
are more likely to occur in Jakarta.  
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Meanwhile, among the total of PKS events that mobilised a number of 
participants (n= 141), 41.8% of them were attended by thousands of the party’s 
participants and 25.5% of them were attended by hundreds of protesters. 
Surprisingly, 7.8% of PKS’ events were converged on by hundreds of thousands of 
its sympathisers, while 3.5% of them involved tens of thousands of people. Even 
more so, there were thousands of people gathered in 5.7% of PKS actions. But there 
were just 5.7% of PKS’ events that succeeded in mobilising dozens of protesters. 
PKS actions that occur in Jakarta involve grand-scale demonstrations and most are 
related to the virulent strain of anti-Zionist and American sentiments.  
Finally, the measurement, which is based on the involvement of significant 
actors or leaders in an event, is politically and culturally significant. Hence, those 
events are more likely to be reported.44 In many instances, this significance may 
arise because of the social status of an actor, notoriety or celebrity.45 In the case of 
PKS, however, there are no outstanding leaders or extraordinary party figures. 
Unlike other parties who rely on particular leaders or charismatic people such as 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for the Democrat Party, Abdurrahman Wahid for the 
Nation’s Awakening Party (PKB), Megawati for the Indonesian Democracy Party-
Struggle (PDI-P), PKS seems to be less attentive politically to individual leaders.46  
                                                
44For a detailed account of the significance of actors, see David Synder and William R. 
Kelly, “Conflict Intensity, Media Sensitivity and the Validity of Newspaper Data,” American 
Sociological Review, 42, 1977, pp. 105-123.   
45Ortiz, Myers, Walls, and Diaz, “Where Do We Stand,” p. 399.   
46For a detailed account of the significance of political leadership in Indonesia, see R. 
William Liddle & Saiful Mujani, “Leadership, Party and Religion,” Comparative Political Studies, 
40, 7 (July, 2007), 832-857.  
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Accordingly, in order to drive up coverage, PKS tends to maximize the size 
of participants in its actions.47 Nonetheless, the media, which covers PKS events, 
still needs a leader or actor which can represent the party and thus become the focus 
of the coverage. The data illustrates that among other leader of PKS actions 
captured in this study, Hidayat Nurwahid, former president of PKS, who resigned 
from the position after being elected as the chairman of the People’s Consultative 
Assembly, is the most media-cited person (22.1%). Media preference also goes to 
Tifatul Sembiring, which serves currently as the president of the party (19.9%). Al-
Muzammil Yusuf, a senior leader of PKS and the chairman of the Palestine caucus 
in the parliament, makes up 5.1%, while Ahmad Heryawan, the leader of Jakarta 
branch of PKS (4.4%). Other leaders are reported at about the same level, on 
average no more than 1.5% of the total PKS/PK/KAMMI events gathered in this 
work.  
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47Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007.    
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Illustration 2 
 
 
Caption: PKS supporters march toward the United States Embassy during an anti-Israel 
rally in Jakarta (date unspecified). Available at zioneocon.blogspot.com/ 
Indonesian%20rally.jpg. 
 
Illustration 3 
 
 
 
Caption: Thousands of protesters from PKS rally in front of the Danish Embassy in Jakarta 
on 6 February 2006, to demand an apology for the publication of caricatures of Prophet 
Muhammad (JP/Mulkan Salmona). Available at newscompass.blogspot.com/ 2006_02_01_ 
archive.html 
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CHAPTER 4 
BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES:  
THE EMERGENCE OF PKS AND ITS POLITICAL  
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES  
 
In this chapter, I will apply the fundamentals of social movement theory to 
illuminate the dynamics of PKS and reveal that the party is not an unusual social 
movement organisation (SMO). In this chapter, I will discuss theories of political 
opportunity structures and examine the double track of political opportunity 
structures; the international contexts and domestic possibilities for political 
opportunities that facilitated or constrained the emergence of PKS.  
 
4.1. Political Opportunity Structures (POS) 
Since its emergence in the late 1970s, the concept of political opportunity 
structures (POS) has become popular among social and political scientists and has 
spurred much research in the field of social movements. Various scholars have 
pointed out the different dimensions of POS. For example, Tarrow’s formulation, 
emphasizes openness or closure of a political system, while Kriesi and his 
collaborators concentrate on the formal institutional structure. Tarrow defines 
political opportunity structures as:  
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“[C]onsistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of 
the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake 
collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure. 
Theorists of political opportunity structure emphasise the mobilisation of 
resources external to the group” (emphasis in original).1  
 
In order to synthesize across the different interpretations of political 
opportunities, McAdam provides the following broadly accepted list of 
fundamental dimensions of POS: (1) the relative openness or closure of a political 
system; (2) the stability or instability of a broad set of elite alignments; (3) the 
presence or absence of elite allies; (4) the state’s capacity or propensity for 
repression.2 In this chapter, I will use McAdam’s scheme of POS with emphasis 
on his central arguments on the extent to which a political system is open or closed 
and the extent to which a regime is able or unable to sideline any challenges. 
According to McAdam, the openness and the closure of political systems 
are amongst the most salient factors of POS, which is influential in determining 
the movement emergence. Dyke supports this notion stating that “groups are more 
likely to mobilise when the institutionalised political system is open to them.”3 On 
the contrary, the more the political system is closed, the less opportunity there is 
for collective action. However, Eisinger indicates that protest is most likely to 
                                                
1Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass 
Politics in the Modern State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 85.  
2McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current problems, Future Directions,” in Doug 
McAdam, John D. Mc.Carthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.) Comparative Perspectives, p. 27. 
3Nella Van Dyke, “Protest Cycles and Party Politics: The Effects of Elite Allies and 
Antagonists on Students Protest in the United Stated, 1930-1990,” in Jack A Goldstone (ed.), 
States, Parties, and Social Movements, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 226.  
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occur in a political system characterized by a mix of open and closed factors,4 as is 
represented graphically in Figure 2.  
 
 
        Level of  
        Mobilisation 
 
 
 
 
Closed System     Open System 
      Figure 2 Eisinger’s model of mobilisation 
 
In other words, Eisinger suggests that collective action is less likely to 
occur in extremely closed or authoritarian systems or in extremely open or 
democratic ones.5 This is largely because repression, which usually happens in the 
closed political system or undemocratic regime, would discourage protest in the 
prior case and would suppress the sustained interaction of collective action actors 
and authorities that is the hallmark of social movements.”6 Meanwhile, a 
completely open and democratic political configuration would render protest 
                                                
4Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior,” p. 15.   
5Ibid.  
6Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Actions and Politics, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 92.  
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unnecessary, because the structure of political configuration has provided a greater 
access for citizens to participate.7  
The idea that a partially open political system encourages protest is 
vindicated in the newly democratic states or semi-democratic regimes, which have 
undergone a transitional phase from an authoritarian or closed political 
configuration to a more democratic regime. Under such circumstances, the 
political system is not fully open or the political openness has not been 
institutionalised. Nonetheless, the capacity of the regime to suppress the 
movement has declined significantly, thereby opening new opportunities for 
collective action. 
In short, social movements do not occur in a vacuum. Instead, they rely 
heavily on external conditions that provide opportunities for collective action. As a 
social movement, PKS is not a spontaneous gathering because before it emerged in 
public there is a series of socio-political processes which overtime contributed to 
its development. In the following section, I will employ the aforementioned 
theoretical approach of POS to explain the emergence of Tarbiyah in the context of 
Suharto’s authoritarianism and the formation of the Justice Party (PK), the 
predecessor to PKS, in the aftermath of the collapse of Suharto regime.    
 
 
 
                                                
7Dyke, “Protest Cycles,” 2003, p. 232.  
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4.2. The Emergence of PKS and the Double-Track of POS 
 In order to examine external conditions that facilitated or constrained the 
emergence of PKS, I will use what is called “the double track of political 
opportunity structures,” that is, both international and domestic factors which 
contributed to the emergence of the party. The international context of political 
opportunities helped to structure the domestic possibilities for the development of 
PKS.  
 
4.2.1 International Context of Political Opportunities  
As explained by McAdam, the international context of political 
opportunities is employed to oppose the tendency among social movement 
scholars to reveal, often unintentionally, a state-centred or closed-polity bias. In 
this regard, alongside the domestic factors outlined above, the following 
international dimensions help to explain the emergence of Tarbiyah and its current 
political wing, PKS.  
The first international impetus for Islamic revivalism in Indonesia that 
facilitated the emergence of Tarbiyah is the triumph of the Islamist revolution in 
Iran.  As was suggested by many scholars, the revival of Islam was perceived as a 
popular assertion of Muslim identity against Western political and cultural 
dominance.8 Revivalists perceive the strength of Western culture in everyday life 
                                                
8Among other things, Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution: On Interpretative History of 
Modern Iran, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981; See also, Nikki Keddi, “Islamic Revival in 
the Middle East: A Comparison of Iran and Egypt,” in Samih Farsoun (ed.), Arab Society, 
Continuity and Change, Croom Helm, London, 1985.    
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as the highest stage of imperialism and ‘cultural invasion’ that undermines their 
Islamic authenticity and cultural basis of identity. As a result of the 1979 Iranian 
revolution, revivalists in many Muslim countries felt that it was now possible for 
Islamic forces to overthrow Western-supported regimes —such as that of the Shah 
which adopted a secular autocratic state— and they were inspired to do so in their 
own countries. 
Another international factor that helped the emergence of the Tarbiyah was 
the strengthening of links between the modernist-Islamist groups DDII and Saudi 
Arabia. As noted in the previous chapter, DDII played a vital role in establishing 
the campus dakwah movement. Having said that the Iranian revolution was 
proudly welcomed in many predominantly Muslim countries, including Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia sought to spread its political and religious influence across the 
Muslim world in order to counter the increasing dominance of Iran. DDII 
emphasised the distinctions between Sunni Islam (subscribed to by Indonesian 
Muslims) and Shiite Islam (subscribed to by the majority of Iranians).9 A 
prominent PKS leader Abu Ridha stated:  
First of all, we think that the 1979 Iranian revolution was the triumph of 
Islam. Then we had been learned that the Shi’ah is the only officially 
recognized sect in Iran. We then see the revolution more objectively, 
claiming that it is not only a representation of Islam, but, more importantly, 
the triumph of the Shi’ah on the world’s stage.10   
 
                                                
9Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.  
10Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.  
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Shiism was continuously described by DDII, who are close to Saudi 
Arabia, as a fatal deviation of Islam.11 As discussed in chapter two, DDII utilised 
its close ties with the kingdom to boost the development of campus dakwah. 
Among other things, in the 1970s DDII sent a number of students to undertake 
Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia with scholarships provided by the kingdom. At this 
time, Islamic activism and enthusiasm, called al-Sahwa al-Islamiyyah (Islamic 
awakening), gripped Saudi universities.12 According to International Crisis Group 
(ICG), the impetus for this phenomenon was derived from the Saudi regime giving 
shelter to a large number of Brotherhood activists from Syrian and Egypt who 
escaped from political persecution in their own countries.13 
Aside from political considerations,14 at the time Saudi authorities also 
urgently needed skilled workers and professionals following the oil price which 
enabled the kingdom to improve their social, health and education sectors. The 
Brotherhood activists played a key role in filling the gap, especially in education 
where they designed educational systems and curriculum at schools and 
universities in the country.15 The PKS ideologue Abu Ridha who was a student in 
Saudi Arabia recalled that most books in university libraries in the 1970s were 
                                                
11For a detailed account of DDII’s accusation of Shiism, see Burhanuddin, “The 
Conspiracy of Jews,” 2007.   
12International Crisis Group (ICG), “Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?” 
ICG Middle East Report No. 31, 21 September 2004.  
13Ibid.  
14According to ICG, the Saudi regime used the Brotherhood’s politicized version of Islam 
as ‘a weapon in its political-ideological disputes with Nasserist [Egypt] and Baathist [Syrian] 
neighbours.” See, ICG, Ibid.    
15Ibid.  
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written by the Brotherhood’s associates.16 It is hardly surprising that Saudi alumni 
were then influenced by the Brotherhood’s ideas and activism. Apart from that, the 
Saudi Kingdom established the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA, 
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab) in Jakarta in 1980 in order to bolster 
the relationship with Indonesia. Its lecturers in the 1980s and 1990s were mostly 
inspired by the Brotherhood thinking and the majority of books in the library were 
written by members of the Brotherhood. According to Mahfudz Sidiq, LIPIA also 
played a crucial role in disseminating the Brotherhood’s approach (manhaj haraki) 
in Indonesia.17  
In addition, the link between Indonesian revivalists and their fellow 
activists from Malaysia is another international dimension that contributed to the 
emergence of Tarbiyah.18 According to Untung Wahono, many young Indonesian 
revivalists in the early 1970s benefited from relations with Malaysian revivalist 
groups.19 A number of writings of Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna and other 
leading ideologues of Islamic revivalism had previously been translated into 
Malay by, most notably, the Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM, Angkatan Belia 
                                                
16Abu Ridha, Interview, 25 September 2007.  
17Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 2003, p. 83. A majority of LIPIA’s lecturers 
are now dominated by salafist ideology.    
18For purposes of this analysis, I simply describe the benefit taken from the link with 
Malaysian young revivalist groups. It is worth noting that ABIM and the National Union of 
Malaysian Muslim Students (PKPIM, Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-pelajar Islam Malaysia) had 
utilised the links with the leading Muslim Students’ Association in Indonesia (HMI). HMI helped 
their Malaysian counterparts to organize several dakwah training trips to Jakarta and Bandung. See, 
Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students, Pelanduk 
Publications, Malaysia, p. 19.       
19Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007. See also,  Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan 
Reformasi, 2003, p. 83. 
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Islam Malaysia).20 In the early 1970s, when the present Islamic awakening was 
beginning to surface, religious enthusiasm among students in Indonesian secular 
campuses (which generally did not have expertise in Arabic) was greatly 
facilitated by the presence of translated books made possible by their counterparts 
in Malaysia. It was a high-profile DDII member and the initiator of LMD, 
Imaduddin Abdulrahim, then a lecturer at the University of Technology Malaysia 
(UTM) in Kuala Lumpur, who brought Malay versions of the Brotherhood books 
into Indonesia.21 
The influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas and activism 
was, not surprisingly, also visible in Tarbiyah’s political thinking and actions. 
Yusuf al-Qardhawi, the influential Egypt cleric, one-time Brotherhood leader, 
called Tarbiyah’s political vehicle PKS an extension (imtidad) of the 
Brotherhood.22 Mashadi, a former PK legislator, admitted that PKS has drawn its 
ideology and model of action from the Brotherhood, largely because the Egyptian 
Islamist group offers a thorough understanding of Islamic teachings rather than 
concentrating on abstract theological debates.23 Like the Brotherhood, PKS gives 
priority to political actions over missionary activities. Although the influence of 
the Brotherhood is much more visible in the party’s ideas and approach, a number 
                                                
20Anwar, Islamic Revivalism.  
21 Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 2003, p. 83. It is worth pointing out that in 
spite of bringing those translating books to Indonesia, Imaduddin had a very important role in 
influencing Malaysian students toward the totality of Islam. Zainah wrote that Imaduddin 
developed selected groups of Islamic students in Malaysia and began to conduct religious circles. 
See, Anwar, Islamic Revivalism, pp. 19-21.        
22Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2004, p. 285. 
23Mashadi, Interview, 4 October 2007.   
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of leading figures of PKS use rhetoric to justify the relationship between the 
Brotherhood and Indonesian society in general. Hidayat Nurwahid even claimed 
that the Egyptian recognition of Indonesian independence was as a result of the 
Brotherhood’s support.24 During an official visit to Egypt, H. Agus Salim and Dr. 
HM. Rasyidi came to the Brotherhood’s headquarters and extended their deepest 
thanks on behalf of the Indonesian people to Hasan Al-Banna for his support for 
independence.25 Surely, this is a post-factum justification which is repeatedly 
stated by PKS leaders to exaggerate the role of the Brotherhood in the 
independence of Indonesia. Historical sources show that a majority of Egyptian 
people and the country’s political groups in 1940s, including its socialist-
nationalist groups, strongly supported the Indonesian independence from the 
Dutch.      
 
4.2.2 Domestic Factors 
Despite the fact that the development of Tarbiyah and its current political 
manifestation, PKS, cannot be viewed in isolation from international contexts, 
there were still domestic factors that contributed to the emergence of Tarbiyah. To 
begin with, I will discuss two domestic factors that directly enhanced the 
emergence of Tarbiyah: Suharto’s repressive measures against political Islam, and 
the regime’s restrictions on student activism in tertiary campuses. I will also point 
                                                
24Hidayat Nurwahid, Interview, 4 October 2007.  
25 K.H. Rahmad Abdullah, “Pengantar,” in Sa’id Hawwa, Memoar Hasan Al-Banna: 
Untuk Dakwah dan Para Dainya, Hawin Murtadho, Salafuddin (translators), Era Intermedia, 
Surakarta, 2004.  
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out Suharto’s formulae combining political stability and developmentalism 
(pembangunan) and the impact of this on certain sociological and anthropological 
changes which contributed to the emergence of Tarbiyah. These domestic factors 
will be discussed in the following contexts: authoritarianism since the regime’s 
inception, Suharto’s rapprochement with Islam in the late 1980s, the fall of 
Suharto and transition to democracy.    
The first notable domestic factor that led to the emergence of campus 
dakwah was the proscription of explicit Islamic political expressions. Suharto’s 
hostility towards political Islam emerged shortly after he took in power in 1967. 
Clear evidence of this can be found in a number of political maneuvers, including: 
the formation of Parmusi instead of the rehabilitation of Masyumi, the policy of 
party reduction which required all Islamic party to fuse into the United 
Development Party (PPP), and the promulgation of legislation to ensure all mass-
based organisations accepted Pancasila as the sole basis (asas tunggal).  
In addition to this, Suharto had repeatedly proven his capacity to suppress 
dissident voices.26 Further, the regime did not hesitate to resort to military action 
or harsh measures to confront Islamic opposition which often claimed hundreds of 
lives.27 Notable among these was the tragedy of 12 September 1984 which took 
place in a mosque in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. Hundreds of protesters led by Amir 
Biki were shot at by the military as they demonstrated against military personnel 
who tore down brochures advocating that Muslim women should wear Islamic 
                                                
26Asiaweek, July 5, 1996.  
27Salim, “The Rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (1982-2004),” 2005. 
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attire (jilbab). The regime also took harsh measures against a radical usrah group, 
Jihad Command (Komando Jihad), headed by Imran Zein who hijacked a Garuda 
Woyla flight to Thailand on 28 March 1981. Long suppressed under authoritarian 
rule, a few Islamic activists became more radicalised and went underground.28 
Under such circumstances, some Islamic activists instead took non-political 
activities like dakwah and focused primarily on the cultivation of religious 
practices. 
A second domestic factor that facilitated the birth of campus dakwah in 
universities was the regime’s restrictions on student activism. In the early 1970s, 
student protests intensified. Student protest exploded in January 1974 during the 
visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Kakuei Tanaka in Jakarta. In 1977-1978, 
large-scale student unrest emerged, including at the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB) that led the military to occupy campuses. Several student 
leaders were arrested and put in jail.  In response to the wave of student radicalism, 
the regime launched a depoliticisation program on campuses under the headings of 
Normalisation of Campus Life (NKK) and Student Co-ordination Bodies (BKK) in 
the late 1970s. These policies banned all student activism inside university 
campuses, replacing the previously independent Students’ Councils (Dewan 
Mahasiswa/DEMA).  
The extensive use of administrative and coercive powers prevented critical 
Islamic groups as well as Islamic students from engaging in explicit political 
activism. As a reaction to such a hostile environment, some of them undertook to 
                                                
28Ibid.  
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revive their faith by establishing the so-called campus dakwah movement and 
concentrating on non-disruptive forms of Islamic activism, which used campus 
mosques as their bases. In terms of resource mobilisation, which draws primarily 
upon rational choice theory, coercive force and repression raise the costs and risks 
of participation and consequently depress collective action.29 Wiktorowicz called 
this a “web of disincentives” which dissuades ordinary people from engaging with 
social movement organisations that challenge the raison d’etre of the state or 
threaten to mobilise mass-based social protest against the regime.30     
Accordingly, campus dakwah then took the form of a less formally 
institutionalised movement, used a non-confrontational approach, and focused on 
the cultivation of religious understanding and practices among Islamic students in 
prestigious universities. Hence, the presence of campus dakwah can best be 
understood as a rejection of the regime. To escape from the regime’s control and 
repression, campus dakwah decided to retreat to what Wiktorowicz called “the 
networks of shared meaning” with secretive leadership structures and no formal 
organisation to achieve its goals.31  
This is particularly the case when campus dakwah, as a representation of 
Tarbiyah, adopted the concept of Sirriyat al-Tandzim wa Alamiyyat al-Dakwah 
(Secret Organisational Structure and Open Predication).32 This notion implies that 
                                                
29Karren Rusler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian 
Revolution,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 61, Issue 1, February, 1996, p. 138.   
30Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, State University of New York Press, New York, 2001, p. 
14.  
31Ibid.  
32Irwan Prayitno, Kepribadian Dakwah, Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, Jakarta, 2003.  
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every Muslim is obliged to perform dakwah in an open way, except in less 
democratic political systems where overt dakwah risks harsh regime reprisals.33 
Under such circumstances, activists of campus dakwah must keep the structural 
organisation of the movement and its leadership secret.34  
The secret nature of the movement in the early stages of its development 
was manifested in the use of informal organisations and religious networks, which 
linked its members through shared meaning about how Islamic society should be 
implemented.35 These networks were embedded in everyday interactions in 
religious circles and activities (daurah, liqa, etc.) Its members share beliefs like 
‘Islam as the solution’ and ‘Islam as the concept beyond the nation-state.’ They 
withdrew from domestic politics and paid significant attention to international 
Muslim issues such as the Palestine-Israeli conflict, Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the like. Overall, these were all strategic choices of actions as a 
result of the harsh realities of repression under the New Order.     
While the first two domestic factors are related to external political 
pressures imposed by the Suharto regime, the following domestic changes are 
primarily concerned with the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices. 
This phenomenon, referred to as “the Islamic turn,” was most notable among 
students in secular universities where many students became “born again 
                                                
33Ibid.  
34Sidiq, “KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi,” 2003, p. 84.    
35Singerman distinguishes the terms “informal” and “social” to describe Islamist networks 
in Cairo. She prefers “informal” to “social” to explain Egyptian Muslim networks, because “it calls 
attention to the extremely sensitive and politicized nature of associational life in contexts where the 
state closely and minutely supervises any formal, legal and public associations.” See, Diane 
Singerman, “The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements,” in Wiktorowicz, Islamic 
Activism, 2004, p. 155.     
 95 
Muslims”. Indeed the trend of Islamic revivalism among students in the early 
1980s was also related to events and socio-political changes in the world-wide 
Muslim community. The sources of these phenomena did, however, have local 
impetus.  
First of all, the phenomenon of the Islamic turn in Indonesia was fueled by 
rapid economic development under Suharto.36 During this time, enormous progress 
was made in education, health and poverty reduction, to mention just a few of the 
most important sectors.37 In sum, tremendous socio-economic achievements 
enabled more people to obtain better education.38 Among those who enjoyed 
tertiary education came from what Clifford Geertz coined a “santri” (pious 
Muslim) background.39 In other words, the economic achievements had enabled 
                                                
36Shortly after Suharto gained power, price stability had been achieved. The real gross 
domestic product had expanded by over 450 percent compared to the previous regime.36 A 
successful campaign on family planning (KB, Keluarga Berencana) reduced population growth 
from an average of 2.4 percent in the period 1965-1980 to an average of 1.8 percent in 1980-
1996.36 The poverty rate declined sharply from 70 percent at the end of the 1960s to only 27 
percent in the mid 1990s.36 The urban population increased significantly from under 20 percent of 
the population to 35 percent in the mid 1990s.Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, “Introduction,” in Hal 
Hill (ed.), Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, Allen and 
Unwin, Australia, 1994, pp. xxiv-xxv.    
37That is why Herbert Feith called Suharto’s regime as a repressive-developmentalist 
referring to a pair of magic mantra, that is “developmentalism” (pembangunan) and political 
stability, which cost political freedom and democracy. See, Herbert Feith, “Repressive-
Developmentalist Regimes in Asia: Old Strengths, New Vulnerabilities,” Prisma, No. 19 (1980, pp. 
39-55.     
38One of the best Suharto’s legacies has been the expansion of education to the point 
where universal primary education has been almost attained.38 The percentage of young adults with 
basic literacy skills grew significantly from 40 percent to 90 percent.38 The percentage of people 
completing senior high school increased dramatically from 4 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 
1990.38 More importantly, the percentage of people completing academy or university education 
reached an unprecedented level from 0.4 percent in 1970 to 1.6 percent in 1990.  Terrence H. Hull 
and Gavin W. Jones, “Demographic Perspectives,” in Hal Hill (ed.), Indonesia’s New Order: The 
Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, Allen and Unwin, Australia, 1994. 
39The term ‘santri’ (pious Muslims) refers to the interpretative school in Indonesian 
studies pioneered by the American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, in the 1950s. Clifford Geertz, 
“The Javanese Village,” in G. William Skinner, ed., Local Ethnic, and National Loyalties in 
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more santri, either from small towns or rural areas, to pursue their study at 
universities.    
In a further development, the emergence of international events that led to 
Islamic resurgence like the triumph of Islamist revolution in Iran in 1979 brought 
influences to many predominantly Muslim countries. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, 
the process of Islamic revivalism began to affect students in secular universities 
who come from various backgrounds. Coincidentally, in the face of the 
depoliticisation of the student world through the policy of NKK/BKK, many 
Islamic students found campus mosques organised by Tarbiyah as a site for 
fulfilling their growing interest in Islamic studies and practices. Through this 
religious activism, those who came from, in Geertz’s term, abangan or less pious 
Muslim backgrounds, became more conscious of their “Muslimness” and tried to 
be more pious and committed to live by teachings and precepts of Islam. 
The notion of dakwah, which literally means “call” as in missionary 
activities, has therefore been expanded to include the task of making Muslims 
better Muslims. Meanwhile those who came from modernist and traditionalist 
santri backgrounds tend to merge with each other becoming what Machmudi 
coined “convergent santri.”40 Since then, those Muslim students from various 
backgrounds were unwilling to identify with a particular sub-group, such as the 
abangan, traditionalist, or modernist Muslims.  Instead, they were more likely to 
call themselves Muslims without applying an adjective, in an effort not to 
                                                                                                                                  
Village Indonesia, Cornell University Modern Indonesian Project, Ithaca, 1959. For the most 
detailed account, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, Free Press of Glencoe, London, 1964. 
40Machmudi, “Islamising Indonesia,” 2006.   
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reproduce the santri-abangan and the modernist-traditionalist dichotomies as well 
as means of identifying with the wider Muslim community (umma).   
 
4.3. Suharto’s Changing Relationship with Islam 
As explained earlier, the development of Tarbiyah in Indonesia has utilised 
informal networks and less visible organisations. Nonetheless, the adoption of 
such informal networks and institutions as part of the Tarbiyah movement’s 
collective activities were only valid at times of the regime’s repression against 
political Islam. Arguably, less visible organisations are often seen as “transitory 
stages” in the development of a social movement, which subsequently turn into 
more formal structures when the state provides a greater access for individuals to 
participate.41 In this sense, the fall of Suharto in 1998 created opportunities for 
Tarbiyah to transform from an informal movement to a political party promoting 
their political ideals in an explicit tone by utilising formal and visible structures.  
Prior to the collapse of the regime, Suharto’s changing relationship with 
Islam in the late 1980s, led Tarbiyah and other Islamic groups to emerge into 
public view. The formation of an intercampus predication organisation FSLDK in 
1986 and the establishment of KAMMI in the 1998, which played a significant 
role in the reformation struggle that led to the resignation of Suharto, proved that 
                                                
41Wiktorowicz, “The Management,” 2001, p. 8. See also, Rodney Stark and William Sims 
Bainbridge, “Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cults and Sects,” 
American Journal of Sociology 85, 6 (May 1980), pp. 1376-95. 
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Tarbiyah began to emerge from its secretive stage adopted throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s.  
Since the late 1980s, the Suharto regime began responding positively to 
demands from various Islamic organisations. For instance, the Ministry of 
Education and Culture abandoned its long firmly held policy, that is, decree no 
052/Kep/D/1982 forbidding the wearing of the jilbab or Islamic attire for women 
in schools. The Ministry of Religious Affairs presented to parliament a bill 
expanding the authority of Islamic courts. It also published a compilation of 
Islamic law. Protests by Muslims against the state’s controlled national sport 
lottery (Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah or SDSB) led to the closing of 
the lottery. The Catholic editor of the weekly popular tabloid Monitor was put in 
jail for three years for announcing a poll which discredited the Prophet 
Muhammad as the 11th most admired person below President Suharto. The birth of 
ICMI in the late 1990, above all, was perceived as the most striking evidence of 
the new centrality of Islam in Indonesian public life. In 1991, Suharto himself 
moved his public identity towards Islam by undertaking a pilgrimage to Mecca, 
and then adopting the name Haji Muhammad Suharto. Although many scholars 
view Suharto’s shift to Islam as simply a part of the regime’s strategy to generate 
Muslim support,42 many dakwah organisations and activists, including Tarbiyah, 
                                                
42Among other things, William Liddle and Michael Vatikiotis works are viewed by many 
as the best examples of literature which draw such a conclusion, namely that ICMI’s formation was 
facilitated by Suharto due to his changing perception of political Islam. See, Michael Vatikiotis, 
Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change Routledge, 
London and New York, 1994. See also, R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A 
Political Explanation,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55, 3 (August, 1996).  
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welcomed the changing relationship with the regime and seized the momentum for 
enhancing their activities in public. 
 
4.4 The Fall of Suharto and the Emergence of PK/PKS 
In mid-1997, a deep economic crisis in Asia began to affect Indonesia. The 
crisis was markedly evident in the dramatic decline in the value of Indonesian 
currency (rupiah). Thousands of enterprises, from small to large-scale businesses, 
collapsed. Since the outbreak of the crisis, people became increasingly frustrated 
by miserable socio-economic conditions. Unemployment levels jumped to the 
highest level since the 1960s. As a result of the sharp increase in prices, the 
number of people living below the poverty line increased to around 50 percent of 
the total population.43  
The deterioration of economic conditions undermined the regime’s greatest 
pillar of strength and Suharto’s legitimacy built on a strong economic development 
track-record had reached its lowest point. The crisis was a trigger for a series of 
student demonstrations.44 In the early stages of mobilisation, student rhetoric 
expressed a deep concern about the crisis. Students across the nation, including the 
Tarbiyah-influenced student group KAMMI, were united by the similarity of their 
                                                
43For detailed accounts of the impact of the crisis, see Arief Budiman, Damien Kingsbury 
and Barbara Hatley, Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 
1999; Fadli Zon, The Politics of the May 1998 Riots, Solstice Publishing, Jakarta, 2004.  
44For a detailed account of the 1998 student movement, see Edward Aspinall, “The 
Indonesian Student Uprising of 1998,” in Arief Budiman, Damien Kingsbury and Barbara Hatley, 
Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, 1999; Cypri Aoer et 
al., Aksi Mahasiswa: Reformasi Total, Mentari, Jakarta, 1998. 
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discontent: high prices which then turned into a call for Suharto to resign.45 The 
economic crisis, which created a window of opportunity to mount challenges 
against the state, set in motion the reemergence of the student movement after 
many years of suppression. 
It is true that during the initial stages of student protest, the political system 
was not fully open, but the capacity of Suharto’s regime to suppress the movement 
had declined significantly. The crisis did not only cause an increase in poverty, 
unemployment and food shortages, but also put the state in a vulnerable and weak 
position unable to overcome the social tensions that escalated and exploded into 
larger-scale violent riots throughout the archipelago. 
Suharto was finally forced to resign from office and B.J Habibie was then 
sworn in as the President of Indonesia on 21 May 1998. Facing strong opposition 
from various quarters due to his close association with Suharto, Habibie was 
forced to conduct a fair and transparent election as soon as possible.46 He also 
abandoned the law No. 8 1985, concerning Pancasila as the sole foundation of 
political and mass-organisations.47 Following these expanding political 
opportunities, Tarbiyah declared the formation of the Justice Party (PK, Partai 
Keadilan), now known as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice 
Party). PK also seized the momentum of the removal of Pancasila as the sole basis 
by announcing Islam as the official basis of the new Islamist party. 
                                                
45For detailed information, see Diro Aritonang, Runtuhnya Rezim daripada Soeharto: 
Rekaman Perjuangan Mahasiswa Indonesia 1998, Pustaka Hidayah, Bandung, 1999.  
46For more discussion about the Habibie Presidency, see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “The 
Habibie Presidency,” in Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos, Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999, pp. 34-37.  
47Ibid.  
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In sum, the birth of PK can best be seen as a result of expanding political 
opportunities following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. During Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime, Tarbiyah advocates developed campus dakwah by utilising 
less visible organisations and informal religious networks. By applying the 
political opportunity framework, the use of these kinds of organisations is most 
often seen in less democratic political systems where overt protest and visible 
institutions are more vulnerable to suppression. Nonetheless, in the late 1980s, 
Tarbiyah activists emerged into public following Suharto’s rapprochement with 
Islam. Finally, following the fall of Suharto in 1998, Tarbiyah advocates seized the 
momentum by establishing PK, now known as PKS, to pursue their ideals within 
the framework of a democratic system.    
Illustration 4 
 
Caption: 
Former President of PKS and chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR), Hidayat Nurwahid, during interviews with the author (October 4, 2007). 
        
 
 102 
CHAPTER 5 
FROM CAMPUS TO POLITICAL MOVEMENT:   
THE RISE OF PKS AND ITS RESOURCE MOBILISATION 
 
In earlier chapters I have described how political opportunity is a necessary 
prerequisite to collective action. Nonetheless, political opportunities alone do not 
make a movement. Even the most conducive political environment will be to no 
avail if the movement does not have sufficient organisation and networks to realise 
its political potential. Accordingly, the study of “means” or resources is crucial in 
social movement theory in order to understand the supportive infrastructures 
required for collective action. The study of means has come to be known as 
resource mobilisation1 or mobilising structure approaches. 
This chapter will look primarily at the various “means” of mobilisation 
utilised by PKS in order to support its collective actions, and it will focus on the 
importance of organisational factors or mobilisation of resources that either 
facilitate or constrain the rise of PKS. In an attempt to describe the organisational 
strength of PKS, I will emphasise its cadres, organisational models and leadership, 
communication networks and financial assets.        
 
 
                                                
1This framework is strongly influenced by rational choice theory. This perspective adopts 
as one of its underlying problems, American economist Mancur Olson’s (1968) concept of “free-
rider.” McCarthy and Zald subsequently offered an answer by introducing the perspective of 
resource mobilisation which focuses on means available to the actors of social movements. 
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5.1. Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT)  
Scholars of social movements define resource mobilisation theory 
(hereafter, referred to as “RMT”) as “collective vehicles, informal as well as 
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”2 RMT 
emphasises both societal support of and constraints on collective action 
phenomena.3 It deals with the variety of resources that must be mobilised to 
maintain collective action, the dependence of movement vehicles on external 
support and the strategies used by authorities to control or incorporate collective 
action.4 
Having said that the concept of resources is crucial in RMT, a thorough 
understanding of this approach requires presenting a clear definition of what 
resources and movement vehicles are. Unfortunately, there is little agreement on 
the definition of resources.  In his definition, Tilly argues that one of the most 
important resources of mobilisation is the formal and informal networks that 
connect individuals and movement organisations.5 The term “network” refers to 
social structures, that is, sets of social relationships that encourage or discourage 
people’s behaviour, attitudes, and possibilities for action.6 Klandermans reveals 
                                                
2Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, 
Mobilising Structures, and Framing Processes – Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on 
Social Movements,” in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.), Comparative 
Perspectives, 1996, p. 3.  
3John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilisation,” 1987, p. 16.    
4Ibid.  
5Charles Tilly, From Mobilisation to Revolution, 1978, p. 3.   
6John. L. Campbell, “Where Do We Stand?” 2005, p. 61.   
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the importance of leadership to constitute the resource for mobilising participants.7 
Maguire divides the resources into two categories, that is, tangible (money, space, 
equipment, and so on) and non-tangible (leadership capacity, managerial and 
organisational experience, ideological justification, tactics and the like).8 
Oberschall9 along with McCarthy and Zald10 include a diverse list of resources 
such as income, savings, communication networks, trust and moral commitment, 
legitimacy and labor. Most commonly, resources refer to material resources, most 
notably time and money.11 
For purposes of this analysis, I will exclude labour and legitimacy from the 
kinds of resource mobilisation that PKS relies on. Instead, I will include ‘cadres’, 
given that the party proclaims itself to be a “cadre party” and the role of cadres in 
PKS’ collective action is significant. In addition to this, I follow two categories of 
resource mobilisation, that is, material and immaterial resources, which include: 
(1) formal or informal organisations; (2) networks; (3) income generation capacity; 
and (4) leadership.12  
 
                                                
7Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge: 
Massachusetts, 1997, p. 133-134 
8See, Diarmuid Maguire, “Opposition Movements and Opposition Parties: Equal Partners 
or Dependent Relations in the Struggle for Power and Reform?” in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert 
Klandermans (eds.), The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social 
Movements, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1995.   
9Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 
1973.  
10McCarthy and Zald,  “Resource Mobilisation,” 1987.   
11McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.    
12I followed this category devised by Agus Salim, “The Rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir (1982-
2004),” p. 115.  
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5.2. The Birth of Jemaah Tarbiyah and Its Organisational Strength and 
Networks  
Among other things, organisation is one of the most important resources.13 
Klandermans called organisation a means to goal-achievement,14 by which various 
resources required in collective action can be accumulated and allocated.15 The 
availability of organisation is also crucial in order to enhance existing networks as 
well as recruit members and mobilise contention. 
Nonetheless, a focus on social movement theories in Western traditions 
tends to equate social movement organisations (SMOs) with formal and visible 
organisations,16 thereby neglecting informal forms of collective action. Islamist 
movements, in fact, tend to utilise “informal, personal networks and religious and 
cultural associability to build movements.”17 Curiously, the use of less formal 
networks is often found in authoritarian systems where overt protest and formal 
institutions are more vulnerable to state control and repression.18  
Given that PKS and Tarbiyah were born in different political contexts, I 
will discuss their capacities to generate organisational resources in separate 
sections. As noted in the previous chapters, PKS has become a highly visible 
institution in the post-Suharto era where all barriers to collective action have been 
                                                
13 McAdam, Political Process, 1982; Aldon Morris, The Origin of the Civil Rights 
Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change, Free Press, New York, 1984. 
14Klandermans, The Social Psychology, 1997, 120.  
15Knoke, “The Political Economies of Associations”, in Richard D. Braungart (ed.), 
Research in Political Sociology, Vol. 1, 211-242, JAI-Press, Greenwich, 1985. 
16Wiktorowicz,  The Management, 2001, p. 8  
17Singerman, “The Networked World,” 2004, 151.  
18Wiktorowicz,  The Management, 2001, p. 8  
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removed. By contrast, Tarbiyah was formed at the height of Suharto’s 
authoritarianism, when the regime utilised a combination of harsh suppression and 
administrative techniques of social control in the management of Islamic activism, 
which successfully contained movements challenging the state (see, Chapter 4).  
I will trace the development of the Tarbiyah movement’s organisational 
forms by looking at the following phases of activities: (1) a campus mosque-based 
movement; (2) LMD as the initial network of dakwah activists; (3) LDK and 
FSLDK as vehicles of the movement; (4) controlling student senates for 
recruitment and organisational purposes; and (5) the formation of an intercampus 
Islamic student movement, KAMMI. Given that these aforementioned forms of 
Tarbiyah organisational activity have been mentioned in Chapter 2, in this section 
I will discuss them very briefly, and just focus on the perspective of resource 
mobilisation.         
First of all, the spirit of Islamic revivalism among Islamic students in 
secular universities began to flourish from the 1970s with the establishment of a 
dakwah network centred in campus mosques. Hence, campus mosques became a 
key institutional focus for the initial development of Tarbiyah’s religious and 
social networks. Through mosques, the growing interest in Islamic studies and 
practices among students was facilitated. They prayed together and congregated 
for the khutbah (Friday sermons) in mosques as well as conducted a number of 
religious study circles and trainings such as liqa (meeting every week), mabit 
(staying the whole night at mosques), daurah (training program). It is clear that the 
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mosques not only serve the religious needs of students, but also create a potential 
institution for further collective action. 
The Institute of Predication Strivers (Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah, LMD) 
also influenced the development of Tarbiyah’s networks. Imaduddin Abdul Rahim 
founded LMD, which, since 1974 conducted regular trainings at ITB’s Salman 
Mosque.  This intensive religious training attracted a large number of students and 
its alumni were spread out not only in Java, but also in Sumatra.19 Imaduddin’s 
monumental training handbook, Kuliah Tauhid (Lectures on Islamic Principles) 
became a key reference and was distributed on many campuses.20 After returning 
from LMD, its alumni began to set up propagation training in their own campuses. 
In UI, for instance, they developed a sense of commitment to the cause of Islam 
and maintained a spirit of dakwah through various bodies in each faculty under 
different names, such as the Integrative Studies about Islam (Integratif Studi 
tentang Islam, ISTI) in the Faculty of Economics, the Integrated Islamic Studies 
(Studi Islam Terpadu, SIT) in the Faculty of Letters and the Study Forum of 
Islamic Principles (Forum Studi Dasar Islam, Fondasi) in the Faculty of Science.21 
Having said that religious enthusiasm among students developed rapidly, 
the presence of LDK in managing a broad range of religious activities was 
important. Interestingly, since LDK was a formal student organisation established 
on campus, it became automatically one of the Student Activity Units (Unit 
                                                
19Ibid.  
20Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006. Machmudi’s account was based on his interview 
with Mustafa Kamal, 11 June 2003.  
21Sidiq, KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi, 2003, 71.  
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Kegiatan Mahasiswa, UKM) and it was therefore allocated funding by the 
university. As an officially recognised student body, LDK was used by dakwah 
activists to carry out regular recruitment campaigns among incoming students.22  
Since the early 1990s, the Tarbiyah movement expanded rapidly and began 
to grow in influence throughout Student Senates (SM, Senat Mahasiswa) in secular 
state universities. Rama Pratama, a PKS legislator who was a the chairman of the 
University of Indonesia’s (UI) student senate in 1997, for example, was one of 
leading figures among dakwah activists. Zulkieflimansyah, who is currently a PKS 
legislator, was also elected as the head of UI’s Student Senate in 1994. 
Kamaruddin, former head of the mosque at the Faculty of Social and Political 
Sciences, UI, won the student election in 1995 followed by Selamat Nurdin, 
another influential figure of dakwah movement from FISIP UI, who was elected in 
1996. The straight victories of dakwah activists in securing student senate 
positions both at the faculty and university level at UI have inspired their 
colleagues in other prestigious universities, such as ITB, IPB, and UGM to take 
over the student senates on their own campuses.       
Finally, notable among Tarbiyah’s organisational strengths was its close 
connections to the Islamic student group KAMMI. Utilising the tenth annual 
meeting of FSLDK in 1998, some LDK activists announced the birth of KAMMI. 
The formation of KAMMI signaled that Tarbiyah was beginning gradually to 
expand its networks with campus dakwah groups, allowing its activists to take to 
                                                
22Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 2002, pp. 129-131.  
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the streets and call for regime change following the 1997 economic crisis. The 
significant role of KAMMI in the reformasi struggle, which helped to bring about 
Suharto’s downfall, marked the beginning of Tarbiyah’s use of more visible and 
formal networks and institutions in the pursuit of its political and social goals.  
 
5.3. The PKS’ Centralised Federal Structure and Leadership 
 As noted earlier, the fall of Suharto gave the Tarbiyah movement an 
opportunity to transform itself into a political party. PK, which then 
metamorphosed into PKS, was seen as a formal organisation of Tarbiyah.23 Prior 
to establishing PK, Tarbiyah cadres were responsible for all recruitment and 
training activities. Since the formation of PK, all Tarbiyah members automatically 
became PK members and all religious circles and training activities were taken 
over by PK.24 In an attempt to accommodate leaders of Tarbiyah, PK set up a peak 
body called the Majelis Syuro or Consultative Council, which determined all 
strategic decisions within the party.25  
There are many examples which point to the complexities inherent in the 
transformation from Tarbiyah, an informal movement, to PK, a formalised 
political party. The complexities emerged immediately after the party set up its 
organisational structures. In general, Tarbiyah resembled an isolated SMO, which 
had no branches and relied heavily on direct contact between its members, which 
                                                
23Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.   
24Interview, Yon Machmudi, Jakarta, 21 August 2007.   
25Ibid.  
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was understandable during the repressive Suharto period when the regime silenced 
political Islam. In contrast to Tarbiyah, the leadership of PK in the post-Suharto 
era resembled what McCarthy and Zald have called a “federated structure,” which 
provides local branches whose contact with constituents can be facilitated by the 
party’s local units or direct communication.26 In terms of decentralisation and 
autonomy, federated structures can be divided into three modes: the loosely 
coupled network structure,27 the pyramid structure,28 and the centralised 
structure.29 
In the case of PK, now PKS, the organisational model of the party is a 
centralised federal and national institution. There is a Central Executive Board 
(Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, DPP), which coordinates all local branches from the 
Province-Level Executive board (DPW, Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah), the District-
Level Executive Board (DPD, Dewan Pimpinan Daerah), the Sub-District-Level 
Executive Board (DPC, Dewan Pimpinan Cabang) to the lowest level of the PKS 
structure, that operates at the village level, called Dewan Pimpinan Ranting 
(DPRa). The DPP is ultimately responsible but administratively hierarchical up to 
                                                
26John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilisation,” 1987. See also, 
Klandermans, The Social Psychology, 1997, pp. 122-124.   
27This loosely coupled network structure was initially described by Gerlach and Hine. 
They said that the features of the structure are the following: (1) segmentation, that is a multitudes 
of different groups and organisations with different groups and organisations with different goals 
and ideologies; (2) a polycephalous structure, that is, a structure with several leaders and no single 
leader controls the whole movement; and (3) a reticulate structure, an availability of networks of 
bonds and linkages which connect other groups or organisation. See Klandermans’ description of 
Gerlach and Hine account in The Social Psychology, 1997, p. 123     
28Meanwhile the pyramid structure was introduced by Lawson (1983), in which 
interaction with the local branches usually takes the forms of top-down approach. See, 
Klandermans, The Social Psychology, 1997, p. 123.  
29Ibid.  
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each level. The DPP’s main task is to manage and coordinate all activities within 
the party. 
The DPP is currently led by Tifatul Sembiring, who graduated from a 
university in Pakistan. The formal composition of DPP is a president, a deputy 
president, department heads, secretary general and treasurer. There are over 100 
members on the full DPP. According to the statutes of PKS, the DPP is at the same 
level as the Central Shari’a Supervisory Council (DPS, Dewan Pengawas Shari’a) 
whose duty is to control party policies based on the rules and principles of shari’a 
and the advisory council (MPP, Majelis Pertimbangan Partai) whose task is to 
provide some degree of consultation with top members of DPP both formally, in 
regular MPP and DPP meetings, and informally (see, Figure 3).    
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Figure 3 
PKS’ Organisational Structure and Decision-Making Process30 
 
Hierarchically, however, the DPP, MPP and DPS are subordinate to the 
most powerful body, the Majelis Syuro. According to PKS statutes, the Majelis 
                                                
30Yudi Latif, Aay Muhammad Furkon and Edwin Arifin, Studi Monografi Partai Politik: 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, The Reform Institute, Jakarta, 2005.    
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has undisputable power to select the party’s president (who then becomes the chief 
executive of the DPP), to legalise the composition of the advisory council (MPP), 
to select the daily board of the Central Sharia Supervisory Body (DPS), to 
determine party policy and strategic issues and the like.31 This supreme council is 
chaired by Madinah University graduate K.H Hilmi Aminuddin, PKS’ chief 
ideologue. It is made up of nearly 100 representatives, which serves, according to 
the Council member Aan Rohanah, like a senate/congress.32 Representatives of the 
council are chosen by the highest levels of cadre called kader inti or core cadres33 
to “represent the interest of members in local areas and ensure their voice is heard 
at the national level.”34 However, Zulkieflimansyah and Rohanah’s accounts fail to 
acknowledge the fact that not all of the representatives of the Council are elected 
by PKS members. Among the Council’s 99 members, nearly half of them are 
chosen by the members-elect in order to represent (1) various provinces;35 (2) 
expertise and professionalism;36 and (3) cadreisation levels or tarbawi.37              
                                                
31Anggaran Dasar dan Rumah Tangga PKS, available at http://www.pk-sejahtera.org.  
32 Interview, Aan Rohanah, Jakarta, 4 October 2007. 
33As noted earlier, PKS members are trained through a series of six levels ending with 
takhassus, holders of special expertise in dakwah. The four highest levels are called kader inti, core 
cadres who have the right to vote for the Majelis Syuro representatives.  
34Zulkieflimansyah, “Understanding PKS as Living Entity within Indonesia’s Democratic 
Space,” in The Jakarta Post, 10 August 2007. See also, Sapto Waluyo, Pilihan Sulit PK Sejahtera, 
2004, available at http://pk-sejahtera.org/article.php?storyid=2644. 
35As noted earlier, PKS members must have passed through a series of six levels ending 
with takhassus, holders of special expertise in dakwah. The four highest levels called core cadres 
are granted opportunities to vote for the Council. Unfortunately, some provinces do not have 
enough core cadres so that they cannot elect their own representatives in the Council. Accordingly, 
in order to represent them, the elect-members of the Council select their representatives.      
36Accordingly, the Council is not made up of only conservative ulama (Islamic scholars), 
but some of the Council members also come from non-ulama background such as nuclear expert, 
lobbyist, and so on.  
37Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi Partai Politik, 2005.   
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Another driving factor to the development of PKS’ organisational 
structures and its leadership is a rapid increase in party branches throughout 
Indonesia. PKS has now opened provincial-level branches (DPW) in all provinces 
in Indonesia. Furthermore, figure 5 shows that in 2004 PKS succeeded in 
establishing district (kabupaten) or municipality (kotamadya) level branches 
(DPD) across the entire country (100%). Meanwhile, the party has sub-district 
(kecamatan) level branches (DPC) in 65% of 4300 of sub-districts in Indonesia 
(see in details in Figure 6). Interestingly, PKS also operates at the lowest level of 
government, that is, at village levels (desa or kelurahan) by forming village-level 
branches called Dewan Pimpinan Ranting (DPRa).  
 
Figure 4 
The Growth of PKS Branches at the District and Sub-district Levels38   
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More so than most other parties, PKS exploited the removal of Suharto’s 
floating mass policy,39 which limited party activities to the level of district and 
                                                
38Ibid.  
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municipalities (i.e., no party branches were permitted to operate at sub-district and 
village levels), by establishing party branches from the central to the lowest level. 
The ability of PKS to set up local party units nation-wide shows that it began 
gradually to expand its organisational structures and networks in order to attract 
new voters other than PKS traditional voters. In the run-up to the 1999 elections, 
PKS’ predecessor, PK was widely perceived to be an exclusive party of urban 
people, most notably urban educated youth and pious middle class Muslims, and 
was unable to form local party units in many rural areas. Unsurprisingly, PK failed 
to garner more than 2% of the popular vote in that election.  
The rapid rise of PKS’ organisational structures was one of the key factors 
in the good performance of the party in the 2004 elections. The PKS general-
secretary Anis Matta claimed that the party successfully increased their votes in 
2004 in sub-districts or villages where new PKS branches had been found.40 It is 
worth noting that PKS’ branches at sub-district and village levels were still limited 
so that the party’s main support in the 2004 elections came largely from urban 
areas, where the lower middle class and urban poor are numerous. Accordingly, in 
the run-up to the 2009 elections, Matta predicted that PKS sub-district level 
                                                                                                                                  
39Suharto argued that the political parties were always trying to gain mass support for the 
sake of their own political interests. Likewise, the presence of party conflicts in the past had 
harmed village people. The issuance of Article Mo. 10 of Law No. 3 had clearly intended to limit 
the scope of political parties’ activities. Ironically, the ruling party Golkar was exempted from this 
limitation so that they could reach all the village people day-to-day activities. See, Muhammad 
Ryaas Rasyid, “State Formation, Party System and the Prospect for Democracy in Indonesia: The 
Case of Golongan Karya (1967-1993),” Ph.D. Dissertation at Hawaii University, 1994.      
40Anis Matta, Integrasi Politik dan Dakwah, Sekjen Bidang Arsip dan Sejarah and Arah 
Press, Jakarta, 2008, p. 7.  
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branches would be 100% up from 65% in 2004 and the party’s village-level units 
would be 75% from the total number of villages in Indonesia.41                      
 
Figure 5 
The Correlation between Party Branches and Increasing Votes in 200442 
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41Ibid.  
42This data is my own analysis based on various sources including Pemi Apriyanto, 
Database Pemilu 2004, Peta Daerah Pemilihan, Perolehan Suara dan Kursi untuk DPR RI, DPRD 
Propinsi dan DPRD Kabupaten/Kota se-Indonesia, Spirit Research and Database, Jakarta, 2007 
and Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi Partai Politik, 2005.    
43In order to organise and generate votes across Indonesia, PKS has divided the 
archipelago into four dakwah territories or areas called “wilayah dakwah.”   
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As a newly established party, the fact that PKS expanded to open offices in 
the sub-districts and villages is viewed by many as a remarkable achievement. 
Unlike New Order parties i.e. Golkar, PPP and PDI-P44 which took advantage of a 
government decision permitting them to keep their existing assets and party 
offices,45 PKS had to build up its branch structures from scratch, using relatively 
new personnel and infrastructures. Other new parties, such as PKB and PAN 
                                                
44Since Megawati, now the chairwoman of PDI-P, was ousted by Suharto from the 
leadership of the regime-endorsed PDI, PDI-P then relied on her former PDI loyalist and cadres. 
Coincidentally, most of PDI cadres backed Megawati and her new party PDI-P, thereby enabling 
PDI-P to benefit from their cadres and resources to build up new infrastructure.       
45It is worth noting that among New Order parties, Golkar is the only party that could 
operate its political machine below the district level.  PPP and PDI had been barred from any 
political activity in the sub-district and village levels. At this point, PPP and PDI-P also 
experienced financial challenges to expand their infrastructure to sub-district and village levels.    
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profited from close ties and associations with large social-religious organisations 
something which PKS lacked.46  
PKS is the only party that emerged after the fall of Suharto without much 
of the historical legacy carried by PKB, PAN, and PBB. Additionally, unlike 
Golkar, PPP, and, to a certain extent, PDI-P, PKS was not burdened by 
identification with Suharto’s New Order. The aim behind PK/PKS, according to 
Mutammimul Ula, was to ‘start from nil; a radical beginning.’47 Indeed PKS 
profited greatly from preexisting networks of the campus-based religious 
movement Tarbiyah. However, the secretive nature of Tarbiyah during Suharto 
period and its lack of assets and infrastructure relative to NU and Muhammadiyah, 
mean that it was less able to give PK a flying start.48 
 
 
                                                
46PKB’s nomination came from a team established by the national leadership of the 
traditionalist Muslim organisation, NU. To some extent, PKB can be seen as the revival of an 
earlier political party, the NU.  Similarly, despite PAN styling itself as a pluralist party, it benefited 
from its close links to the largest Modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah. In addition, 
among Islamic political parties that tried to revive Masyumi, PBB is the largest and is officially 
supported by ex-leaders of Masyumi within DDII. See, Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005. See 
also, Greg Fealy and Bernhard Platdasch, “The Masyumi Legacy: Between Islamist Idealism and 
Political Exigency,” in Studia Islamika, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005.           
47Cited from Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005, p. 98.   
48Recently, there has been a growing tension between PKS and Islamic mass-
organisations, Muhammadiyah and NU. The two accused PKS of infiltrating their institutions such 
as mosques, schools, universities, hospitals, charities and so on for the party’s political self-
interests. In the perspective of resource mobilisation theories, such accusation shows the 
appearance of ‘competition’ to seize religious and social institutions. Muhammadiyah, for instance, 
is well-known as the century-old, 30 million-strong Islamic organisation with its immense network 
of social services. The chairman of Muhammadiyah Prof. Din Syamsuddin even issued a decree in 
2007 distancing the organisation, its cadres and resources from “parties of any kind whose primary 
goal is the acquisition of political power for themselves.” The decree was believed to counter the 
PKS penetration to Muhammadiyah. See, Bret Stephens, “The Exorcist: An Indonesian Man Seeks 
“to Create an Islam that will Make People Smile,” in The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2007, 
available at http://opinionjournal.com/columnists/bstephens/?id=110009922.          
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5.4. The Network Expansion and Organisational Growth of PKS 
 In order to expand its social services and organisational capacities, PKS 
has created numerous institutions under the coordination of its central board 
(DPP). There are at least five departments in the DPP. The department of 
cadreisation, whose main programs are related to recruitment, training, dakwah 
activities, sport and youth, holds responsibility for coordinating and managing 
such PKS-affiliated organisations as the Justice Guard (Garda Keadilan), the youth 
organisation Gema Keadilan, the Indonesian Muslim Senior and Junior High 
School Students’ Action Union (KAPMI, Kesatuan Pelajar Muslim Indonesia 
(KAPMI),49 the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI, Kesatuan 
Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia),50 the Asia-Pacific Student and Youth 
Foundation (YPPAP, Yayasan Pemuda dan Pelajar Asia Pasifik), and the Mission 
Group for School Predication (GTDS, Gugus Tugas Dakwah Sekolah).51  
The department of public policy, whose sub-divisions include politics and 
defense, law and human rights, art and culture and communication and networks, 
supervises PKS affiliated think-thanks and strategic institutions such as the Center 
for Indonesian Reform (CIR),52 the Indonesian Advocacy Center for Law and 
Human Rights (PAHAM, Pusat Advokasi Hukum dan Hak Azasi Manusia),53 the 
                                                
49For more information of KAPMI, visit these links http://kapmi.tripod.com/ and 
kapmijakarta.blogsome.com/  
50For more information about KAMMI, see its official website http://www.kammi.or.id  
51Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi Partai Politik, 2005.       
52For a detailed description of CIR, visit its official website http://www.cir.or.id/  
53PAHAM was formed in May 1999. The organisation’s goal is “justice for all.” It 
promotes social justice by providing advocacy programs to educate and empower people regarding 
their rights. Despite PAHAM shares an argument that human rights are universal, but it maintains 
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Institute for Economics Studies (INFES), the Institute of Student and Youth for 
Democracy (INSYD) and Yayasan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Pemuda 
(CYFIS).54 
 Meanwhile the department of planning and human resource development, 
whose primary task is to manage a number of programs related to education, 
health, science and environment, formed the Indonesian Society of Scientists 
(MITI, Masyarakat Ilmuwan dan Teknologi Indonesia) in 2004.55 This department 
also extended its activities to include a variety of private voluntary organisations 
such as charities, schools, medical clinics and day care centers. Notable among 
these is the Network of Integrated Islamic Schools (JSIT, Jaringan Sekolah Islam 
Terpadu) which organizes hundreds of Integrated Islamic Primary Schools (SDIT, 
Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu, SDIT) throughout Indonesia. Also, through the 
establishment of the Islamic Medical Association and Network Indonesia (IMANI) 
in 2002 PKS cadres seek to provide social welfare services to larger society.  
In addition, the department of economic empowerment has endeavored to 
develop the PKS-affiliated labor union Serikat Pekerja Keadilan (SPK), the 
Indonesian Shari’a-based Small Cooperation (KOSINDO), and the like. PKS also 
has links to a number of professional and sectoral associations such as the Network 
of Indonesian Muslim Entrepreneurs (JPMI, Jaringan Pengusaha Muslim 
                                                                                                                                  
Islam as its foundational ideology. See, Ann Marie Murphy, “The Role of Professional 
Organisations in Indonesia’s Socio-Political Transformation,” in NBR Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 3, 
March 2008, available at www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol18no3.pdf 
54Ibid.  
55Ibid  
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Indonesia),56 the Indonesian Labor Foundation (ILF) and the Indonesian 
Association of Prosperous Farmers and Fisherman (PPNSI, Perhimpunan Petani 
Nelayan Sejahtera Indonesia).57 The Department of Women is responsible for 
supervising the Women’s Association (Salimah, Persaudaraan Muslimah)58 and 
the Women’s Group for Justice (Pos Wanita Keadilan). PKS has also extended its 
activities to include social work and charities, including efforts to help the victims 
of natural disasters across Indonesia by establishing social organisations such as 
the National Humanitarian Foundation Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (PKPU),59 the 
Ummul Qura Social Fund (DSUQ, Dompet Sosial Ummul Qura) and the 
Indonesian Red Crescent (BSMI, Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia)60 that engage in 
collecting donations from both internal and external contributors. These 
organisations are under the supervision and coordination of the treasurer.61 
                                                
56The main aim of this professional association is ‘to enhance the skills and capacity of 
Muslim entrepreneurs through seminars, provision of credit via the organisation’s networks in the 
sharia banking system, and assistance in securing government contracts.” Like other Islamic 
professional associations, Islam is the sole ideology of JPMI. See, Murphy, “The Role of 
Professional Organisations,” 2008. For more information about this, visit JPMI’s official website, 
www.jpmi.or.id/ 
57Ibid.  
58For a detailed information of the Salimah, visit its official website 
http://www.salimah.or.id/  
59PKPU was established in response to the multi-dimensional crises that hit Indonesia in 
1997. It is a non-profit institution whose main program is to provide a relief to the social problems 
of the poor (dhu’afa). For more information of PKPU, visit its official website 
http://www.pkpu.or.id/homes.php  
60BSMI was established by Muslim medical professionals in response to a perception that 
the Muslim victims of the conflict in Maluku were not receiving the same access to medical care as 
Christian victims. BSMI claims no formal relationship to PKS, but the former president of PKS 
Hidayat Nur Wahid sits on the organisation’s steering committee. See, Murphy, “The Role of 
Professional Organisations,” 2008. For a detailed description of BSMI, visit this link 
www.bsmipusat.net/   
61Ibid  
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It is true that other major political parties in Indonesia have similar bodies. 
In terms of women’s divisions or women’s affiliated organisations, for example, 
PPP has the United Women (Wanita Persatuan); PAN has the Women’s National 
Mandate (Perempuan Amanat Nasional, PUAN). Other parties are catching up 
with the mobilisation of youth and students too. Golkar Party, for example, has the 
Multipurpose Cooperative of Mutual Assistance (Kosgoro) whose main supporters 
are youth. However, most other organisations affiliated with political parties do 
not function well. Unlike PKS-affiliated associations which actively engage in all 
year-round activities, other political parties’ bodies mostly only engage with their 
constituents during election time. This is largely because PKS is unusual parties 
whose cadres are ideologically motivated people and are required to rise through a 
series of intensive trainings. In short, PKS relies heavily on its highly motivated 
cadres to run the party’s bodies.  
Undoubtedly, the aforementioned extensive networks linked to PKS 
demonstrate the proliferation of Islamic professional associations. Indeed, they are 
not all professional associations nor are they —borrowing Clark’s term— “Islamic 
social institutions (ISIs).” In terms of the emergence of PKS’ professional 
associations, it can be seen as a result of higher rates of Muslim participation in 
tertiary education since the 1970s. As noted in Chapter 4, the Suharto’s regime’s 
tremendous economic achievement had allowed Muslim students to enjoy 
university education, most of who were involved in the campus dakwah movement 
since the growing interest in Islamic studies and practices in the late 1970s. After 
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graduating from university, “[they] move into profession and professional 
associations in which they were previously underrepresented relative to the 
numbers of Muslims in society.”62 They use such associations as vehicles for 
maintaining their spirit of dakwah, as well as advancing their own distinctive piety 
and professionalism.63    
From the perspective of resource mobilisation, these Islamic professional 
associations alongside PKS-affiliated organisations have played an important role 
as “webs or networks of linkages, institutional or personal, in which their 
associated institutions are embedded.”64 In the vocabulary of PKS, such groups are 
called “wajihah” (literally means ‘cover’). Within this network of institutions, 
professional and non-professional associations linked to PKS have been 
particularly successful, providing social and medical services to many people. 
Through its ideologically motivated cadres, PKS has also run schools called SDIT 
as well as provided financial aid through small cooperatives (koperasi). Indeed, 
other parties occasionally provide relief to victims of natural disasters. Unlike 
PKS, however, their assistance is temporary and non-institutionalised.      
By providing social services, PKS appears to be in stark contrast to other 
political parties by proving that the party’s social concern is backed up by 
grassroots-based regular activities. More significantly, these PKS-affiliated 
organisations and professional associations have served as a tool of recruitment. 
                                                
62Robert W. Hefner, “Introduction: Civic Platforms or Radical Springboards,” in in NBR 
Analysis Vol. 18, No. 3, March 2008, available at www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/ 
vol18no3.pdf  
63Interview, Mahfudz Sidiq, Jakarta, 28 September 2007.    
64Janine Clark, “Social Movement Theory,” 2004, p. 942.  
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The hope is that the disenfranchised poor who utilise social welfare services 
provided by Islamic social institutions linked to PKS could be mobilised to 
become its new cadres. 
                                   
5.5. The PKS Recruitment of Cadres and Its Process of Cadreisation  
Aside from the growth of PKS organisational structures and its affiliated 
institutions, the rise of PKS in the 2004 elections can also be explained by the 
expansion of its membership. After the modest performance of the party in 1999, 
when there were only 5,000 core cadres and 42,000 cadres in total, its leadership 
set the target of expanding to 800,000 total cadres by 2004. The hope was that 
each cadre would attract five to ten new voters per-week prior to the election.65 In 
2004, PKS had only 500,000 active cadres, but it received approximately 8.3 
million votes in that election, a significant increase from 1.4% of the popular votes 
in 1999.66 In the 2009 elections, the secretary-general of PKS, Anis Matta aimed to 
expand PKS’ total cadres to two million.67 
                                                
65Al-Muzammil Yusuf, Isu Besar Dakwah dalam Pemilu, PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2003, 
p. 41.   
66Tifatul Sembiring, “Berpolitik Itu Indah,” Republika, 17 October 2004. Tifatul explores 
the growth of PKS cadres in more detail in Tifatul Sembiring, Dakwah adalah Perubahan ke Arah 
yang Lebih Baik, Arah Press and DPP PKS, Jakarta, 2008. In other pieces, however, Anis Matta 
claimed that PKS had only 400,000 cadres in 2004. See, Matta, Integrasi Politik, 2008, p. 6.   
67According to Anis Matta and Zulkieflimansyah, however, the remarkable success of 
PKS in 2004 had more to do with the party’s massive campaign on clean and caring government 
than with mobilisation by their cadres. The two influential leaders were interviewed by William 
Liddle as quoted in Liddle and Mujani, “Islamist Parties and Democracy: The Indonesian Case.” 
Interestingly, Anis Matta, in other occasions, does not downplay the role of cadres in the rise of 
PKS in 2004 and repeatedly stated that the party should increase the total number of cadres in the 
next elections in order to generate votes. See, Matta, Integrasi Politik, 2008, p. 6.    
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To this end, like Tarbiyah on which it is based, PKS employs two 
mechanisms of recruiting new participants.68 The first is the individual pattern of 
recruitment (al-da’wah al-fardhiyyah), the person-to-person form of outreach, 
which involves direct personal contact. Rather than approach a stranger, this 
mechanism begins by persuading potential recruits among families, friends, and 
neighbours. In other words, PKS recruitment is built on preexisting relationships 
while at the same time enhancing a new kind of solidarity based on shared beliefs, 
strong commitment and loyalty.69  
Those potential recruits will be encouraged to participate in the bulk of 
religious circles and training organised by PKS such as usrah (family) or halaqah 
(small study group) or liqa (weekly meeting), rihlah (recreation), mukhayyam 
(camping expeditions), daurah (intellectual training and Islamic workshops), 
nadwah (seminars) and the like. The hope is that each new participant will know 
(ta’aruf), understand (tafahum) and support (tafaul) each other.70 Given that these 
organised activities are conducted regularly, it is also hoped that new participants 
can be directed towards shared values and meaning.   
The second is the institutional pattern of recruitment (al-da’wah al-
‘amma). There are various institutional forms of outreach involving PKS 
organisational structures, PKS-affiliated organisations as well as benefiting from 
religious institutions i.e. mosques as well as educational institutions i.e. schools 
                                                
68As noted earlier, after the birth of PK, all Tarbiyah’s religious training and recruitment 
activities were carried out by the party structures.   
69For elements of comparison, notably in the case of Egyptian Islamist movements, see 
Wickham, Mobilising Islam, 2002, pp. 130-131.  
70 Hassan al-Banna, Usrah dan Dakwah, Ikhwan Agency, Kuala Lumpur, 1979, p. 4. 
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and universities. As a political party, PKS’ involvement in the national and local 
governments has become a new form of recruitment. It decided to engage with the 
governing coalition led by President Yudhoyono, and had three of its nominees in 
the thirty-four member cabinet.  Zulkieflimansyah admitted that these posts like 
agriculture, youth and sports and public housing are important to expand the 
party’s networks to rural areas.71 PKS has also participated in many gubernatorial 
and district/municipality executive elections.  
Above all, the aforementioned forms of cadre recruitment in PKS can be 
divided into two categories in terms of political objectives.72 The first is aimed at 
mobilising as many new members as possible, regardless of their ethnicity, race or 
gender, to be PKS members, sympathisers or volunteers in all political activities 
and social activities organised by the party. This mechanism of cadre recruitment 
is clearly a matter of numbers given the nature of PKS as a political party, which 
focuses largely on numbers, is clearly to increase PKS’ popular support in society.  
The second is aimed at enlisting potential cadres in selective ways. Having 
proclaimed itself to be a cadre party which sets strict standards of recruitment, 
PKS requires its cadres to rise through a series of intensive trainings. These 
trainings are comprised of hierarchical levels (marhalah), which consist of the 
learning process (ta’lim), organisational skills (tandzim), character development 
                                                
71Zulkieflimansyah, USINDO Open Forum: Prospects for the Justice and Prosperity Party 
(PKS) and Political Islam, Washington D.C., June 8, 2006.  
72Interview, Al-Muzammil Yusuf, as cited by Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi 
Partai Politik, 2005.      
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and internalisation of Islamic tenets (taqwin) and evaluation (taqwim).73 In sum, 
the process of cadreisation, which determines the hierarchical levels of cadres 
within PKS, can be divided into six levels. As noted earlier, PKS members are 
trained through a series of six levels ending with takhssus, holders of special 
expertise in dakwah.   
Figure 6 
The Cadreisation System of PKS 
 
TYPE SUB-
TYPE 
DEFINITION AND LADDER OF 
CADREISATION 
REGISTRATIO
N 
Tamhidi 
Cadres(Be-
ginners) 
Registered 
Beginners 
(Terdaftar) 
These newly recruited cadres have just 
completed the first training for the party 
orientation (TOP, Training Orientasi 
Partai 1).  
Tamhidi Cadres 
are usually 
registered in the 
list of members at 
the sub-district  
level branches 
(DPC) 
Cultivated 
Beginners 
(Terbina) 
The second category of the beginners has 
completed TOP 1 and 2. They are also 
required to attend cadres’ regular meeting 
(TRK, Taklim Rutin Kader). If they pass 
through this level, they will be granted a 
certificate called SKAP/KTAP (Surat 
Kelulusan Anggota Pemula/Kartu Tanda 
Anggota Pemula) in order to rise to the 
next training called Basic Training (TD, 
Training Dasar 1).   
Muayyid 
Cadres 
(Young) 
 Those who completed TD 1 and have been 
recommended by their murabbi (instructor) 
to be Muayyid Cadres. Besides attending 
TRK and participating in PKS activities, 
they are also required to take KISP1 
(Kajian Ilmu Sosial Politik or Course for 
These cadres are 
recorded in the 
lists of members at 
the district level 
branches (DPD) 
                                                
73Djony Edward, Efek Bola Salju Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Harakatuna Publishing, 
Bandung, 2006, p. 18.   
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Social and Political Sciences).  
Muntasib 
Cadres 
(Medium) 
 Cadres in this level are attending training 
and religious circles as the muayyid, but 
the content and intensity of trainings are 
more advanced. They are required to pass 
through Advance Training (TL, Training 
Lanjutan 1)  
These cadres are 
enlisted at the 
district level 
branches (DPD) 
Muntazim 
Cadres 
(Adult) 
 Cadres in this level are attending training 
and religious circles as the muntasib, but 
they are also required to pass through TL 2. 
Their murabbi have a right to recommend 
them to rise to the next level. 
These cadres are 
recorded in  the 
Provincial level 
branches (DPW) 
Amil Cadres 
(Specialist) 
 These cadres have completed all required 
trainings and are attending the training at 
the specialist level. These cadres have the 
right to hold high and strategic positions in 
the party.  
These cadres are 
documented and 
registered by the 
Central Executive 
Board (DPP) 
Takhassus 
Cadres 
(Post) 
 This is the highest level of trainings 
holding special expertise in dakwah, 
completing the ahli trainings. 
These cadres are 
registered by the 
Central Executive 
Board (DPP) 
Honorary 
Cadres 
(Kehorma-
tan) 
 Those, who are regarded as being 
meritorious, have rendered a service and 
deserve to be honoured by the party. They 
are not required to pass through these 
series of training. 
MPP has a right to 
decide those who 
are eligible to be 
honourary cadres. 
 
The multilayered process of cadreisation reveals that PKS employs the 
organisational model of Islamism “based on intense cohesion, persuasive guidance 
and conformity which together creates unanimity.”74 In order to sustain a code of 
belief and to create strong identification among cadres, they need to take an oath of 
                                                
74Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005, pp. 50-51.  
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allegiance (baiat).75 Likewise, the party’s cadreisation and its membership ladder 
are hierarchical systems. As can be seen in figure 6, the four highest levels, i.e., 
takhassus (post), amil (specialist), muntazim (adult), and muntasib (medium), are 
called kader inti or core cadres who enjoy the right to vote for the representatives 
of Majelis Syuro. In addition, they have the right to hold strategic positions in the 
national leadership of PKS.  
Further, such cadreisation processes demand obedience from members to 
the command of the party’s elite. The President of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, says:  
The enjoyment of being a party cadre will not exist without loyalty, the 
enjoyment of loyalty will not exist without obedience, the enjoyment of 
obedience will not exist without sacrifice, and the enjoyment of sacrifice 
will not exist without sincerity (keikhlasan).76  
 
Another influential figure, Zulkieflimansyah, stated cheerfully that the 
cadreisation system of PKS has very much in common with “a communist party 
with Islamic ideology.’77 It is clear that PKS has put weight on the issue of 
cadreisation and it strongly believes that its religious and political ideals cannot be 
realised without the systematic formation of devoted cadres and campaigners.  
In addition to being the only cadre party in Indonesia, PKS members are 
also different in terms of their demographic backgrounds. PKS has attracted many 
talented Muslims in the country. They are usually young and better educated than 
other political party members. Some of them have advanced degrees from foreign 
                                                
75Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 2002, p. 11.  
76Nurhasan Zaidi, “Resepsi PKS,” Republika, 30 July 2005.  This excerpt is not my 
translation. I cite from Firman Noor, “Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism,” 2007. 
77Zulkieflimansyah, USINDO Open Forum: Prospects for the Justice and Prosperity 
Party (PKS) and Political Islam, Washington D.C., June 8, 2006.   
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universities, particularly from the U.S., England, Australia, Germany, and Japan. 
PKS has also particularly found acceptance in urban areas. Many are graduates 
from Indonesia’s top secular universities such as UI, ITB, and UGM. Most of their 
qualifications are in the medical and natural sciences.  It comes as no surprise then 
that PKS members seem to be technologically savvy, often communicating and 
disseminating their views on audiocassettes, videotapes, email and web pages.   
One should note that PKS members have tried to improve the ‘quality’ of 
individuals in terms of moral rectitude and behaviour. In Indonesia where people 
smoke everywhere, it is almost impossible to find a cadre of the party who 
smokes. PKS cadres strive to follow closely Islamic norms and practices by 
appearing strictly Islamic in terms of wearing Islamic attire and eating halal food 
(lawful food according to Islamic beliefs). In a country where most women do not 
cover their heads, it is difficult to find a female PKS cadre without a jilbab (veil). 
Meanwhile its male members usually wear baju koko. In connection with the halal 
issue, PKS members would prefer to take the option of eating food with label halal 
on it and scrutinising the ingredients. In addition, PKS members frequently use 
Arabic words in their daily conversation such as ikhwan (brothers), akhwat 
(sisters), siyasah (politics), hizb (party), ma’isyah (income), and so on.   
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5.6. The Political Financing of PKS 
 Social movement organisations require financial resources in order to 
achieve the movements’ long and short-term objectives. As a social movement 
which actively mobilises its supporters onto the streets, PKS faces financial 
challenges to meet the needs of transporting its protesters to the site of 
demonstrations, producing leaflets, logistics, and the like. Similarly, as a newly 
established party, PKS is experiencing a heavy financial burden due to its lack of 
business networks while at the same time it must cover the routine costs of 
political party activity such as an increase in the operational expenses, 
expenditures for electoral campaigning and constituency mobilisation and the 
like.78 Additionally, the nature of election campaign in Indonesia has been changed 
by the increasing role of the media in political campaigning through expensive 
advertisements.79 Also, political parties must now spend more money on opinion 
pollsters and political consultants, most of whom are professionals who have only 
a loose emotional relationship to their employers.80     
 The argument offered by some PKS leaders that the party relies primarily 
on the financial support of individual cadres through various mechanisms of 
                                                
78Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, “Piety and Pragmatism Trends in Indonesian 
Islamic Politics,” Asia Program Special Report, April, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2003.   
79The increasing expenditures for electronic and print media advertisement can clearly be 
seen in the 2004 elections, which made up at least 30 percent of the total campaign costs.  Marcus 
Mietzner, “Party Financing in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between State Subsidies and Political 
Corruption,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia, August 2007, 29, 2. p. 253.   
80Ibid.  
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Islamic philanthropy is implausible.81 Machmudi, for instance, said that “most of 
the political activities are self-funded through professional arrangements of 
religious charities. Members of the party are obliged to pay religious dues, zakat 
(alms), infaq (gift for specific purposes), and shadaqah (charitable gifts).”82 
However, he does not supply the claims with sufficient data. Basic questions about 
how these arrangements are carried out and how much money is collected from 
these internal donations remain unanswered.      
The head of a PKS faction in parliament, Mahfudz Sidiq, describes in some 
detail how PKS has collected funds.83 In spite of internal contributions, PKS relies 
financially on several mechanisms. First, PKS instructs its cadres who hold 
parliamentary seats in national, provincial, and district levels to pay contributions 
to the party. Anis Matta reveals that PKS has asked for 50 to 60 per cent of its 
parliamentarians’ salaries.84 Furthermore PKS MPs are increasingly required to 
help pay for the party functions as well as satisfying financial demands from their 
constituencies which eventually reduces their take-home salary even further.85 
Second, PKS is attempting to advance a spirit of entrepreneurship among cadres.86 
The hope is that such attempts will encourage them to be wealthy entrepreneurs 
who are maximally attached to PKS and will use their financial benefits to cover 
the party’s routine costs.  
                                                
81For example, Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006; Interview, Khairuddin, Jakarta,   
82Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, 2006.  
83Interview, Mahfudz Sidiq, Jakarta, 28 September 2007.   
84Matta, Integrasi Politik, 2008, p  
85Interview, Mahfudz Sidiq, Jakarta, 28 September 2007.    
86Ibid.  
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Third, PKS has also been open to external contributions from companies 
and individuals who share religious and political ideals with the party.87 In fact, 
however, ‘most donors have clearly defined political and economic interests and 
they expect the party and its politicians to take those interests into consideration if 
elected to public office.”88 PKS leaders repeatedly claim that their party does not 
accept funds from corrupt donors and keeps distanced from politically and 
economically interested sponsors.89 The party’s reluctance to engage in corruption 
limits its funding. In practice, however, PKS has drawn criticism. The most 
controversial of these was the nomination of Tamsil Linrung as the PKS legislative 
candidate, despite his bad reputation for financial mismanagement.  
This clearly indicates that, as a new party, PKS is still struggling to expand 
its business networks and access to wealthy entrepreneurs. In Indonesian politics, 
in fact, entrepreneurs and large corporations make up important sources of income 
for most parties.90 According to the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) which 
conducted a series of seven polls since the April 2004 election, the lack of PKS’ 
resource mobilisation, notably financial income, has partly contributed to the 
declining support for the party.91 
                                                
87Ibid.   
88Mietzner, “Party Financing,” 2007, p. 240.  
89Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, “Piety and Pragmatism,” 2003.  
90Ibrahim Fahmy Badoh, “Manipulasi Dana Kampanye dan Politik Uang Pemilu. 
Deskripsi dan Evaluasi untuk Perbaikan Pasal-Pasal Dana Politik dan Paket Undang-Undang 
Politik,” Position Paper, Political Finance Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2005.   
91 Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), “Trend Dukungan terhadap Islam Politik,” 9 October 
2007, available at http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/216/peta-partai-politik-maret-2007. Hidayat and 
Zulkieflimansyah admitted that such financial constraints hinder the party from making visits 
throughout the entire country to spread its message. See, Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, 
“Piety and Pragmatism,” 2003. 
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Faced by such financial constraints, PKS is now selling nominations for 
legislative and executive office to wealthy individuals who have no particular 
connection to the party or its ideology. Notable among these was the former 
deputy chief of the national police, Gen. Adang Daradjatun, who was widely 
speculated to have paid considerable contributions to the party in exchange for his 
nomination as a governor of Jakarta.92 Many analysts believe that Adang’s money 
was almost certainly corruptly gained. Also, a prominent figure from the Institute 
of Public Administration (IPDN, Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri), Inu 
Kencana Syafei, told the public that he was asked to pay a large sum of money to a 
PKS branch in Payakumbuh if he would run as the party’s mayor nominee in the 
municipality.93 To some PKS cadres, the nomination of Adang was seen as PKS 
breaking an earlier commitment to nominate its own cadres in the regions’ local 
elections where it had sufficient prior electoral success, such as in Jakarta where 
the party won the capital decisively in the last elections. More significantly, these 
dubious fund-raising efforts have raised further questions about PKS integrity.94 
                                                
92Adang was widely reported to pay somewhere between Rp 13 billion and Rp 15 billion 
and even PKS did not deny that financial compensation was involved while popularising new term 
in Indonesian political financing “uang mahar.” See, Mietzner, “Party Financing,” 2007.    
 93“PKS Usung Ardi-Nasrullah, Inu: Saya Tak Punya Uang Rp1 Miliar,” Padang Ekspress, 
23 Mei 2007; “Inu: Mereka Bilang, Saya Pilih Rp1 M atau Rp3 M?” Padang Ekspress, 25 Mei 
2007, available at http://www.padangekspres.co.id/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&artid 
=105 
94During my interview with a chief ideologue of PKS Abu Ridha, he deeply expressed his 
serious concern to the recent development of the party in regard to the involvement of money 
politics. He did not apologetically deny Azyumardi Azra’s remarks on PKS saying that the party 
has no different with other parties in terms of its political behaviours.     
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According to Mietzner, such illicit fund-raising efforts have partly been 
caused by the cut in state subsidies for political parties in 2005.95 The Wahid 
administration issued a Government Regulation on Financial Assistance to 
Political Parties (PP 51/2001) by which the central board of any political party 
would annually receive Rp 1,000 per vote gained in the 1999 elections.96 Likewise 
local governments were also asked to pay subsidies to political parties according to 
the popular vote obtained in each region.97 Based on the Rp 1,000 per-vote 
scheme, PKS which inherited the popular vote of its predecessor, PK, received Rp 
1.4 billion each year for its central board. Nonetheless, the current government 
issued a new decree, that is, the Government Regulation 29 of 2005 stating that the 
per-vote based formula would be replaced by a seat-based one. According to the 
new decree, political parties were to receive annually Rp 21 million per-seat 
obtained in the 2004 elections, with local authorities to issue their own regulations. 
This new funding formula resulted in a significant decrease in income for any 
political party.98 PKS, for instance, witnessed a decline of its central state subsidy 
from the annual Rp. 1.4 billion it received until 2004 to only Rp. 945 million in 
January 2006, when the first payment according to the new formula was made. If 
the government uses the old funding scheme, PKS central office would receive Rp. 
8.3 billion each year given its remarkable achievement in the 2004 elections.  
                                                
95Mietzner, “Party Financing,” 2007.  
96Ibid. pp. 243-244.  
97Ibid.  
98Ibid.  
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Against this background, it comes as no surprise if political parties, 
including PKS, endeavour to find alternatives forms of income to cover their rising 
costs. To some extent, PKS has, more so than other mass parties, mostly funded its 
activities through membership fees and small contributions made by its cadres.99 
In some instances, PKS can rely on its highly motivated cadres to perform unpaid 
secretarial work, electoral activities and the like. Similarly in many instances of 
the party’s social movement activities, its cadres work voluntarily to mobilize 
huge rallies. The model of an internal funding mechanism can reduce the 
dependence of PKS on state subsidies on the one hand and external contributions 
made by politically interested donors on the other. Unfortunately for PKS, Abu 
Ridho admitted that “PKS is a poor party whose main base of support comes from 
poor people.”100 Likewise Hidayat and Zulkieflimansyah suggest that PKS is 
mainly supported by young people, who do not have ample financial resources.101 
It is therefore difficult for PKS to rely primarily on its cadres in dealing with 
financial constraints.  
 
5.7. Media as Communication Networks 
 As noted earlier, the ideological outreach of PKS and its recruitment 
channels are typically personal and based on preexisting social relationships. But 
such relationships have been reinforced by other electronic and printed media as 
                                                
99For further discussion on the mass parties, see Richard Katz, Democracy and Elections, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.   
100See also Abu Ridha, interview, cited in Latif, Furkon and Arifin, Studi Monografi 
Partai Politik, 2005.  
101Hidayat Nurwahid and Zulkieflimansyah, “Piety and Pragmatism,” 2003.        
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well as the wide range of Islamic publishing, pamphlets, video cassettes, cassette 
tapes and so on. Among other things, the weekly news magazine Sabili is the most 
popular Islamist publication, the circulation of which in 2000 was more than one 
hundred thousand per-issue.102 Although Sabili claims no formal relations with 
any political party, it has links to Tarbiyah and PKS. The birth of Sabili can be 
traced by the involvement of Tarbiyah’s leading figures such as Rahmat Abdullah 
(the first chairman of the PKS’ Majelis Syuro), Zainal Muttaqin and so on.103 In 
the run up to the 2004 elections, Sabili openly declared its support for PKS.104 
 In addition to Sabili, there are numerous Islamic publications linked to 
Tarbiyah and PKS such as Saksi, Annida, Ummi, and Tarbawi. Saksi is the news 
magazine whose primary sections are national political issues, international news, 
especially from the Muslim world, and columns and opinions provided by PKS 
intellectuals and affiliates. Saksi has presented itself as a publication wing of PKS 
by disseminating the party’s political views. Meanwhile, Annida is a less 
politically interested magazine targeting young Muslims whose rubric is mostly 
dominated by Islamic short stories. However, on some occasions, Annida appeals 
to its readers to help Palestinians perceived as suffering from the Israeli 
occupation.  
Likewise, Tarbawi offers less political news. Instead, the magazine, whose 
readership mostly comes from Tarbiyah activists, focuses primarily on the 
                                                
102For a detailed account of Sabili, see Syamsu Rijal, “Media and Islamism in Post-New 
Order Indonesia: The Case of Sabili, in Studi Islamika,” Volume 12, Number 3, 2005.   
103Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, 2002, p. 158.  
104See, Murphy, “The Role of Professional Organisations,” 2008.  
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significance of education and religious values. The magazine often reports on 
social work and activities carried out by PKS as well as featuring the personal 
sides of PKS leading figures. For example, former president of the party Hidayat 
Wahid’s story with his mother as well as PKS MP, Mutammimul Ula’s wife’s 
efforts to raise their eleven children were given a large space in the special edition 
of Tarbawi on women. Finally, as evident by its name Ummi which means “my 
mother,” the magazine focuses on the cultivation of family values targeting 
Muslim mothers rather than devoting its reports on divisive political issues. 
According to Rijal, there are numerous indications showing the issues and views 
raised by such Islamic magazines are concomitant with the characteristics of 
Tarbiyah.105 In addition, many contributors and Muslim figures consulted for the 
magazine have a PKS/Tarbiyah background.106 
PKS also makes the most effective use of the Internet of any political party. 
PKS central office and its branches, ranging from the provincial level to the village 
level, promote their political views and religious values through more than 50 
websites. Also, PKS special branches overseas utilise websites and mailing lists to 
reinforce their networks. Some PKS leading figures and the party’s members have 
also promoted their political views and affiliations through personal websites or 
homepages. 
In sum, the remarkable achievement of PKS in the 2004 elections and its 
ability to mobilise collective action have been facilitated by the availability of 
                                                
105Rijal, “Media and Islamism,” 2005, p. 431. 
106Ibid.  
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supportive infrastructures. These infrastructures that are required for collective 
action have become known as ‘resource mobilisation.’ PKS relies on a variety of 
resources, which include cadres, organisational strengths, leadership, 
communication networks and financial assets. PKS was formed by activists of 
Jemaah Tarbiyah which seized the momentum of the downfall of Suharto regime. 
During Suharto’s authoritarianism, Tarbiyah used less formal and visible 
organisations and networks in order to avoid the sustained regime’s repression. 
Nonetheless, the collapse of the regime created opportunities for Tarbiyah to form 
PKS and thus utilising a far more visible institution and network. Since the post-
Suharto era, PKS has also endeavoured to boast its resource mobilisation, 
including acquisition of income, cadre recruitment, organisational and networking 
expansion, so that the party can actively engage with collective action and thus 
requires no jump start at election time.                                   
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CHAPTER 6 
“ISLAM IS THE SOLUTION:” 
THE PKS’ COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES AND ITS ISLAMIST 
TRANSNATIONAL FRAMING 
 
I have argued that the development of Tarbiyah which led to the formation 
of PKS, occurred under favourable conditions (political opportunities), and in a 
supportive organisational environment (resource mobilisation). However, the 
development of the Tarbiyah movement that led to the emergence of PKS cannot 
only be treated in organisational and political terms, but also in a way to link 
shared ideas, meaning and beliefs with political and organisational factors. In 
social movement theory, the study of ideas and the social construction of ideas has 
come to be known as collective action frames.   
Many proponents of collective action frames indicate the strong relations 
between frames and the role of ideology in mobilising collective action.  In this 
way, PKS has successfully proven its ability to produce clear summations of its 
ideology that resonate with its target audience. In this chapter, I will concentrate 
on PKS framing processes and dynamics. This chapter will also describe PKS’ 
Islamist transnational framing which is being used in the context of recruitment 
and mobilisation.   
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6.1. Key Elements of Collective Action Frames 
Social movement scholars use the concept of collective action frames to 
define a problem in collective terms that necessitates a collective response.1 The 
key point of ‘collective action frames’ is that people feel aggrieved about certain 
problems in their lives and believe that through protest they can redress them.  
At this point, students of social movements refer to Klandermans coined 
consensus and action mobilisation by which the support or the erosion of support 
for participation is influenced by attitudinal and behavioral aspects. The consensus 
mobilisation is “the process through which a social movement organisation tries to 
obtain support for its viewpoint.”2 Meanwhile, action mobilisation is related to the 
classic social psychological problem of the relationship between attitude and 
behaviour. While consensus mobilisation refers to the so-called struggle for the 
minds or the ideological support of individuals, action mobilisation implies a 
struggle for individuals’ willingness by offering resources such as money, time, 
skills, or expertise.3  
In order to understand the complexities of consensus and action 
mobilisation, students of social movements introduce the concept of frame 
resonance. This notion examines “the ability of a movement to transform a 
mobilisation potential into actual mobilisation [which] is contingent upon the 
                                                
1Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology, August 2000, Vol. 26; William Gamson, 
Talking Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.  
2Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology, 1997, p. 7.  
3Ibid.  
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capacity of a frame to resonate with potential participants.”4 Benford and Snow 
identify three core elements of framing for social movements.5 The first is 
diagnostic framing that entails the identification of a problem and the attribution of 
responsibility and targets of blame or causality. The second is prognostic framing 
that entails the articulation of a proposed solution to the problems and the 
identification of strategies, tactics and targets. The third is motivational framing 
that is “the elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the 
diagnosis and prognosis.”6   
 
6.2. The Diagnostic and Prognostic Framings of PKS 
As a social movement, PKS is heavily involved in the production of 
meaning and concomitant framing processes. A crucial component of PKS 
diagnostic frames is to blame the spread of Western liberal beliefs and practices 
for a broad range of problems including moral decay, economic injustice and 
political degradation. More specifically, PKS activists point to what they perceive 
to be the root of Western values, that is, secularism, as it manifests itself in various 
spheres of life. They regard this as the greatest challenge ever to the Muslim 
community and Islamic values. In the words of PKS president, Tifatul Sembiring, 
                                                
4Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 2004, p. 16.  
5Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes”, 2000, pp. 615-617; see 
also, David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology,”1988,  pp. 199-204.   
6David A Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology,” 1988, p. 202.  
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‘secularism is incompatible with PKS, which is also opposed to the reality of 
Indonesia’s social life.’7   
According to PKS, the marginalisation of political Islam in Indonesia has 
to do with the adoption of secular values in the state’s national ideology, Pancasila, 
marked by the failure of founding fathers to include in the preamble of the 
constitution a phrase known as the Jakarta Charter,8 which would have given 
shari’a constitutional status and would have acknowledged the role of Islam in 
political discourse.9 In a later development, activists of political Islam were 
continuously suppressed by the nationalist-secular regimes of Sukarno and 
Suharto.10 For PKS, because the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, it is 
imperative that Islam be given a voice in the nation as a whole.11 However, in the 
minds of PKS supporters the deepening processes of secularisation has led 
Indonesian Muslims to divert attention from their own religious rules and caused 
them to look at Islam merely as a religion that consists of ritual and worship. 
Accordingly, PKS has conducted prognostic framing to counter the 
problem of sustained secularisation among Indonesian Muslims by proposing the 
                                                
7The Jakarta Post, an Interview with Tifatul Sembiring, ‘The PKS and Shari’a Law: 
Indonesia,’ 8 February 2006.  
8In the earliest stage of Indonesia’s independence, some Islamic figures fought for the 
inclusion in the preamble to the constitution of a phrase which would have given the shari’a 
constitutional status. The Jakarta Charter attributed to the preamble that proclaimed Indonesia was 
based on ‘belief in God’ (Ketuhanan), followed by seven words: ‘Dengan kewajiban menjalankan 
syariah Islam bagi pemeluknya’ (with the obligation to practice Islamic shari’a by its adherents). 
Those serious efforts failed because of the strong opposition from the secular-nationalist-Christian 
political parties. For a detailed account of the 1945 Jakarta Charter, see B.J Boland, The Struggle of 
Islam in Modern Indonesia, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971, pp. 25-27.   
9MPP (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat) PKS, Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera: Terwujudnya Masyarakat Madani yang Adil, Sejahtera dan Bermartabat, (no 
publisher, no place, no date), p. 42.  
10Ibid., pp. 42-43.  
11Ibid., p. 47.  
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idea that “Islam is the solution” (al-Islam huwa al-hall). In its vision and mission 
statement PKS proclaims itself as “a dakwah party that struggles for Islam as the 
solution in the life of the nation and the state.”12 Although this frame is common 
among Islamist movements elsewhere, there are crucial divergences over tactics 
and strategies. Jamaah Tabligh, for example, focuses on ‘pure dakwah,’ dealing 
with the transformation of individual beliefs with Islamic values, but avoid 
engaging in politics. By contrast, Hizbut Tahrir is heavily involved in political 
matters campaigning for Islam as the only solution for the current human-made 
system i.e. democracy, secularism, capitalism.  
Instead, PKS appears to frame Islam as both the solution both for the 
transformation of individuals and for the so-called Islamising of the state through 
formal political participation. The party offers two patterns of Islamisation.13 The 
first is cultural Islamisation that involves individuals and community groups. The 
basic argument is that the process of cultural imperialism through secularism has 
undermined Muslim society so that they must return to the true path outlined in the 
sources of Islam (al-ruju’ il al-Qur’an wa al-Hadist). Islam must be understood as 
kaffah, a total, comprehensive and all-encompassing way of life with no separation 
between al-diin wa al-dawlah (religion and state). In other words, PKS views 
Islam as a comprehensive corpus of rules and guidelines that provides all the 
spiritual and worldly needs of human beings (syamil). This conception is 
                                                
12PKS’ official website, http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/v2/index.php?op=isi&id=110  
13MPP PKS, Platform, p. 48.  
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combined with the assertion that Islam is universal. Such universality of Islam will 
provide a moral basis for the development of Indonesia.  
Cultural Islamisation, carried out in gradual and incremental ways, is a 
long process.14 Accordingly, PKS’ second type of prognostic framing is the 
structural approach of Islamisation.15 Some leading figures of PKS admit that the 
party’s true political objective is “a state based on Islamic law.”16 As is stated in 
the paradigm of PKS, this structural pattern takes the form of formal political 
participation to restructure state policies and institutions in order to implement 
Islamic laws (shari’a) in society.17 The basic argument is that Islam must play a 
key role within the state.  To PKS, shari’a is an inherent part of Indonesian people, 
which should be absorbed into national law.18  
According to PKS, the implementation of Islamic values in the state is the 
final step of the Islamisation process following continuous efforts to Islamise 
individuals, family, neighbours, communities and other collectivities.19 In order to 
advance its structural approach of Islamisation, PKS is willing to work within the 
existing political system. This is the major defining trait differentiating the party 
from Indonesia’s more radicalised Islamist groups such as Hizbut Tahrir which 
rejects democracy.  
                                                
14Interview, Aan Rohanah, Jakarta, 4 October 2007.  
15MPP PKS, Platform, p. 50.   
16Notable among these was an interview with the president of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring, The 
Jakarta Post, ‘The PKS and Shari’a Law: Indonesia,’ 8 February 2006. 
17MPP PKS, Platform, p. 50.  
18The Jakarta Post, ‘The PKS and Shari’a Law: Indonesia,’ 8 February 2006. 
19MPP PKS, Platform, p. 35 
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The structural change proposed by PKS is distinguished from “either an 
Islamic state, which demands the formalisation of shari’a without considering 
other believers interests, or a secular state, which is perceived as a system that 
rejects the idea that shari’a be implemented within state policies.”20 Although the 
definition of Islamic state is starkly at odds, PKS seems to distinguish itself from 
other Islamist parties such as PPP and PBB. When the Islamic parties in the 2000 
legislature pioneered by PPP and PBB raised the issue of returning to the Jakarta 
Charter, which would have formalised Islam in the state, PKS predecessor, PK, did 
not support the move. Instead, PK MPs proposed what they called the ‘Medina 
Charter’ (Piagam Madinah), which respects all religions of Indonesia and gives 
equal rights and opportunities to them to carry out their teachings.21 After the 
merger of PK into PKS in mid-2003, the former president of PKS, Hidayat 
Nurwahid, affirms that PKS is still committed to propose the Medina Charter 
instead of the Jakarta Charter.22     
This is not to say that PKS has abandoned its commitment to Islamise 
society and the state.  The project of Islamising the state remains a cornerstone of 
the party’s struggle.23 Given that most Indonesian people are still reluctant to 
support the agenda of establishing an Islamic state, PKS conveys its Islamist 
                                                
20Ibid., 50.  
21Many scholars indicate that the Medina Charter was the first ‘constitution’ formulated 
by the Prophet Muhammad to regulate all inhabitants of Medina community, including Christians 
and Jews, into a single polity. See,  Nurcholish Madjid, “Agama dan Negara dalam Islam,” in 
Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah,  Paramadina, Jakarta, 1994.   
22Hidayat Nurwahid, Interview, 4 October 2007.   
23Bubalo and Fealy, Joining the Caravan? 2005, p. 71.   
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messages in politically neutral language.24 PKS’ strategy focuses on how to 
implement shari’a-based policies without declaring Indonesia to be an Islamic 
state.25 To shed light on this point Bubalo and Fealy cite the opinions of a 
prominent PKS leader as the following: 
If the substance sufficiently represents the name [i.e., ‘Islamic state’], the 
name does not need to reflect the substance…What is the use of a country 
as large as Indonesia, whose Muslim population is the largest in the world, 
declaring itself to be [an Islamic state]. Previously, the people ran this 
nation in a secular way [but] now we want run it Islamically. That is the 
essence of it. Hence, PK(S) never bears aloft the Islamic state or syariat 
Islam.26   
 
In order to intensify the two patterns of Islamisation, PKS promotes its 
motivational framings by engaging in a massive Islamic outreach program called 
dakwah ila Allah, literally, “the call” or “invitation” to God. Having said that PKS 
has attempted to address individual and structural changes, the party draws on the 
existing concept of dakwah, but adapts it for new purposes. First, the notion of 
dakwah was shifted to include the task of making “ordinary Muslims” better 
Muslims. Second, PKS introduced new content into the material of dakwah with 
emphasis on the interpretation of Islam as more than a code governing moral 
conduct; instead it is a total way of life which provides guidance for the 
transformation of individual beliefs and for the organisation of society and state.27  
The adoption of a new interpretation of dakwah in the realities of post-
Suharto Indonesia gives more room for political Islam to maneuver and indicates 
                                                
24Ibid. 
25MPP PKS, Platform, p. 50.   
26Bubalo and Fealy, Joining the Caravan?2005, p. 71.   
27MPP (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat) PKS, Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan PKS, no 
publisher, no place, 2007.    
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the success of PKS activists to articulate and transmit messages through dakwah. 
This has formed a basis for their Islamist framing process, in a way similar to the 
framing defined by David Snow, that is, “conscious strategic efforts by groups of 
people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action.”28 Through the medium of dakwah, the 
party introduces a new conception of Islam, claiming that it is a religious 
obligation (fardhu ‘ain) for every Muslim to participate in the Islamic reform of 
individuals, society and state.29 Dakwah is therefore framed as Islamic activism 
that demands self-sacrifice and total commitment to the cause of Islam.30 So long 
as PKS cadres follow this path of dakwah, they will be rewarded for their 
obedience. In the case of PKS, this reward manifests into two ways: ‘heaven’ as 
was promised by God and structural positions within the party due to the fact that 
merit and dakwah commitment become its usual basis for promotion.31      
PKS then divides its activities of dakwah into four stages called the orbit of 
dakwah (mahawir).32 The first is mihwar tanzhimi, which focuses on the 
consolidation and strengthening of cadres.33 The bottom line is that change must 
begin from the ability of PKS to create strong cadres through small training and 
                                                
28Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes: Towards a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on 
Social Movements,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer 
N. Zald, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 6.    
29MPP PKS, Platform, pp. 16-19.   
30Ibid.  
31Interview, Khairuddin, Jakarta,    
32K.H Hilmi Aminuddin, Bingkai Dakwah di Jalur Politik, Arah Press, Jakarta, 2008, pp. 
1-5; MPP PKS, Platform.  
33MPP PKS, Platform, 30.  
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mentoring cells (usrah) to cultivate distinctive beliefs and customs. Abu Ridha, 
ideologue and PKS leading figure wrote: 
For an Islamic party, Islamic ideology is the foundation of all structures of 
its actions and, at the same time, [it works] as the axis of its political 
moves. In this context, the department [of] cadreisation is responsible to 
implant Islamic ideology among all cadres so that their political mind-set 
unequivocally is based on ideology.34 
 
The second is mihwar sya’bi which concentrates on attempts to encompass 
wider sectors of society.35 At this point, the proliferation of Islamist social 
institutions linked to PKS (wajihah) such as schools, hospitals, charities, and so on 
become important sites of the party’s outreach.36 The third stage is mihwar 
muassasi, when PKS cadres are pushed to reach out to penetrate public and state 
political institutions.37 This stage is divided into two sectors, either dakwah in 
parliament or in bureaucracy. The two are an extension of the dakwah arena where 
cadres are encouraged to struggle in constitutional ways for the application of 
Islamic norms through state policies and legislation.38 The forth stage is mihwar 
daulah, whisch has the purpose of runing Indonesia Islamically, in a total way.39 
Nonetheless, the party’s constitution and manifesto make no clear explanation of 
the last crucial stage of dakwah.  
Those PKS stages of dakwah are carried out gradually, starting from the 
bottom up. The set of preparatory steps to Islamise Indonesia culminating with the 
                                                
34Abu Ridha, “Ideologi dan Energi Politik,” Suara Keadilan, October-November 2001. 
Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.  
35MPP PKS, Platform, p. 31.  
36Ibid., p. 32.  
37Ibid.  
38Ibid., pp. 32-33.  
39Ibid., p. 35.  
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incorporation of shari’a into the constitution are called ‘tadarruj’ (pentahapan, 
gradualism). As the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, put it:  
“We begin with the individual, the family, the local neighbourhood or 
community, and then the society at large. When society itself has become 
truly Islamic, it will be only a matter of time before Islam is extended to 
the sphere of the state.”40  
 
6.3. Electoral Strategy and Non-Islamist Agenda 
 As a political party seeking to extend support beyond its traditional basis 
outside pious Muslim middle-class and educated people, PKS faces a major 
challenge of how to appeal to wider society. PKS leaders believe that promoting 
the party’s commitment to Islamist causes in Indonesia’s political discourse would 
be counterproductive for electoral purposes. That is why PKS downplayed Islamist 
issues in the 2004 elections and shied away from showing its Islamist stance too 
plainly. Instead, the party decided to promote a clean and caring image and 
emphasised “secular” themes of fighting corruption, good governance and socio-
economic equality in the last elections. This electoral strategy was successful in 
2004 where PKS increased of its share of the vote to 7.34 per cent from 1.4 per 
cent in 1999.  
 Since then, PKS has prioritised to building its reputation for 
incorruptibility. Unlike other parties where structural positions or nominations for 
executive or legislative offices can be “purchased” or guaranteed by powerful 
                                                
40Cited from Wickham, Mobilising Islam, 2002, p. 127.  
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patrons, advancement in PKS depends on merit and ideological commitment.41 In 
the national and local parliaments, the party takes every opportunity to flaunt its 
clean image. It has opposed several plans to increase salaries for legislators and 
has pledged to refuse bribes. Recently, the PKS faction in DPR reported the 
gratification funds its members received and returned the money to the Corruption 
Eradication Commission in an attempt to promote clean government.42 In an effort 
to avoid conflicts of interest, PKS leaders who were chosen as public officials 
usually resigned from high party positions, such as occurred with Hidayat 
Nurwahid (former President of PKS stepped down after taking over as the leader 
of MPR) and Nur Mahmudi Ismail (former President of PK resigned after being 
appointed as a minister during Abdurrahman administration).  
 To be fair, PKS is not entirely free of corruption allegations. It was 
attacked for its choice of Suripto as a legislative candidate despite the fact that he 
was under investigation for corruption. It has also been widely speculated that PKS 
sold nominations for executive office, most notably, the former deputy chief of the 
national police Adang Daradjatun who reportedly paid a large amount of money to 
the party in exchange for his nomination as a governor of Jakarta. However, 
relative to other parties, PKS is far more committed to the ideals of clean 
government and has consistently taken an uncompromising stance in the fight 
against corruption.  
                                                
41Bubalo and Fealy, Joining the Caravan?2005, p. 71.    
42Suarasurabaya.net, Fraksi PKS Kembalikan Uang Gratifikasi Rp. 2 Milyar, available at 
http://www.suarasurabaya.net/v05/politik/?id=f1b34e8eb87778159edd8d9c0bb2ec91200851112 
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 Furthermore PKS leaders have tried to frame their position on these non-
Islamist issues i.e., anti-corruption and social work, in religious terms. In his 
interview with a Jakarta-based daily newspaper, President of PKS, Tifatul 
Sembiring, held: 
People often simplify shari’a as cutting off hands and stoning. Shari’a is 
very broad, covering all aspects of life and having a universal nature. In our 
understanding, a government creating public welfare performs amar ma’ruf 
(doing what is correct) in the sense of shari’a, and one eradicating 
corruption carries out nahi munkar (rejecting what is wrong) as obliged by 
shari’a.43 
           
The Muslim political mainstream represented by the two largest Islamic 
organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, also take a similar stance. Along with 
fourteen other Indonesian Islamic organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah called 
every Muslim to perform jihad (fight) against corruption.44 They strongly believe 
that fighting corruption is a part of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (Islamic teaching of 
commanding good and forbidding evil deeds). PKS’ position on this issue, which 
is combined with the assertion that combating corruption is informed by Islamic 
norms, can be seen as an attempt to broaden its appeal to the Muslim mainstream.  
Also, the agenda of eradicating corruption in Indonesia, which is a problem 
deeply rooted both at the both the local and national level is attractive for 
Indonesian people in general regardless of their religion and background. This is 
particularly the case for PKS whose rhetoric of clean government is backed up by 
its visible and steadfast position against corruption. Unsurprisingly, in the 2004 
                                                
43The Jakarta Post, ‘The PKS and Shari’a Law: Indonesia,’ 8 February 2006.  
44Lanny Oktavia, ‘Jihad Bushido,” available at http://www.islamlib.com.  
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elections, PKS received more than eight million votes, many of which came from 
outside the party’s traditional basis.  
 
6.4. Islamist Issues and the Maintaining of PKS’ Base  
 Aside from strenuous efforts to extend its base by promoting its broader 
messages through the adoption of the language of clean government and social 
concern, PKS seeks to preserve its traditional support by maintaining its earlier 
commitment to Islamist causes. It is clear that the party has adopted what Liddle 
and Mujani called a two-track—simultaneously Islamist and non-Islamist—
electoral strategy.45  
For all PKS’ efforts to moderate its image by promoting non-Islamist 
issues, it is still likely seen as an Islamist party that has a ‘hidden’ agenda to 
eventually push for the implementation of shari’a in public life and other 
conservative legislation products.46 This can be seen from the party’s strong 
support to enact the draft anti pornography bill. In addition, there are also growing 
signs that local campaigns which involve PKS cadres in many provinces and 
districts in Aceh, West Sumatra, West Java, Banten, and South Sulawesi pushing 
for laws based on Islamic norms such as regulating Islamic attire in public office, 
banning alcohol, gambling, and prostitution. Despite some criticism against the 
implementation of local laws inspired by shari’a, PKS leaders saw that the 
                                                
45Liddle and Mujani, “Islamist Parties,” unpublished paper.  
46Steele, “The Decline of Political Islam.”    
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application of shari’a in some parts of Indonesia should not be deemed negative.47 
PKS strongly argues that “any controversy over the substance of national law 
against Islamic/local laws should be avoided.”48  
Many analysts have been suspicious that PKS was all along masquerading 
behind non-Islamist issues (i.e., anti-corruption credentials and public services), 
while quietly pushing forward its Islamist agenda.49 It is clear that there are some 
contradictions between the rhetoric of PKS ‘secular’ issues and its conservative 
agenda. In many instances, PKS has continuously tried to burnish its image as an 
open party committed to pluralism and tolerance. However, this self-proclamation 
is clearly at odds with PKS training documents indicating widespread intolerant 
interpretations of Islam among many of its leaders and cadres.50   
The above indications of maintaining an Islamist agenda have much to do 
with PKS’ attempt to convince its traditional base that it will not abandon its initial 
vision of striving for Islam as the solution for the nation’s problems. As noted 
earlier, PKS’ support base is among young orthodox, well-educated Muslims. In 
order to understand the characteristics of PKS members and their support for 
Islamist agendas, it is useful to referring to LSI’s survey findings on “Support for 
Radical Religious Attitudes and Behaviour.”51  To measure support for Islamist 
                                                
47The Jakarta Post, ‘The PKS and Shari’a Law: Indonesia,’ 8 February 2006.   
48Ibid.  
49Steele, “The Decline of Political Islam.”    
50Bubalo and Fealy, Joining the Caravan? 2005, p. 72.     
51As a researcher of the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), I had an opportunity to access a 
number of LSI’s survey findings. The institute has conducted a nationwide survey through face-to-
face interviews with 1,200 respondents as a sample selected through multistage random sampling. 
This method is used to produce a sample that enables us to make inferences and generalisations 
about the national population. The number of samples was determined to account for 
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agenda, 1,200 respondents of the survey were asked about their opinions on 
polygamy, bank interest, cutting thief’s hand off, and so on. It recorded that a 
number of factors correlate positively with support for Islamist agendas, most 
notably support for PKS compared to support for PDI-P and other large parties.52 
Above all, the survey showed that PKS’ constituents are more likely to support 
Islamist agendas relative to other major political parties.  
LSI’s findings confirm that PKS has brought Islamist political orientations, 
including support for the implementation of an Islamist agenda at the polity. In 
short, despite the fact that PKS has promoted non-Islamist agendas, the party is 
still committed to Islamist policies in order to reassure the party's base about its 
long-term goal to Islamise Indonesian society culminating in a state based on 
shari’a. 
 
6.5. PKS’ Collective Action and Its Islamist Transnational Framing 
 Aside from striving to impose Islamic laws through institutionalised 
politics, PKS also uses collective action, most notably large-scale demonstrations, 
to maintain its Islamic image. As described in Chapter 3, roughly 60% of PKS 
demonstrations can be called Islamist in essence. These Islamist issues range from 
moral reform to transnational Islamism. PKS collective action on non-Islamist 
                                                                                                                                  
approximately ± 2.9% margin of error with 95% reliability.  For more detailed information of this 
measurement, see Lembaga Survey Indonesia, Support for Religious Radical Attitudes and 
Behaviour, 2006, available at http://www.lsi.or.id.  
52This survey asserts the term of radical and Islamist in parallel ways. For more detailed 
information of this measurement, see Lembaga Survey Indonesia, Support for Religious Radical 
Attitudes and Behaviour, 2006, available at http://www.lsi.or.id. 
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issues such as anti-corruption and the reformasi struggle are outnumbered by the 
party’s demonstrations against anti-pornography, -Ahmadiyah—an allegedly 
deviant sect, and Israel and the U.S.  I have also noted that PKS remains 
preoccupied by distant but religiously charged issues (Chapter 3).  
 Those results, which are tabulated from Indonesian daily newspapers by 
utilising protest event analysis, demonstrate that PKS’ collective action is geared 
more toward advancement of Islamist issues and transnational framing of 
mobilisation rather than grappling with non-Islamist domestic issues that 
correspond with national interests.  
 In the following pages, I will present three of the major Islamist 
transnational frames employed by PKS. The first is that Islam is under siege by 
the West. The second is there is a Jewish conspiracy to undermine Islam. The first 
two frames are seen as the crux of all problems in the Muslim world and represent 
PKS’ diagnostic framing. The third, replicating one of most common frames 
among Islamist movements elsewhere, is the idea of the global umma as the 
parameter of the Muslim identity.  
 These Islamist transnational framings are vital to understand the nature of 
PKS’ collective action which is driven by a strong antipathy to America and 
Israel. Also, these cultural framings show the ability of PKS to link its ideology 
with a more specific interpretation of a situation. Students of social movement 
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have argued that frames can draw on ideology and discourse.53 In the framing 
process, however, movement activists must be able to construct their ideology and 
discourse with the objective of mobilising support. 
   
6.5.1. Islam is under Siege by the West 
 One of PKS’ missions is to “contribute positively to uphold justice and 
oppose oppression, particularly toward oppressed Muslim countries.”54 This 
mission indicates that the party is greatly concerned with the perceived Muslims’ 
pain and misery across the world. It also suggests that PKS founders who 
formulated the vision and mission of the party were driven by a strong sense of 
global Muslim subjugation and suppression. They contrasted this with Islam’s 
glorious past.  
 The invocation of an Islamic golden age is especially prevalent in the 
thinking of Muslims whose outlook is shaped by a deep reverence for history. 
Like most Islamist groups, PKS divides the history of Muslims into two phases. 
The first encompasses the Prophet’s lifetime, the period of the Prophet’s first four 
successors, the ‘rightly guided caliphs’ (al-khulafa al-rasyidun), the formation of 
the first Islamic state, the phenomenal expansion of Islam out of Arabia, and the 
spread of great empires under the Islamic caliphates of Umayyad, Abbasid, and 
                                                
53For discussions of the relationship between discourse, ideology and frames, see, for 
example, Pamela Oliver and Hans Johnston, “What a Good Idea: Frames and Ideology in Social 
Movement Research,” Mobilisation, 5 (1), 2000, pp. 37-54.    
54PKS’ official website, http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/v2/index.php?op=isi&id=110 
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Uthmaniya that brought Islamic civilisation to its height.55 This phase is viewed 
as an exemplary period.  
 The second phase is the decline of Muslim power in the late seventeenth 
century exemplified by loss of territory and the period of Western colonialism.56 
This period was marked by the Western cultural, economical, political and 
intellectual dominance. Again, this is not a unique of PKS view. Virtually 
everywhere in the contemporary Muslim world, Islamists have felt subordinate to 
the West. “The trauma of modern Islam,” Daniel Pipes stated, “came about from 
this disparity between medieval successes and recent troubles,” which lead to “a 
pervasive sense of debilitation and encroachment in the Islamic world today.”57 
The following PKS training material describes the vulnerability of the 
contemporary Muslim world. It holds: 
The condition of Muslims today is…pitiful and under the rule of the 
enemies of Islam. Muslims as the best and grand community obviously no 
longer display their grandness amidst other humankind; even appears to 
wane more and more because of ignorance [jahiliyyah]…Muslims today 
have deficiencies such as ethics, training, culture …organisational 
management [and] intellect. This situation exists in a majority of Islamic 
countries.58 
      
 To restore the past glory of Islam, Islamists, including PKS, act on the 
presumption “that Muslims lag behind the West because they are not good 
                                                
55Lawrence Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut 
and London, 1998, p. 3.  
56Ibid.  
57Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism: Faith and Ideology,” The National Interest, 
Washington, Spring 2000, pp. 87-93. 
58Irwan Prayitno, Ahwaal Al-Muslimun Al-Yaum (Kondisi Umat Islam Saat Ini), reprinted 
in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2005, p. 155. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, “Religious 
Dogma,” 2005.   
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Muslims.”59 Accordingly, PKS promotes an ‘active and comprehensive form of 
dakwah’ (al-dakwah al-harakiyyah al-syamilah) to create better Muslims.  
There is only one simple solution: dakwah has to tell to the umat and the 
people of this country: “You are Muslims!” until they openly declare 
with the conviction: “We are Muslims!” Or in other words the solution is 
to REESTABLISH THE ISLAMIC IDENTITY (emphasis in original).60      
 
Dakwah is seen by PKS as an essential instrument to re-Islamise society 
and to return Indonesian Muslims to their religious identity.61 To PKS, many 
Muslims are reluctant to embrace Islamic identity, because of the existence of a 
Western conspiracy to undermine Muslims across the world.62 Central to this 
notion of cultural undermining was al-ghazw al-fikri (war of ideas). This concept 
is frequently used by PKS to counter what is perceived as Western ideological 
challenges to Muslim worldviews. It holds that there is a fundamental division of 
the world into two categories: Islamic and non-Islamic or jahiliyyah. The word 
jahiliyyah is initially translated to ‘the age of ignorance’ and taken to refer to the 
Arabian society of the century prior to the advent of Islam. Nonetheless, Sayyid 
Qutb and modern Islamists expanded the meaning to a set of un-Islamic cultures in 
Muslim societies.63 In a guideline written specifically for preachers and religious 
                                                
59Daniel Pipes, “Islam and Islamism,” pp. 87-93.  
60Mahfudz Sidiq, Pemilu dan Urgensi Tarbiyatul Ummat: Agenda-agenda Besar Dakwah 
Menuju Perbaikan Umat dan Bangsa melalui Kemenangan Politik Islam, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 
Jakarta, 2003, p. 35. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.  
61MPP PKS, Platform.  
62Irwan Prayitno, “Al-Ghazw Al-Fikri,” reprinted in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2005, pp. 
3-4.   
63Ibid.  
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trainers of Islamic study groups, Irwan Prayitno, ideologue and PKS’ MP, 
addresses the doctrine of jahiliyyah.  
The infidels…have since looked for an alternative way of destroying the 
Islamic community…The strategy they have chosen to destroy Islam is al-
ghazw al-fikri. Al-ghazw al-fikri is an ideological, cultural, mental and 
conceptual attack waged continually in a systematic, organised and well-
planned fashion. The result is the emergence of a change in the personality, 
lifestyle and behaviour of the Muslim community…These efforts…began 
with the severing of ties between Islamic countries under the Islamic 
caliphate, causing the emergence of nationalist groups and national 
ideologies. The separation of religion and state, orientalism, 
Christianisation, and the women’s emancipation movement are also al-
ghazw al-fikri activities...64            
 
6.5.2. Jewish Conspiracy 
Like most Islamist groups in Indonesia, PKS is fundamentally anti-Semitic. 
In many PKS training documents, Jews and Zionists are conflated leading to a 
tendency to see the Palestine-Israeli conflict in fundamentally religious, not 
nationalist, terms. Furthermore, PKS propagates the view of Jewish control over 
the world.   
The Jews aspire to control the world by conquering every system owned by 
each nation or nation. Whatever method the Jews may employ through 
their Zionist movement, their aim is always to control the world. At 
present, the world’s political, economic, legal and social systems, wherever 
they have developed, are controlled by Jews. This urge to control the world 
is founded on a conviction that God has appointed Jews as the leaders of 
nations and the heirs of the earth and all that is legitimate in it. Islam holds 
the same conviction, called a caliphate, namely that a faithful and pious 
organ has been given a mandate to develop and tend the earth and all that is 
in it. This conviction on the part of Muslims will motivate Jews to wage 
war on Islam, because Islam has the potential to defeat the Jews. The Jews 
                                                
64Irwan Prayitno, “Al-Ghazw Al-Fikri,” reprinted in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2005, pp. 
3-4. Not my translation. I cite from Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds.), Voices of Islam in 
Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 
2006.  
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work hard to wage war on the Muslim community, so that Muslims will 
follow them, as mentioned in the Qur’an, Al Baqarah, verse 120: “The 
Jews and Christians will not be pleased with you until you follow their 
religion’…To achieve this obsession they have employed all means. The 
Jews are widely known to have orchestrated various secret movements. 
They have also been behind many catastrophes throughout history. There 
are indications that the September 11 tragedy was a Jewish conspiracy to 
corner Islam, so that Israel could justify attacks on Palestinians using 
terrorism as a reason…Islam does not have a history of attacking innocent 
civilians…The history of the Jews is full of evil, such as cruel slavery, 
arrogance, extreme patriotism, blind fanaticism to their bloodline, material 
greed, a usurious economic system, and other evil behaviour such as being 
suck-ups, slippery, cruel, hypocritical, with rotten intentions, stubborn, 
seizing other people’s possessions by illegitimate means and obstructing 
humans from the path of Islam…This behaviour is the behaviour of the 
devil…The actions of the U.S. in attacking Islamic states are also the result 
of the strong Jewish lobby in the U.S. The Jews control world or foreign 
politics through effective way to conquer the world, which they follow, is 
by economic means. History also shows that the Jews defeat other people 
through their economic strength, namely through a system of bank interest 
and control of assets using unjust and dishonest trade practices.65 
 
6.5.3. Global Umma 
PKS uses the rhetoric of returning society to genuine Islamic identity by 
utilising the concept of umma and Muslim brotherhood, above notions of race, 
blood, clan, tribe, nation, and birth place. Accordingly, the party shares a greater 
sense of Islamic unity and solidarity and views Muslims in different parts of the 
world within the framework of a global Muslim umma than do other Indonesian 
Islamist parties. As stated in the basic policy adopted by PKS, one of principles on 
                                                
65Irwan Prayitno, “Yahudi sebagai Hizbus Syaithan Menguasai Dunia,” reprinted in 
Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, 2005, p. 111. Not my translation. I cite from Fealy and Hooker (eds.), 
Voices of Islam, 2006..  
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which the party’s political policies and operational activities are based, is that it is 
part of global dakwah (al-‘alamiyah).66 
In principle, any Islamic dakwah movement must have a global vision in 
parallel to the universality of Islam. This, indeed, has been the very nature 
of the dakwah. It is an activity that is not limited to certain ethnics, or by 
state or regional boundaries. This recognition highlights that the existence 
of our dakwah is part of the dakwah activities around the globe. It is, 
therefore, essential that every policy made, program planned and step taken 
is in harmony with the international dakwah strategy and follows the 
sunnat al-dakwah whilst not setting aside specific issues happening 
locally.67 
 
It is true that that PKS has made no plain statement in its political platform 
but this does mean that it has no desire to the idea of an Islamic caliphate. In the 
founding manifesto of PK, PKS’ predecessor, however, there were calls for the 
restoration of an Islamic caliphate. In the 2000 national congress of PK when the 
party deliberated over policy guidelines it was revealed that the Islamic caliphate 
is seen as its long-term orientation.  
[We are] aware that the objective of dakwah, which will be realised, is a 
large objective, that is to implement God’s religion on earth and to install 
Islamic Sovereignty or state in an Islamic caliphate system of which the 
results possibly can be enjoyed by following generations. Hence, every 
policy…and program…connects [to] three time dimensions. The past as 
lesson, the present as reality and the future as hope.68 
 
After the formation of PKS, these calls for the resurrection of a caliphate 
were written off for political purposes from the party’s political platform. 
Nonetheless, the notion of global umma is still strong in the minds of PKS leaders. 
                                                
66For more detailed about PKS’ basic policy, see http://pk-sejahtera.us/index.php?option 
=com_content&view=article&id=8&Itemid=25 
67Ibid.  
68Komisi C Kebijakan Dasar Partai, Musyawarah Nasional I Partai Keadilan, 18-21 Mei 
2000. Not my translation. I cite from Platzdasch, “Religious Dogma,” 2005.  
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Andi Rahmat, a PKS MP, argues that PKS shares its belief in the notion of 
caliphate with other Islamist groups.69 He called the idea of umma “the 
foundational basis for the formation of political community.”70 Additionally, in a 
PKS’ document training, there are texts referring to how the economic problems of 
the Muslim world are due to the absence of an Islamic caliphate.71 It has been 
argued that the caliphate is the solution of Muslims’ economic dependence on the 
West.   
Among Islamist groups, Hibut Tahrir is the most vocal group and widely 
propagates the necessity of restoring a single and universal caliphate for all 
Muslims across the world. PKS also shares this idea, but there are important 
differences in strategies for rebuilding the caliphate. Andi Rahmat states that the 
main difference between PKS and HTI is not in goals, but methods. In contrast to 
Hizbut Tahrir which aims to resurrect the caliphate by rejecting the concepts of 
nation-state and democracy, critics within PKS consider this method to be 
unrealistic. To PKS, the Islamic caliphate could be realised through a gradualist 
approach which has strong strategic value. Unlike Hizbut Tahrir, PKS’ approach 
remains firmly grounded in political realism and thus it accepts Indonesia as the 
nation-state and pursues its short-term objectives through a democratic system. 
Untung Wahono summed up the differences between PKS and Hizbut Tahrir.         
While Hizbut Tahrir views the Islamic global caliphate as the necessary 
condition, PKS saw it as an outcome of the unity of the Muslim world. We 
                                                
69Andi Rakhmat, Interview, 27 August 2007.   
70Ibid.  
71Panduan Lengkap Manhaj, 2005, p. 321.   
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must be united first prior to rebuild the caliphate. PKS is now striving to 
achieve the integration of umma.72  
 
Based on the aforementioned Islamist transnational framings, it is hardly 
surprising that PKS seems to extend the global jihad of fighting against distant 
enemies. PKS’ outlook is anchored in geographically distant issues such as the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine, the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and so 
on. These, rather than domestic matters, have become PKS’ most favoured issues 
throughout collective action. There is a growing belief among PKS supporters that 
Muslims are the community’s most discriminated. A key leader of the party, 
Untung Wahono, holds: 
We are bonded together by no other quality than the fact of being Muslim. 
When Palestinians are suffering from Israeli brutal attacks, Indonesian 
Muslims should express their Islamic solidarity beyond geographical 
boundaries.73 
 
In brief, the collective action frames of PKS have provided a mechanism 
for mobilising collective action. PKS’ frames, which draw primarily upon the 
party’s ideology, aspire both to explain the world and to change it. PKS replicates 
the most common frame among Islamist groups in the Middle East, that is, the 
notion of Islam as the solution (al-Islam huwa al-haal). The vulnerability of the 
Muslim world and social ills of the society are attributed to the departure from 
Islamic values.         
 
 
                                                
72Untung Wahono, Interview, 4 October 2007.  
73Ibid.   
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Illustration 5 
 
 
 
Caption: 
This is the PKS “One Man, One Dollar” Campaign/Demonstration (07 May 2006). 
Available at: http://www. lautjenny.blogsome.com/2006/06/ 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
This sub-thesis studies the emergence and the rise of the Prosperous Justice 
Party (PKS) and the nature of its collective action. The party successfully 
increased its vote by six hundred percent, from 1.4 percent in 1999 to 7.3 percent 
in 2004. Despite its success PKS is an unusual party in many respects, most 
notable is that it is not merely a political party that articulates its agenda within 
institutionalised politics, but it also acts as a social movement organisation which 
vigorously engages in collective action. It regularly uses collective action as a 
vehicle to continuously engage with its supporters—rather than only reaching out 
at election time as is the case with most other parties. No other party is so active in 
regularly mobilising their sympathisers on the streets.  
As described in Chapter 2, PKS takes this form as a political party partly 
because it emerged out of an Islamist student movement called Tarbiyah. Founded 
in the late 1970s, Tarbiyah is a loose network of student dakwah groups in state 
secular universities whose activists are strongly influenced by the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas and activism. Faced with the Suharto regime’s 
suppression towards political Islam and student activism in the 1980s, Tarbiyah 
took the form of a less formally institutionalised movement, used non-
confrontational approaches and conducted few public activities that were alyawys 
apolitical. By the early 1990s, Tarbiyah began to emerge into public view 
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following the regime’s rapprochement with Islam. Following the resignation of 
Suharto in 1998, Tarbiyah activists seized the momentum by transforming their 
movement into a political party named PK, now known as PKS. 
Having this general picture in mind, I felt that it was pertinent to ask: why 
did Tarbiyah eventually decide to transform its activism into a political 
movement? In answering this question, I used a social movement integrated 
approach, combining three emerging trends in the tradition of social movement 
research, i.e. political opportunity structures, resource mobilisation theory and 
collective action frames. 
 From these three integrated perspectives, I demonstrated that PKS: (1) 
emerged from an array of unsettling social and political conditions that produced a 
political opportunity structure; (2) took advantage of favourable social and 
political opportunities by consolidating and enhancing its organisational resources 
and communication networks to support the sustainability of the movement; and 
(3) consciously and subjectively responded to the significant increase in political 
opportunities and its structural capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas, 
beliefs and values. 
The first factor of the emergence of PKS was a significant increase in 
political opportunity structure. Based on evidence gathered in this research, it is 
clear that the development of Tarbiyah leading to the formation of PKS did not 
occur in a vacuum. Instead, the party relied on external conditions that provided a 
mechanism for collective action. In social movement theory, the study of 
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‘conditions,’ that may constrain or facilitate the emergence of a movement has 
come to be known as political opportunity structure.  
By using “the double track of political opportunity structures,” which 
combines both international and domestic factors, this study revealed the complex 
nature of PKS’ emergence. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are a range of 
international influences that helped to explain the emergence of the party including 
the 1979 Iranian revolution, the sponsoring of DDII activities by Saudi Arabia 
leading to the popularity of new Middle Eastern Islamic thinking, the link between 
Indonesian revivalists and their fellow activists from Malaysia, and more 
importantly, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas and methods in 
PKS’ political thinking and behaviour. The transplantation of the Brotherhood 
ideas and methods into Tarbiyah was facilitated by DDII’s extensive networks, 
including DDII-affiliated intellectuals who massively translated the works of 
Brotherhoods ideologues into Indonesian.   
These international contexts of political opportunities helped to structure 
the domestic possibilities for the development of Tarbiyah on which PKS was 
based. These domestic factors include the regime’s repressive measures against 
political Islam and restrictions on student political activities in campuses. To avoid 
the regime’s sustained repression, Tarbiyah organised its activities by adopting the 
notion of Sirriyat al-Tandzim wa Alamiyyat al-Dakwah (Secret Organisational 
Structure and Open Predication). According to this concept, every Muslim is 
obliged to perform dakwah in an open way, except in less democratic political 
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environment where overt dakwah risks harsh regime reprisals. Indeed dakwah 
activities faced no problems during the New Order era as long as they were not 
political. Accordingly, Tarbiyah focused its activities on the cultivation of 
religious understanding and practices among Islamic students in secular 
universities.    
The second crucial factor is PKS’ ability to generate organisational 
resources. In social movement theory, this is a large specialty area known as 
resource mobilisation. This approach is based on a theoretical assumption that 
political opportunities alone do not make a movement. As described in Chapter 5, 
the rise of Tarbiyah and PKS can be explained through its capacity to improve its 
organisational strength, including building a system cadre, leadership, 
communication networks and financial assets. Since its emergence in the late 
1970s, Tarbiyah utilised informal forms of collective action in an attempt to escape 
from the regime’s control by taking advantage of campus mosques as the centre of 
its activities. By the early 1980s, the use of usrah or halaqah became the main 
means to propagate Tarbiyah’s core teachings and to draw students into more 
intensive training and involvement. In addition, the establishment of LDK as one 
of student dakwah networks across campuses is also important for managing a 
range of religious activities organised by Tarbiyah activists. By the mid-1990s, 
Tarbiyah activists began to take control of student senates in many prestigious 
universities along with their success in establishing the student movement group, 
KAMMI.  
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The collapse of Suharto regime in 1998 allowed Tarbiyah activists to use 
their organisational resources for the purpose of transforming the movement into a 
political party, PK, later renamed itself PKS in mid-2003. Utilising preexisting 
Tarbiyah networks, the party expanded its organisational structures rapidly 
throughout Indonesia. PKS has now opened provincial-level (DPD) and district-
level branches (DPD) in all provinces and districts across the entire country. This 
rapid rise in party branches is seen as a key factor of PKS’ remarkable success in 
the 2004 elections. Additionally, PKS has operated as a ‘cadre party,’ which 
requires strict standards and intensive training of members.  
The last factor shaping the emergence of Tarbiyah and PKS was the 
formation of collective action frames. Frames identify targets of blame, offer 
solutions to achieve a desirable world, and provide a rationale to motivate 
collective action. Frames can draw upon ideology. In this way, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, PKS’ ideology, which is based on selective interpretation of Islamic 
theology and history, provides a basis for its collective action. The party’s 
ideological roots lie deep in the notion that Islam is al-diin, al-kaffah, or a total, 
comprehensive, and all-encompassing way of life with no separation between 
aqidah wa shari’ah (belief and law), diin wa dawlah (religion and state), and diin 
wa dunya (spiritual and temporal). Accordingly, PKS activists attribute many of 
the problems besetting the global Muslim community to the spread of secularism. 
To PKS, the adoption of secular values in the state’s political platform has 
marginalised political Islam. Toward this end, PKS offers one of the most common 
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frames among Islamist groups worldwide, that is, “Islam is the solution” (al-Islam 
huwa al-hal). 
Following PKS’ successful campaign in 2004 on an anti-corruption ticket, 
PKS began to downplay its ideological frames and avoid displaying its Islamist 
stance too plainly. Instead, the party promotes a clean and caring image and 
emphasises the ‘secular’ themes of fighting corruption, good governance, and 
devotion to welfare activities. Furthermore, PKS leaders have endeavoured to 
frame their position on these non-Islamist issues in religious terms. They view 
shari’a in a general term, covering all aspects of live and having a universal 
nature. In their understanding, fighting corruption and eradicating poverty are also 
parts of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (Islamic teaching of commanding good and 
forbidding evil deeds). Despite this clean and caring campaign is central to PKS’ 
self-image, PKS’ strenuous efforts to promote its broader message can be seen as a 
way to reach out a wider audience outside its traditional base.    
In addition to PKS’ attempts to extend its base by promoting non-Islamist 
issues through the adoption of the language of clean government and social 
concern, PKS seeks to convince its traditional supporters by maintaining its earlier 
commitment to Islamist causes. Despite its success to moderate its image by 
promoting non-Islamist agendas, it is still likely seen as an Islamist party 
eventually pushing for the implementation of shari’a in public life and other 
conservative legislation products. This is markedly evident in PKS’ strong support 
to enact the draft anti pornography bill. There are also growing signs that local 
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campaigns which involve PKS cadres in many provinces and districts pushing for 
the implementation of Islamic-inspired laws such as regulating Islamic attire in 
public office, banning alcohol, gambling, and prostitution.   
Aside from striving to implement Islamic-based laws through formal 
politics, PKS also uses collective action to maintain its Islamic image. This study 
employed protest-event analysis, which is commonly used in the tradition of social 
movement research to examine PKS’ collective action. The results of this study 
suggest that roughly six-in-ten of PKS demonstrations can be called Islamist in 
essence. As described in Chapter 3, PKS’ collective actions have been driven by a 
strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support for the 
Palestine cause. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously 
charged issues rather than grappling with non-Islamist and domestic issues that 
correspond with national interests.  
It can be argued that PKS is still preoccupied with Islamist transnational 
framings. As discussed in the last part of Chapter 6, these PKS’ Islamist framings 
refer to the idea that Islam is under siege by the West as well as a belief in Jewish 
conspiracies to undermine the Muslim community and the importance of an 
integration of umma to deal with a range of problems faced by Muslims across the 
world. These Islamist framings are crucial to understand the nature of PKS’ 
collective action which is driven by a strong antipathy to America and Israel. Also, 
these framings demonstrated the ability of PKS to construct its ideology and 
discourse with the objective of mobilising support.  
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APPENDIX 1 
PIAGAM DEKLARASI 
PARTAI KEADILAN 
 
 
Bahwa sesungguhnya Bangsa Indonesia telah melintasi gelombang pasang naik 
dan pasang surut, menghela beban berat penjajahan, penindasan dan 
pengkhianatan. 
 
Tahap demi tahap perjuangan panjang mengantarkan bangsa ini ke gerbang 
kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan, yang pada mulanya dicitakan untuk mewujudkan 
Negara yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah 
Indonesia untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan 
bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, 
perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial, sesuai dengan semangat Proklamasi 1945. 
Namun selama lima dekade berikutnya, garis sejarah itu mengalami berbagai 
penyimpangan, sehingga 
cita-cita besar bangsa menjadi kabur. 
 
Kejatuhan rejim Orde Lama, diikuti dengan keruntuhan rejim Orde Baru, 
merupakan tragedi yang seharusnya menyadarkan kembali bangsa ini akan cita-
cita luhurnya semula. Seluruh kekuatan bangsa wajib bergandeng tangan dengan 
landasan persaudaraan, keadilan, dan berpacu dalam kebaikan, seraya 
meninggalkan permusuhan, kedhaliman, dan pertikaian antar kelompok. 
 
Gerakan mahasiswa, yang disokong penuh rakyat Indonesia, telah mengobarkan 
"Reformasi Mei 1998" sebagai peretas jalan bagi terbentuknya "Orde 
Reformasi";orde yang diikat dengan nilai-nilai fitri kemanusiaan berupa keimanan, 
moralitas, kemerdekaan, persamaan, kedamaian, dan keadilan. Berkat rahmat 
Allah SWT, kemudian dipicu semangat reformasi, tercetuslah momentum untuk 
membangun kembali negeri yang besar ini, dengan cara pandang yang benar dan 
meninggalkan segala bentuk kesalahan generasi terdahulu. Mari bersatu dalam 
kebenaran untuk mengisi lembaran sejarah baru agar bangsa Indonesia senantiasa 
berdiri tegak dan berperan serta dalam mewujudkan masyarakat international yang 
berperadaban. 
 
Kejayaan atau kehancuran suatu negeri merupakan buah dari kepatuhan atau 
keingkaran penduduknya terhadap nilai-nilai religius dan universal, terutama nilai 
keadilan. Pada titik ini fitrah insani bertemu dengan tuntutan reformasi dan 
peluang demokratisasi. Maka perjuangan menegakkan keadilan pun menjadi 
 174 
keharusan, sebagai manifestasi misi utama Islam untuk menjadi rahmat bagi 
seluruh alam.  
 
Demi mewujudkan cita-cita sejati Proklamasi, mengisi kemerdekaan, 
mempertahankan kedaulatan dan pe rsatuan, serta berbekal semangat reformasi 
dan dukungan umat dari berbagai daerah, kami selaku anak bangsa dengan ini 
mendeklarasikan berdirinya PARTAI KEADIL AN. 
 
Semoga Allah Yang Maha Kuasa membimbing dan memberi kekuatan untuk 
menegakkan keadilan, mewujudkan kesejahteraan dan kemakmuran bagi seluruh 
bangsa Indonesia. 
 
"... Berbuat adillah, karena adil itu lebih dekat kepada taqwa ..." (Al-Qur-an, Surah 
Al-Maidah: 8) 
 
Dinyatakan di Jakarta 
Ahad, 15 Rabi'ul Tsani 1419 / 9 Agustus 1998 
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APPENDIX 2 
DEKLARASI 
PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA 
 
Bismilllahirrahmaanirrahiim 
Bangsa Indonesia telah menjalani sebuah sejarah panjang yang sangat menentukan 
dalam waktu lebih dari lima dekade ini dengan sebuah perjuangan yang berat dan 
kritis. Setelah lepas dari penjajahan Belanda dan Jepang selama tiga setengah 
abad, Indonesia memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya pada tanggal 17 Agustus 
1945.  
Kebangkitan ini berjalan hingga tahun 1959 ketika upaya untuk membangun 
bangsa yang demokratis dan sejahtera mengalami kebuntuan dengan 
dikeluarkannya Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 yang menandai awal diktaktorisme di 
Indonesia. Orde Baru muncul pada tahun 1966 tetapi ternyata hanya merupakan 
sebuah perpanjangan tangan kekuasaan militer yang benih-benihnya sudah mulai 
bersemi pada masa Orde Lama.  
Pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998 bangsa Indonesia mengukir kembali harapannya untuk 
hidup dalam suasana yang mampu memberi harapan ke depan dengan 
digulirkannya Reformasi Nasional yang didorong oleh perjuangan mahasiswa dan 
rakyat. Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya 
mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan kesejahteraan bagi bangsa Indonesia dari 
perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad.  
Demokratisasi menjadi tulang punggung perjuangan tersebut yang mewadahi 
partisipasi masyarakat dalam keseluruhan aspeknya. Bertolak dari kesadaran 
tersebut, dibentuklah sebuah partai politik yang akan menjadi wahana dakwah 
untuk mewujudkan cita-cita universal dan menyalurkan aspirasi politik kaum 
muslimin khususnya beserta seluruh lapisan masyarakat Indonesia umumnya. 
Partai tersebut bernama Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. 
Semoga Allah SWT memberikan hidayah dan inayah-Nya kepada kita, 
mengikatkan hati diantara para pengikut agama-Nya dan menolong perjuangan 
mereka dimana pun mereka berada. Amin. 
Jakarta, 20 April 2002 
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APPENDIX 3 
ANGGARAN DASAR 
 
PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA 
 
MUQADDIMAH 
Bangsa Indonesia telah menjalani sebuah sejarah panjang yang sangat menentukan 
dalam waktu lebih lima decade ini dengan sebuah perjuangan yang berat dan kritis. 
Setelah lepas dari penjajahan Belanda dan Jepang selama tiga setengah abad, 
Indonesia memproklamirkan kemerdekaannya pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1945. 
Kebangkitan ini berjalan hingga tahun 1959 ketika upaya untuk membangun 
bangsa yang demokratis dan sejahtera mengalami kebuntuan dengan 
dikeluarkannya Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 yang menandai awal diktaktorisme di 
Indonesia. Orde Baru muncul pada tahun 1966 tetapi ternyata hanya merupakan 
sebuah perpanjangan tangan kekuasaan militer yang benih-benihnya sudah mulai 
bersemi pada masa Orde Lama. Pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998 bangsa Indonesia 
mengukir kembali harapannya untuk hidup dalam suasana yang mampu memberi 
harapan ke depan dengan digulirkannya Reformasi Nasional yang didorong oleh 
perjuangan mahasiswa dan rakyat. 
Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya 
mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan Sejahtera bagi bangsa Indonesia dari 
perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad. Demokratisasi 
menjadi tulang punggung perjuangan tersebut yang mewadahi partisipasi 
masyarakat dalam keseluruhan aspeknya. Bertolak dari kesadaran tersebut, 
dibentuk sebuah partai politik yang akan menjadi wahana dakwah untuk 
mewujudkan cita-cita universal dan menyalurkan aspirasi politik kaum muslimin 
beserta seluruh lapisan masyarakat Indonesia, dengan Anggaran Dasar sebagai 
berikut.  
BAB 1  
NAMA, PENDIRIAN, ASAS, KEDUDUKAN DAN LAMBANG PARTAI  
Pasal 1  
Nama dan Pendirian  
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Partai ini bernama Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. Didirikan di Jakarta pada hari Sabtu, 
tanggal 9 Jumadil Ula 1423 H bertepatan dengan tanggal 20 April 2002 M.  
Pasal 2  
Asas  
Islam.  
 
Pasal 3  
Kedudukan  
1. Pusat Partai berkedudukan di ibu kota negara Republik Indonesia.  
2. Pusat partai dapat dipindahkan dalam kondisi tertentu atas keputusan 
Majelis Syuro.  
3. Partai dapat membuka cabang-cabang di seluruh wilayah hukum negara 
Republik Indonesia dan perwakilan di luar negeri bagi Warga Negara 
Indonesia.  
Pasal 4  
Lambang  
Gambar dua bulan sabit dengan untaian padi tegak lurus ditengah berwarna kuning 
emas dalam perisai segi empat persegi panjang berwarna hitam bergambar Ka’bah. 
Di bagian atas tertulis PARTAI KEADILAN dan bagian dalam kotak Ka’bah 
tertulis SEJAHTERA berwarna kuning emas.  
Bab 2  
TUJUAN DAN USAHA  
Pasal 5  
Tujuan  
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera adalah Partai Da'wah yang bertujuan mewujudkan 
masyarakat yang adil dan sejahtera yang diridlai Allah Subhanahu Wata'ala, dalam 
negara kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang berdasarkan Pancasila.  
Pasal 6  
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Usaha  
Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut diusahakanlah hal-hal sebagai berikut :  
1. Membebaskan bangsa Indonesia dari segala bentuk kezaliman.  
2. Membina masyarakat Indonesia menjadi masyarakat Islami.  
3. Mempersiapkan bangsa Indonesia agar mampu menjawab berbagai 
problema dan tuntutan masa mendatang.  
4. Membangun sistem kehidupan bermasyarakat dan bernegara yang sesuai 
dengan nilai-nilai Islam.  
5. Membangun negara Indonesia baru yang adil, sejahtera dan berwibawa .  
Bab 3 
KEANGGOTAAN  
Pasal 7  
Keanggotaan  
Setiap warga negara Indonesia dapat menjadi anggota partai.  
Bab 4 
STRUKTUR ORGANISASI  
Pasal 8  
Struktur Organisasi  
Organisasi tingkat pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera adalah sebagai berikut  
1. Majelis Syuro  
2. Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.  
3. Dewan Syari'ah Pusat  
4. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat  
5. Lembaga Kelengkapan Partai  
Pasal 9  
Masa Jabatan Pimpinan  
Batas maksimal jabatan Ketua Majelis Syuro, Ketua Majelis Pertimbangan Partai, 
Ketua Dewan Syari'ah Pusat dan Ketua Umum Partai adalah 2 (dua) periode.  
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Pasal 10 
Akhir Masa Jabatan Pimpinan  
1. Telah selesai menjalani masa jabatannya sesuai dengan masa kerja yang 
telah ditetapkan.  
2. Apabila tidak dapat lagi melaksanakan kewajiban-kewajibannya sebagai 
Pimpinan Partai , maka Majelis Syuro hendaknya mempelajari kondisi 
tersebut dan mengambil keputusan yang sesuai. Jika terlihat bahwa 
penghentian Pimpinan Partai tersebut akan membawa maslahat bagi Partai, 
maka hendaknya Majelis Syuro mengadakan pertemuan khusus untuk itu. 
Dan keputusan penghentian Pimpinan partai tersebut harus mendapatkan 
persetujuan lebih dari dua pertiga anggota Majelis Syuro.  
3. Apabila ada Pimpinan Partai mengajukan pengunduran dirinya, maka 
Majelis Syuro hendaklah mengundang anggotanya untuk mempelajari latar 
belakang pengunduran diri tersebut dan mengambil keputusan yang sesuai. 
Dan apabila yang bersangkutan mendesak mengundurkan diri maka 
pengunduran diri itu dapat diterima berdasarkan keputusan suara terbanyak 
secara mutlak anggota Majelis Syuro.  
4. Apabila terjadi kevakuman pada jabatan ketua dan wakil ketua Majelis 
Syuro dalam waktu yang sama, maka Majelis Syuro melakukan pemilihan 
penggantinya.  
5. Apabila Ketua Umum Partai meninggal dunia atau berhalangan tetap, maka 
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai menunjuk salah seorang Ketua Dewan 
Pimpinan Pusat untuk mengambil alih seluruh tugas dan wewenang Ketua 
Umum hingga Majelis Syuro menetapkan Ketua Umum baru.  
6. Apabila Ketua Dewan syari'ah Pusat meninggal dunia, maka wakilnya 
mengambil alih seluruh wewenangnya hingga habis masa jabatannya.  
7. Ketentuan lain yang terkait dan atau sejalan dengan pasal ini akan 
ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro Partai  
Bab 5  
MAJELIS SYURO  
Pasal 11 
Fungsi Majelis Syuro  
Majelis Syuro adalah lembaga tertinggi partai yang berfungsi sebagai Lembaga 
Ahlul Halli wal-Aqdi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.  
Pasal 12 
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Anggota Majelis Syuro  
1. Anggota Majelis Syuro terdiri dari sekurang-kurangnya tiga puluh lima 
orang yang dipilih melalui pemilihan raya yang melibatkan seluruh anggota 
kader inti partai.  
2. Pemilihan anggota Majelis Syuro dilakukan melalui pemilihaan raya yang 
penyelenggaraannya dengan membentuk kepanitiaan oleh Majelis Syuro 
yang sekurang-kurangnya terdiri dari: 
-Seorang ketua berasal dari anggota Majelis Syuro.  
-Seorang wakil ketua berasal dari anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat.  
-Seorang sekretaris berasal dari Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.  
-Dan beberapa orang anggota. 
3. Pengesahan dan pelantikan anggota Majelis Syuro terpilih dilakukan oleh 
Musyawarah Nasional.  
Pasal 13 
Tugas Majelis Syuro  
1. Majelis Syuro bertugas menyusun Visi dan Missi Partai, ketetapan-
ketetapan dan rekomendasi Musyawarah Nasional, dan memilih Pimpinan 
Pusat Partai serta keputusan-keputusan strategis lainnya.  
2. Membentuk Majelis Pertimbangan Partai sebagai Badan Pekerja Majelis 
Syuro dan Dewan Syari'ah Pusat.  
Bab 6  
MAJELIS PERTIMBANGAN PARTAI  
Pasal 14 
Tugas Majelis Pertimbangan Partai  
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai adalah lembaga pelaksana harian tugas-tugas Majelis 
Syuro, dalam hal mengawasi jalannya partai agar sesuai dengan tujuan-tujuan 
Partai, Ketetapan-Ketetapan yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Majelis Syuro dan 
Musyawarah Nasional.  
Bab 7  
DEWAN SYARI'AH  
Pasal 15 
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Struktur dan Anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat  
1. Jumlah anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat sebanyak-banyaknya sepertiga 
anggota Majelis Syuro.  
2. Ketua, Wakil Ketua dan beberapa orang anggota Dewan Syari'ah Pusat 
dipilih oleh Majelis Syuro dari anggotanya.  
3. Dewan Syari'ah diberi wewenang membentuk struktur kepengurusan, 
mengangkat Mudir Idarah dan melengkapi keanggotaannya.  
Pasal 16 
Struktur dan Anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah  
1. Jumlah anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah sekurang-kurangnya tiga orang.  
2. Ketua, Wakil Ketua dan anggota Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah dipilih oleh 
Musyawarah Wilayah.  
3. Struktur Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah sedapatnya mengikuti Dewan Syari'ah 
Pusat  
4. Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah diberi wewenang melengkapi keanggotaannya 
dan mengangkat Mudir Idarah.  
Pasal 17 
Tugas Dewan Syari'ah  
Dewan Syari'ah adalah lembaga fatwa dan qadha yang bertugas merumuskan 
landasan syar'i terhadap partai dalam melaksanakan aktifitasnya dan memberikan 
jawaban syar'i terhadap berbagai permasalahan yang dihadapi partai dan 
anggotanya serta masyarakat.  
Bab 8  
DEWAN PIMPINAN PUSAT  
Pasal 18 
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Pusat  
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Pusat sekurang-kurangnya beranggotakan sebagai 
berikut  
1. Ketua Umum  
2. Sekretaris Jendral.  
3. Bendahara Umum.  
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4. Departemen-departemen yang diperlukan.  
Pasal 19 
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.  
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat adalah lembaga tanfiziyah partai pada tingkat pusat yang 
bertugas melaksanakan kegiatan-kegiatan partai dengan masa kerja selama lima 
(5) tahun qomariyah.  
Bab 9  
STRUKTUR ORGANISASI WILAYAH, DAERAH,  
CABANG DAN RANTING  
Pasal 20 
Organisasi Tingkat Wilayah  
1. Organisasi Wilayah didirikan pada tingkat propinsi yang berkedudukan di 
ibukota propinsi.  
2. Struktur Organisasi tingkat wilayah terdiri dari Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah - 
Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.  
3. Besarnya lembaga atau badan-badan tersebut disesuaikan dengan 
kebutuhan wilayah.  
Pasal 21 
Organisasi Tingkat Daerah, Cabang Dan Ranting  
1. Dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat wilayah didirikan organisasi Daerah pada 
tingkat kabupaten / kotamadya yang berkedudukan di ibukota kabupaten / 
kotamadya.  
2. Dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat Daerah didirikan organaisasi cabang dan 
dalam lingkup organisasi tingkat cabang pada tingkat kecamatan didirikan 
organisasi Ranting.  
3. Struktur organisasi yang disebutkan ayat 1 dan 2 pasal ini disusun sesuai 
dengan Anggaran Rumah Tangga.  
Bab 10  
FORUM PENGAMBILAN KEBIJAKAN  
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Pasal 22 
Musyawarah  
1. Musyawarah adalah forum pengambilan kebijakan yang diselenggarakan 
oleh semua elemen struktural Partai Keadilan Sejahtera.  
2. Jenis dan jenjang musyawarah diatur dengan ketentuan tersendiri yang 
ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.  
Pasal 23 
Musyawarah Nasional  
Musyawarah Nasional adalah pemegang kekuasaan tertinggi Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera yang diselenggarakan oleh Majelis Syuro.  
Bab 11  
KEUANGAN  
Pasal 24 
Sumber Keuangan  
Keuangan partai terdiri dari sumber-sumber berikut :  
1. Iuran rutin anggota.  
2. Sumbangan dan hibah dari para anggota dan simpatisan  
3. Sumber-sumber lain yang halal dan tidak mengikat.  
Bab 12  
HUBUNGAN KEORGANISASIAN  
Pasal 25 
Hubungan dan Koalisi Partai  
1. Ummat Islam Indonesia merupakan bagian dari ummat Islam sedunia. 
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera sebagai Partai Da'wah menyatakan dirinya 
merupakan bagian tak terpisahkan dari gerakan da'wah di berbagai 
kawasan dunia.  
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2. Untuk merealisasikan kemaslahatan ummat dan bangsa, Partai melakukan 
hubungan baik dan kerjasama dengan berbagai pihak di dalam maupun di 
luar negeri.  
3. Majelis Syuro adalah lembaga yang berwenang memutuskan koalisi partai 
dengan partai atau organisasi lain.  
Pasal 26 
Hubungan Antar Struktur  
Hubungan antar lembaga-lembaga partai tingkat pusat dan lembaga-lembaga partai 
tingkat pusat dengan lembaga-lembaga di bawahnya diatur dalam Anggaran 
Rumah Tangga.  
Bab 13  
KETENTUAN PENUTUP  
Pasal 27 
Perubahan Anggaran Dasar  
Perubahan Anggaran Dasar dilakukan sebagai berikut:  
1. Permintaan perubahan berikut alasan-alasannya diajukan melalui 
mekanisme struktural kepada Majelis Syuro untuk dinilai kelayakannya.  
2. Pengubahan dianggap sah bila disetujui oleh dua pertiga anggota Majelis 
Syuro.  
Pasal 28 
Ketentuan Anggaran Rumah Tangga  
1. Hal-hal yang belum ditetapkan dalam Anggaran Dasar ini diatur dalam 
Anggaran Rumah Tangga.  
2. Anggaran Rumah Tangga adalah tafsir dan penjabaran Anggaran Dasar 
yang direkomendasikan oleh Majelis Syuro.  
 
Pasal 29 
Pengesahan Anggaran Dasar  
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1. Anggaran Dasar ini disahkan oleh Majelis Syuro Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
berdasarkan Rapat Pendirian Partai tanggal 24 Maret 2002  
2. Anggaran Dasar ini berlaku sementara sejak tanggal ditetapkan sampai 
diselenggarakannya Musyawarah Nasional Pertama.  
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APPENDIX 4 
ANGGARAN RUMAH TANGGA 
 
PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA 
BAB 1  
TAFSIR LAMBANG PARTAI  
Pasal 1  
Arti Lambang Partai  
Bentuk lambang partai memiliki arti sebagai berikut :  
1. Kotak persegi empat berarti kesetaraan, keteraturan dan keserasian.  
2. Kotak hitam berarti pusat peradaban dunia Islam yakni Ka’bah  
3. Bulan sabit berarti lambang kemenangan Islam, dimensi waktu, keindahan, 
kebahagiaan, pencerahan dan kesinambungan sejarah.  
4. Untaian padi tegak lurus berarti keadilan, ukhuwah, istiqomah, berani dan 
ketegasan yang mewujudkan keejahteraan.  
Warna lambang partai memiliki arti sebagai berikut :  
1. Putih berarti bersih dan kesucian.  
2. Hitam berarti aspiratif dan kepastian.  
3. Kuning emas berarti kecermelangan, kegembiraan dan kejayaan.  
Pasal 2  
Makna Lambang Partai  
Makna lambang partai secara keseluruhan adalah menegakkan nilai-nilai keadilan 
berlandaskan pada kebenaran, persaudaraan dan persatuan menuju kesejahteraan 
dan kejayaan ummat dan bangsa.  
Bab 2  
SASARAN DAN SARANA.  
Pasal 3  
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Sasaran  
Untuk mencapai tujuan partai dirumuskan sasaran berikut :  
1. Terwujudnya pemerintahan yang jujur, bersih, berwibawa, dan 
bertanggung jawab berdasarkan nilai-nilai kebenaran dan keadilan.  
2. Tegaknya 'Masyarakat Islami' yang memiliki kemandirian berdasarkan 
sebuah konstitusi yang menjamin hak-hak rakyat dan bangsa Indonesia.  
Sasaran partai yang dimaksud ayat (1) pasal ini diupayakan dalam bingkai 
Kebijakan Dasar Periodik dan Agenda Nasional Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, yang 
merupakan bagian tak terpisahkan dari Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah 
Tangga Ini.  
Pasal 4  
Sarana dan Prasarana  
Dalam mewujudkan tujuan dan sasarannya partai menggunakan cara, sarana dan 
prasarana yang tidak bertentangan dengan norma-norma hukum dan kemaslahatan 
umum, antara lain:  
1. Seluruh sarana dan manajemen politik, ekonomi, sosial, budaya dan IPTEK 
yang dapat mengarahkan dan mengatur kehidupan masyarakat serta dapat 
menyelesaikan permasalahan-pernasalahannya.  
2. Ikut serta dalam lembaga-lembaga pemerintahan, badan-badan penentu 
kebijakan, hukum dan perundang-undangan, lembaga swadaya masyarakat, 
dan lain sebagainya.  
3. Menggalakkan dialog konstruktif disertai argumentasi yang kuat dengan 
semua kekuatan politik dan sosial.  
4. Aktif berpartisipasi dalam berbagai lembaga dan organisasi serta yayasan 
yang sesuai dengan tujuan partai.  
Bab 3  
KEANGGOTAAN  
Pasal 5  
Sistem dan Prosedur Keanggotaan  
Anggota Partai Keadilan Sejahtera terdiri dari :  
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1. Anggota Kader Pendukung, yaitu mereka yang terlibat aktif mendukung 
setiap kegiatan kepartaian.  
2. Anggota Kader Inti, yaitu anggota yang telah mengikuti berbagai kegiatan 
pelatihan kepartaian dan dinyatakan lulus oleh panitia penseleksian.  
3. Anggota Kehormatan yaitu mereka yang berjasa dalam perjuangan partai 
dan dikukuhkan oleh Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.  
Sistem dan prosedur keanggotaan serta hal-hal yang terkait dengan keanggotaan 
partai diatur dalam ketentuan tersendiri yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.  
Bab 4  
MAJELIS SYURO  
Pasal 6  
Anggota Majelis Syuro  
1. Syarat keanggotaan Majelis Syuro sebagai berikut:  
a.Umur tidak kurang dari 30 tahun qomariyah  
b.Telah menjadi anggota kader inti dengan status anggota ahli  
Partai  
c.Melaksanakan asas dan tujuan partai  
d.Komitmen dengan kewajiban-kewajiban anggota  
e.Berkelakuan baik dan tidak mendapatkan sangsi dalam 3 tahun terakhir.  
f.Berwawasan syar’i.  
g. Bersifat amanah dan berwibawa  
2. Jika ada anggota Majelis Syuro berhalangan tetap maka majelis berhak 
mengangkat dan mensahkan pengantinya.  
3. Majelis Syuro berhak menambah keanggotaannya dengan orang-orang 
yang dibutuhkan oleh Partai, terdiri dari para pakar dan tokoh dengan 
catatan tambahan itu tidak lebih dari 15 % anggotanya.  
4. Jika anggota Majelis Syuro telah dipilih, maka masing-masing 
mengucapkan janji setianya di hadapan Musyawarah Nasional, dengan 
bunyi sebagai berikut:  
 
'Saya berjanji kepada Allah yang Maha Agung untuk berpegang teguh 
pada syari'at Islam dan untuk berjihad di jalan-Nya, menunaikan syarat-
syarat keanggotaan Majelis Syuro Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, melak 
sanakan tugas-tugas darinya dan untuk mendengar serta taat kepada 
pemimpinnya dalam keadaan lapang maupun sempit -selain untuk maksiat-
, sekuat tenaga melaksanakannya. Dan saya bersumpah kepada Pengurus 
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Majelis Syura untuk itu, dan Allah menjadi saksi atas apa yang saya 
ucapkan.  
Pasal 7  
Tugas Majelis Syuro  
1. Memilih dan menetapkan Ketua majelis, Wakilnya dan SekretarisMajelis 
dan menetapkannya sebangai ketua, wakil dan sekretaris Majelis 
Pertimbangan Partai.  
2. Memilih dan menetapkan anggota Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.  
3. Memilih, dan menetapkan Ketua, Wakil dan Anggota Dewan Syari'ah 
Pusat  
4. Memilih, dan menetapkan Ketua Umum, para Ketua, Sekretaris Jendral 
dan Bendahara Umum serta beberapa orang Anggota Dewan Pimpinan 
Pusat.  
5. Menyusun tujuan-tujuan Partai, keputusan-keputusan dan rekomendasi 
Musyawarah Nasional.  
6. Menetapkan klausul-klausul perubahan Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah 
Tangga (AD/ ART) dan kebijakan politik.  
7. Menetapkan anggaran tahunan dan evaluasi akhir dari laporan keuangan.  
8. Menetapkan rencana kerja periodik partai, dan mengawasi serta 
mengevaluasi pelaksanaannya.  
9. Mengambil sikap tegas dan bijak dalam hal pencemaran nama baik, kritik, 
pengaduan, dan tuduhan-tuduhan yang berkaitan dengan partai.  
Bab 5  
MAJELIS PERTIMBANGAN PARTAI  
Pasal 8  
Anggota Majelis Pertimbangan Partai  
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai terdiri dari sebanyak-banyaknya sepertiga anggota 
Majelis Syuro yang dipilih oleh Majelis Syuro dari anggotanya.  
Pasal 9  
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai  
1. Menjabarkan ketetapan-ketetapan Musyawarah Nasional dan Majelis 
Syuro  
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2. Mengarahkan dan mengawasi pelaksanaan ketetapan-ketetapan 
Musyawarah Nasional dan Majelis Syuro  
3. Menentukan sikap Partai terhadap permasalahan-permasalahan umum dan 
perubahan-perubahan politik secara regional, dunia Islam atau 
internasional bersama Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.  
4. Mempersiapkan penyelenggaraan Musyawarah Nasional dan Sidang-
sidang Majelis Syuro.  
5. Merekomendasikan kebijakan program pemilihan umum dan melegalisir 
calon-calon partai untuk Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat.  
6. Menunjuk perwakilan (wakil) Partai pada lembaga-lembaga, organisasi dan 
kongres-kongres di dalam dan luar negeri bersama Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.  
7. Meratifikasi langkah-langkah yang terarah untuk melaksanakan program 
kerja politik (strategis).  
8. Meratifikasi anggaran proyek yang diajukan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 
sebelum diajukan ke Majelis Syuro.  
9. Meratifikasi pengajuan struktur dan personil Bidang Dewan Pimpinan 
Pusat.  
10. Mengambil tindakan tegas dalam hal fitnah, kritik, aduan, dan tuduhan 
yang berkaitan dengan partai dan anggotanya.  
11. Mejelis berhak membentuk komisi ad-hoc yang terdiri dari unsur anggota 
Majelis Syuro dan pakar-pakar sesuai dengan bidangnya.  
Bab 6  
DEWAN SYARI'AH  
Pasal 10 
Syarat Anggota Dewan Syari'ah  
1. Umur Ketua dan wakil ketua Dewan Syari'ah Pusat tidak kurang dari 35 
tahun qomariyah.  
2. Umur Ketua dan Wakil ketua Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah tidak kurang dari 
30 tahun qomariyah.  
3. Telah menjadi kader inti partai dengan status anggota ahli Partai.  
4. Berpegang dan komitmen kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran 
universal, adil, bertaqwa, sabar, jujur dan bijaksana.  
5. Memiliki pengetahuan hukum-hukum syariat yang memadai, bersifat 
amanah dan berwibawa.  
6. Memiliki pengetahuan di Bidang peradilan dan menguasai mekanisme 
pengambilan keputusan.  
Pasal 11 
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Fungsi Dewan Syari'ah  
1. Sebagai Lembaga Fatwa.  
2. Sebagai Lembaga Qadha yang keputusan-keputusannya mengikat.  
3. Pelaksana tugas-tugas khusus yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.  
4. Lembaga Peradilan Banding.  
Pasal 12 
Tugas dan Wewenang Dewan Syari'ah  
1. Memberikan landasan syar'i terhadap kebijakan-kebijakan dan persoalan-
persoalan yang dihadapi partai.  
2. Melakukan pembinaan terhadap Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah.  
3. Melakukan kajian terhadap perkara-perkara yang tidak terselesaikan di 
Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah.  
4. Melakukan investigasi terhadap isu, pengaduan, tuduhan, evaluasi dan 
kesewenangan yang berkaitan dengan Pimpinan Partai dan 
mengungkapkan hasilnya kepada Majelis Syuro. Khusus yang berkenaan 
dengan Ketua Umum Partai atau Ketua Majelis Syuro atau Ketua Majelis 
Pertimbangan Partai atau Ketua Dewan Syari'ah Pusat untuk kasus yang 
menyangkut dirinya dilakukan oleh komisi khusus yang dibentuk oleh 
Majelis Syuro.  
5. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, atau Dewan Syari'ah Wilayah kepadanya.  
6. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Syari'ah Pusat 
kemudian mengajukannya kepada Majelis Syuro.  
7. Mengajukan laporan kerja setiap dua bulan kepada Majelis Syuro.  
Pasal 13 
Klasifikasi Pelanggaran dan Hukuman  
1. Setiap perbuatan anggota yang menodai citra partai atau bertentangan 
dengan prinsip-prinsip kebenaran dan Anggaran Dasar atau Anggaran 
Rumah Tangga partai adalah pelanggaran yang harus dikenakan sangsi 
hukum.  
2. Klasifikasi pelanggaran berikut hukuman dan cara pelaksanaannya, di atur 
oleh ketentuan Dewan Syari'ah yang ditetapkan oleh Majelis Syuro.  
Bab 7  
TUGAS DEWAN PIMPINAN PUSAT  
Pasal 14 :  
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Tugas Konsepsional  
1. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 
dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukannya 
kepada Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.  
2. Mengajukan rancangan perubahan Anggaran Dasar/Anggaran Rumah 
Tangga kepada Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.  
3. Menetapkan Produk-produk konsepsional untuk Bidang-bidang tugas dan 
lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya.  
Pasal 15 
Tugas Stuktural  
1. Menerima waqaf, hibah dan dana sukarela yang legal.  
2. Menyerahkan laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir kepada Majelis 
Pertimbangan Partai.  
3. Mengusulkan daftar nama calon sementara anggota legislatif kepada 
Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.  
4. Mengajukan laporan kerja setiap dua bulan kepada Majelis Syuro.  
Pasal 16 
Tugas Manajerial  
1. Menunjuk ketua-ketua Bidang dengan persetujuan Majelis Pertimbangan 
Partai.  
2. Memimpin, mengesahkan dan mengawasi lembaga-lembaga struktural di 
bawahnya.  
3. Membentuk dan mengkoordinasikan lembaga-lembaga pendukung partai.  
4. Mensahkan struktur kepengurusan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah  
5. Mengawasi dan mengevaluasi pelaksanaan program kerja tahunan  
6. Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah dan lembaga terkait lainnya.  
Pasal 17 
Tugas Operasional  
1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah 
Nasional dan Majelis Syuro.  
2. Menerbitkan pernyataan-pernyatan resmi.  
3. Mempersiapkan kader partai dalam berbagai Bidang.  
4. Melaksanakan koordinasi anggota legislatif, eksekutif dan yudikatif yang 
berasal dari anggota kader partai.  
 196 
Bab 8  
DEWAN PIMPINAN WILAYAH  
Pasal 18 
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah  
Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah adalah lembaga eksekutif tingkat propinsi yang 
berkedudukan di ibukota propinsi dengan struktur sebagai berikut :  
1. Ketua Umum dan beberapa ketua.  
2. Sekretaris dan wakil sekretaris  
3. Bendahara dan wakil bendahara  
4. Deputi-deputi.  
Pasal 19 
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah  
1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah 
Wilayah dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.  
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah 
dan lembaga-lembaga strutural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukan kepada 
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.  
3. Memimpin, mengesahkan dan mengawasi lembaga-lembaga struktural di 
bawahnya.  
4. Menyiapkan laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya 
kepada Musyawarah Wilayah dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.  
5. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Wilayah sesuai dengan ketentuan 
yang terkait dengan hal tersebut.  
6. Mengajukan laporan kerja secara terperinci setiap tiga bulan kepada Dewan 
Pimpinan Pusat.  
Pasal 20 
Syarat-syarat Ketua Umum dan Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah  
1. Telah menjadi kader inti partai dengan status anggota ahli.  
2. Berpegang teguh kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran, adil, bertaqwa 
dan kuat dalam (membela) kebenaran, serius dalam kemaslahatan dan 
persatuan bangsa, jauh dari fanatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.  
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syari&#146;at yang 
memungkinkannya melaksanakan tugas.  
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4. Umur tidak kurang dari 25 tahun qomariyah.  
Bab 9  
DEWAN PIMPINAN DAERAH  
Pasal 21 
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Daerah  
Dewan Pimpinan Daerah didirikan pada tingkat kabupaten/kotamadya yang 
berkedudukan di ibukota kabupaten/kotamadya dengan struktur sebagai berikut  
1. Ketua Umum dan beberapa ketua.  
2. Sekretaris dan wakil sekretaris  
3. Bendahara dan wakil bendahara  
4. Bagian-Bagian.  
Pasal 22 
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Daerah  
1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah 
Daerah dan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.  
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Daerah 
dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukan 
kepada Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.  
3. Memimpin, mengesahkan dan mengawasi lembaga-lembaga struktural di 
bawahnya.  
4. Menyusun laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya 
kepada Musyawarah Daerah.  
5. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Daerah sesuai dengan ketentuan 
yang terkait dengan hal tersebut.  
6. Mengajukan laporan kerja secara terperinci setiap tiga bulan kepada Dewan 
Pimpinan Wilayah.  
Pasal 23 
Syarat-syarat Ketua Umum dan Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Daerah  
1. Telah menjadi kader inti partai yang sekurang-kurangnya dengan status 
anggota dewasa.  
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2. Berpegang teguh kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran, adil, bertaqwa 
dan kuat dalam (membela) kebenaran, serius dalam kemaslahatan dan 
persatuan bangsa, jauh dari fanatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.  
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syari’at yang memungkinkannya 
melaksanakan tugas.  
4. Umur tidak kurang dari 25 tahun qomariyah.  
Bab 10  
DEWAN PIMPINAN CABANG  
Pasal 24 
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Cabang  
Dewan Pimpinan Cabang didirikan pada tingkat kecamatan yang berkedudukan di 
ibukota kecamatan dengan struktur sebagai berikut  
1. Ketua dan Wakil ketua.  
2. Sekretaris dan wakil sekretaris  
3. Bendahara dan wakil bendahara  
4. Seksi-Seksi.  
Pasal 25 
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Cabang  
1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah 
Cabang dan Dewan Pimpinan Daerah.  
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Cabang 
dan lembaga-lembaga struktural di bawahnya kemudian mengajukan 
kepada Dewan Pimpinan Daerah.  
3. Memimpin, mengesahkan dan mengawasi lembaga-lembaga struktural di 
bawahnya.  
4. Menyusun laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya 
kepada Musyawarah Cabang.  
5. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Cabang sesuai dengan ketentuan 
yang terkait dengan hal tersebut.  
6. Mengajukan laporan kerja secara terperinci setiap tiga bulan kepada Dewan 
Pimpinan Daerah.  
Pasal 26 
Syarat Ketua dan Wakil Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Cabang  
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1. Telah menjadi kader inti partai yang sekurang-kurangnya dengan status 
anggota madya.  
2. Berpegang teguh kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran, adil, bertaqwa 
dan kuat dalam (membela) kebenaran, serius dalam kemaslahatan dan 
persatuan bangsa, jauh dari fanatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.  
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syariat yang memungkinkannya 
melaksanakan tugas.  
4. Umur tidak kurang dari 20 tahun qomariyah.  
Bab 11 
DEWAN PIMPINAN RANTING  
Pasal 27 
Struktur Dewan Pimpinan Ranting  
Dewan Pimpinan Ranting didirikan pada tingkat kelurahan/desa dengan struktur 
kepengurusan sebagai berikut :  
1. Ketua dan Wakil ketua.  
2. Sekretaris dana wakil sekretaris  
3. Bendahara dan wakil bendahara  
4. Unit-Unit.  
Pasal 28 
Tugas Dewan Pimpinan Ranting  
1. Melaksanakan kebijakan-kebijakan yang ditetapkan oleh Musyawarah 
Ranting dan Dewan Pimpinan Cabang.  
2. Menyusun program dan anggaran tahunan untuk Dewan Pimpinan Ranting 
kemudian mengajukan kepada Dewan Pimpinan Cabang.  
3. Menyiapkan laporan keuangan dan evaluasi akhir dan mengajukannya 
kepada Musyawarah Ranting.  
4. Menyusun sidang-sidang Musyawarah Ranting sesuai dengan ketentuan 
yang terkait dengan hal tersebut.  
5. Mengajukan laporan kerja secara terperinci setiap tiga bulan kepada Dewan 
Pimpinan Cabang.  
Pasal 29 
Syarat-syarat Ketua dan Wakil Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Ranting  
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1. Telah menjadi kader pendukung partai dengan status anggota muda.  
2. Berpegang teguh kepada nilai-nilai moral dan kebenaran, adil, bertaqwa 
dan kuat dalam (membela) kebenaran, serius dalam kemaslahatan dan 
persatuan bangsa, jauh dari anatisme kepentingan pribadi dan golongan.  
3. Memiliki wawasan politik, hukum dan syariat yang memungkinkannya 
melaksanakan tugas.  
4. Umur tidak kurang dari 18 tahun qomariyah.  
Bab 12  
KEUANGAN  
Pasal 30 
Sumber Keuangan  
Kekayaan Partai diperoleh dari:  
1. Iuran, infaq wajib, dan shadaqah yang berasal dari anggota.  
2. Infaq dan shadaqah dari luar anggota.  
3. Sumbangan dan bantuan tetap atau tidak tetap dari masyarakat atau orang-
orang atau badan-badan yang menaruh minat pada aktifitas Partai yang 
bersifat sukarela dan tidak mengikat.  
4. Waqaf, wasiat dan hibah-hibah lainnya.  
Pasal 31 
Pemungutan Iuran dan Infaq Anggota  
Partai mempunyai hak untuk mengambil iuran, infaq dan shadaqah dari 
anggotanya.  
Pasal 32 
Penyaluran/Pengalokasian Dana 
1. Partai mempunyai hak untuk menentukan penyaluran dan atau 
pengalokasian dana Partai.  
2. Dana Partai yang tidak segera digunakan untuk kepentingan aktifitas 
Partai, pengaturannya ditentukan oleh Majelis Syuro.  
Pasal 33 
Tugas Bendahara Partai 
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1. Mengatur kekayaan Partai.  
2. Mencatat semua harta Partai dan membukukan pengeluaran dan 
pemasukannya.  
3. Mengawasi semua jenis kegiatan keuangan dan akuntansinya serta 
melaporkannya kepada Dewan Pimpinan Pusat secara periodik.  
4. Menyusun anggaran dan penyiapan evaluasi akhir.  
Bab 13  
HUBUNGAN KEORGANISASIAN  
Pasal 34 
Asas Hubungan Keorganisasian  
1. Hubungan dengan oragisasi yang sejenis baik vertikal maupun horizontal 
atas asas wala' dan ta'awun.  
2. Hubungan dengan organisasi Islam atas asas ukhuwah dan ta'awun.  
3. Hubungan dengan organisasi umum atas asas kemanusiaan dan 
kemaslahatan umum yang dibenarkan Islam.  
Pasal 35 
Hubungan Antar Struktur 
1. Hubungan lembaga tertinggi partai dengan lembaga-lembaga di bawahnya 
bersifat langsung.  
2. Hubungan antar lembaga tinggi partai tingkat pusat bersifat langsung, 
melalui Pimpinan masing-masing.  
3. Hubungan lembaga tinggi partai dengan lembaga organisasi partai tingkat 
wilayah bersifat langsung sesuai tingkat wewenangnya.  
4. Hubungan departemen di Dewan Pimpinan Pusat dengan deputi terkait di 
Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah bersifat langsung sesuai tingkat wewenang dan 
kebutuhan, dengan sepengetahuan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.  
5. Apabila departemen di Dewan Pimpinan Pusat tidak mempunyai 
turunannya di Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah maka departemen tersebut dapat 
berkoordinasi dengan Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah.  
6. Hubungan antar pimpinan partai tingkat wilayah dengan struktur di 
bawahnya, mengikuti pola hubungan antar level kepemimpinan partai 
seperti tersebut dalam ayat 2 sampai dengan 5 pasal ini.  
7. Hubungan lembaga-lembaga struktural di tingkat bawah dengan lembaga-
lembaga di atasnya mengikuti mekanisme struktural yang telah ditetapkan.  
Bab 14  
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KETENTUAN TAMBAHAN  
Pasal 36 
Ketentuan Tambahan 
1. Untuk memperluas jaringan kerja dan menampung aspirasi pendukung 
partai, maka:  
- Dewan Pimpinan Pusat dapat membentuk kepengurusan Majelis 
Kehormatandan Dewan Pakar,  
- Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah dapat membentuk kepengurusan Dewan Pakar,  
- Dewan Pimpinan Daerah dapat membentuk kepengurusan Dewan 
Penasehat, dan  
- Dewan Pimpinan Cabang dapat membentuk kepengurusan Dewan 
Pembina, yang diatur oleh peraturan khusus yang ditetapkan Majelis Syuro.  
2. Apabila persyaratan kepengurusan tingkat Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah, 
Dewan Pimpinan Daerah serta kelengkapan strukturnya tidak terpenuhi, 
maka dimungkinkan pembentukan struktur dan pengangkatan kader dari 
jenjang keanggotaan di bawahnya, dengan sepengetahuan Dewan Pimpinan 
Pusat dan Majelis Pertimbangan Partai.  
3. Apabila persyaratan kepengurusan tingkat Dewan Pimpinan Cabang, 
Dewan Pimpinan Ranting serta kelengkapan strukturnya tidak terpenuhi, 
maka dimungkinkan pembentukan struktur dan pengangkatan kader dari 
jenjang keanggotaan di bawahnya, dengan sepengetahuan Dewan Pimpinan 
Wilayah dan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat.  
4. Didirikan perwakilan Partai di kalangan warga negara Indonesia di luar 
negeri sesuai dengan peraturan khusus yang diterbitkan Dewan Pimpinan 
Pusat dengan memperhatikan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku 
di negara bersangkutan.  
Bab 15  
KETENTUAN PENUTUP  
Pasal 37 
Penutup 
Dalam hal belum dilaksanakannya Musyawarah Nasional I, maka para pendiri 
partai bertindak dan melaksanakan tugas selaku Majelis Syuro. 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Susunan Pengurus Pusat PKS 2005-2010 
 
 
 
Ketua Majelis Syuro / Ketua Lembaga Tinggi Partai : K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin. 
Presiden Partai : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring. Sekretaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta 
Lc. Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfud Abdurrahman. Badan Pemenangan Pemilu : 
H.M. Razikun, Ak, MS. Ketua : DR. H. Surahman Hidayat. 
 
Lembaga Tinggi Partai  
 
Ketua Majelis Syuro / Ketua Lembaga Tinggi Partai : K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin 
 
Mas’ul Maktab Hay-ah Syar’iyyah/Ketua Dewan Syariah Pusta : Drs. H. Suharna 
Surapranata, MT. 
 
Mas’ul Maktab Tanfidzi/Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Pusat/Presiden Partai : Ir. H. 
Tifatul Sembiring 
 
Aminul ‘Aam/Sekretariat Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta 
 
Amin Maali / Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfudz Abdurrahman 
 
Badan-Badan di Lembaga Tinggi Partai :  
Badan Pertimbangan Tugas dan Jabatan : ex officio 
Ketua : Drs. H. Suharna Supranata, MT.  
Anggota : Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Kader, Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah, 
Wilda terkait, Ketua Departemen Kaderisasi, Sekjen, Wasekjen Bidang 
Organisasi. 
 
Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisasi : ex officio 
 
Ketua : H. Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, MA 
Anggota : Ketua Wilayah Dakwah terkait, Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah, 
Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Kader, Ket.Dept. Kaderisasi, Sekjen, MPP. 
 
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat 
 
Presiden Partai : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring 
 
Sekretaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta Lc. 
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Wakil Sekjen I : Ir. H. Suswono, MMA. 
Wakil Sekjen II : Ir. Ade Barkah 
Wakil Sekjen III : Ir. Aboe Bakar Alhabsy 
Wakil Sekjen IV : Dr. Mardani 
Wakil Sekjen V : H. Fahri Hamzah, SE. 
Wakil Sekjen VI : Nurhasan Zaidi, S.Sos.I 
Wakil Sekjen VII : Riko Desendra : SSI. 
 
 
Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfud Abdurrahman 
Bendahara I : P. Edy Kuncoro 
Bendahara II : Masfuri, Ak. 
Bendahara III : Taruna Wiyasa 
Bendahara IV : H. Kiemas Taufik 
Bendahara V : H. Didin Amaruddin, Ak.  
 
Bidang Pembinaan Kader : Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc 
Departemen Kaderisasi : Abdul Muiz, MA 
Departemen Dakwah : Thahhah Nuhin, Lc. 
Departemen MDI (Ma’hid dan Dirosah Islamiyyah) Samin Barkah, Lc 
 
Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah : H. Aus Hidayat Nur 
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Sumbagut : Drs. Chairul Anwar, Apt. 
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Sumbagsel : Drs. M. Syahfan Badri  
Departemen Wilayah DakwahBanten, DKI Jakarta, Jawa Barat : Ir. Syamsu Hilal 
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Jawa Tengah dan Jogjakarta : Zubeir Syafawi, SH.I 
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Jawa Timur dan Bali : Ir. Sigit Sosiantomo 
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Kalimantan : Abdurrohman Amin 
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Maluku, Maluku Utara, Irian : Ahmad Zaki, Ak. 
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah Sulawesi : drs. Cahyadi Takariawan, Apt. 
Departemen Wilayah Dakwah NTB, NTT : Triono, SH. 
 
Bidang Kewanitaan : Ledia Hanifa, MS 
Departemen Kajian Wanita : dra. Sri Utami, MM 
Departemen Jaringan Lembaga Wanita : Netti Prasetyani 
Departemen Pemberdayaan Wanita : Dwi Septiawati 
 
Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat : drs. H. Musholi 
Departemen Pendidikan dan SDM : drs. Fahmi Alaydroes, Psi, MM, Med. 
Departemen Kesehatan dan Sosial : dr. H. Agoes Koos Hartoro 
Departemen Kemahasiswaan : Ahmad Ariyandra, Ak. 
Departemen Seni dan Budaya : H. M. Ridwan 
 
Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan (POLHUKAM) : Ir. H. Untung Wahono, 
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Msi. 
Departemen Politik dan Hankam : drs. H. Almuzammil Yusuf 
Departemen Hukum dan HAM : Fitra Arsil, SH, MH. 
Departemen Pemerintahan dan Otonomi Daerah : Achyar Eldine, SE,MM 
 
Bidang Ekonomi, Keuangan, Industri dan Teknologi (EKUINTEK): DR. 
Mohammad Sohibul Iman 
Departemen Ekonomi, Keuangan, Perbankan : Sigit Pramono, SE,MSE. 
Departemen Pembinaan UKM : Ir. H. Ruly Tisna Yuliansyah  
Departemen Teknologi, Industri, LH : DR. Edi Syukur 
Departemen Buruh Tani, Nelayan : Edy Zannur, MSAE. 
 
Bidang Pembinaan Pemuda : Ir. Ahmad Faradis 
Departemen Kepeloporan Pemuda: Slamet Nurdin 
Departemen Kepanduan : Cahya Zailani 
Departemen Olahraga : Unggul Wibawa 
 
 
Badan-Badan di Bawah DPP  
 
Badan Pemenangan Pemilu : H.M. Razikun, Ak, MS. 
Badan Legislatif : Hermanto, SE, MM. 
Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan, drs. H. Mahfudz Siddiq, MSE. 
Badan Hubungan Luar Negeri : H. Lutfi Hasan Ishaq, MA 
 
Dewan Syariah Pusat  
Ketua : DR. H. Surahman Hidayat 
Amin Maktab (Mudir Idarah) : H. Bukhari Yusuf, MA. 
Amin Mali : H. Kastiri 
 
Laznah Qadha :  
Amin Lajnah (Panitera) : drs. Muhroni 
Anggota : DR.H. Muslih A. Karim, Dr. H. Mu’inuddin, H. Abdul Hasyib Hasan, 
Lc, H. Amang Syarifuddin, Lc, Msi. 
 
Lajnah Tahqiq : 
Koordinator : H. Iskan Qolban Lubis, MA. 
Anggota : DR. H. Idris Abdu Shamad , H. Aunurafiq Saleh Tamhid, Lc, Hj. 
Herlini Amran, MA, Dra. Suzy Mardiani 
 
Lajnah Ifta  
Amin Lajnah : Harjani Hefni, MA 
Anggota : DR. H. Muslih Abdul Karim, DR. H. Muiduddin, H. Abdul Hasib 
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